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I. FOUR ISSUES AND RESPONSES 
 
 How do American trade sanctions against Iran work?  Have they worked?  
Championed by six American Presidents and sixteen Sessions of Congress, these 
sanctions against Iran have spanned nearly forty years.  In that time, the bilateral 
relationship between the United States and Iran has been dreadful, with each side 
fixated on monstrosities perpetrated by the other: the 1953 coup d’état of a 
democratically-elected Iranian leader orchestrated by the United States; the 
subsequent American support for human rights abuses by the Peacock Throne; 
and the November 1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran by Iranian 
militants and subsequent state-sponsored terrorist atrocities.  
 To Iran, America became the “Great Satan” to be confronted wherever 
and whenever possible.  To the United States, Iran perpetrated “evil” and was to 
be targeted for sanctions.  American trade sanctions against Iran thus became, and 
continue to be, an important part of international trade law. Around the globe, 
practice in this field is touched by the dysfunctional relationship between the 
“Great Satan” and “Evil” Āyatollāhs. 
 The practical significance does not mean that the technical rules, or 
policy justifications for those rules, are easily or well understood.  The rules have 
become more intricate as they have evolved over nearly forty years.  The policies 
for them have been subject to polarizing debates.  Accordingly, four issues are 
addressed herein: 




(1)  What transactions with Iran are prohibited? 
(2)  What are the penalties for violating those prohibitions? 
(3)  What is the logic for the regime of prohibitions and sanctions? 
(4)  Have the sanctions worked? 
 
In addressing the first two issues, three points are clear. 
 First, as intimated, American trade rules against Iran are complex.  
Navigating them is not for the faint-hearted, but doing so is essential in the 
everyday practice of international trade law around the globe.  The sanctions 
cover not only trade in goods and services, but also foreign direct investment 
(FDI), transportation, banking, securities, and insurance.  
 Second, aside from their relevance, the American trade rules are a 
technically fascinating case study.  They were imposed against a country that 
accounts for one percent of the world’s population.2  They were imposed despite 
the fact that Iran has no misunderstanding about the objective power asymmetry, 
exemplified when its Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said in December 
2013 to students at Tehran University: “Do you think the U.S., which can destroy 
all our military systems with one bomb, is scared of our military system?”3  The 
trade sanctions have had a considerable, but imperfect, extraterritorial reach, not 
only affecting third party countries, but cajoling them (or trying to) into 
ostracizing Iran.  And, for critics and champions of the use of trade sanctions to 
effect political and national security goals in foreign countries, the case study of 
Iran gives both comfort and concern. 
 Third, Iran and third-party countries made clever adjustments to 
minimize, as best they could, adverse effects of the regime on them.  Given those 
adjustments, the regime had to evolve.  At inception, and for most of its life, it 
was not a comprehensive set of sanctions designed to put Iran, metaphorically 
speaking, in solitary confinement.  Rather, as the types of transactions barred grew, 
so did the penalties for violating those bars. 
 The third issue admits an unequivocal answer: the regime has always 
served the dual purpose of denying Iran the ability to acquire a weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD) and stopping it from supporting terrorist organizations.  As a 
victim of chemical weapons in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iran swore it had no 
interest in acquiring them.  Accordingly, the key concern of the United States was 
that Iran not get a nuclear device or the operational means to deliver that device. 
As for terrorist groups, the principal (but not only) one of interest was Hezbollah. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2  The population of Iran is nearly eighty million (as of July 2013).  See The World 
Factbook: Middle East; Iran, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).  The world 
population is 7.1 billion.  The World Factbook: World, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/xx.html (last visited Mar. 
8, 2014). 
3  Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Zarif Pressed by Iran Hardliners, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
2013, at 2. 
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 This answer begs two follow-up questions.  First, given that the rules of 
the regime evolved, did the rationale for the regime ever change?  While America 
never waivered in its two original purposes, deterrence with respect to WMDs and 
terrorism, it did add a third rationale.  Following the June 2009 to February 2010 
Green Revolution, the United States viewed deterrence of human rights abuses as 
a third basis for the regime. 
 Second, why was acquisition by Iran of a nuclear weapon, or support for 
Hezbollah, America’s problem?  Unlike North Korea, Iran did not threaten the 
United States with a nuclear attack, and while Hezbollah inflicted deadly blows to 
Americans, it did not do so on American soil.  The response – as politically 
incorrect as it may be to state – is that the primary threat was to Israel and Gulf 
Arab countries.  Reasonable minds can and do differ as to whether such a threat is 
so problematic to the United States that it justifies not only the regime, but also an 
American military strike against Iran. 
 A single, clear response to the fourth issue is difficult, perhaps even 
imprudent.  It is one of efficacy and should be dissected into three questions: 
 
(1) Were American trade sanctions against Iran necessary and sufficient 
to wreck the economy of Iran? 
(2) Were American trade sanctions necessary and sufficient to compel 
Iran to sign the November 2013 preliminary nuclear agreement? 
(3) Were American trade sanctions necessary and sufficient to achieve 
the three American policy goals for those sanctions, namely, to deny 
Iran a nuclear weapon, to convince Iran to cease support for 
international terrorism, and to promote human rights in Iran? 
 
Here the answers are, respectively, “no,” “it depends,” and “it is uncertain.” 
 Until the November 2013 preliminary nuclear deal, sanctions looked set 
to become an epic failure.  Iran met an ever more expansive and detailed array of 
American measures by spinning more centrifuges to enrich uranium.  Accordingly, 
American rules failed to bring about their stated goals.  The longer they dragged 
on, the more entrenched the two countries became.  Between 1996 and 2012, the 
United States increased the severity of its sanctions regime, widening the range of 
forbidden transactions and boosting the number of prohibited activities and 
penalties.  Concomitantly, the number of centrifuges spinning in Iranian nuclear 
facilities and the stockpile of highly enriched uranium grew, while terrorist acts 
continued, and the human rights environment changed minimally. 
 But, thanks to the November 2013 deal, sanctions one day may be 
viewed retrospectively as efficacious, because they appear to have played a 
necessary part in causing the economic collapse that resulted in its signing the 
November 2013 agreement.  In terms of the first question, it appeared sanctions 
were necessary, but not sufficient, to wreck the economy of Iran.  Sanctions could 
not have been sufficient, however, because they were not systematic or seamless 
from inception.  Instead, they were a confusing array of haphazard measures, 
mostly targeted at the Iranian energy sector, but with plenty of gaps that later 
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needed plugging.  Moreover, inefficient economic management and corruption in 
Iran were causal factors, without which the ever-more expansive and tighter 
regime might not have produced change. 
 On the second question, American and Iranian officials disagree on the 
role sanctions played in yielding the November 2013 accord.  That the response 
“depends on who is asked” is not surprising.  One side is eager to trumpet a 
foreign policy success, while the other seeks to show the world it was not cowed 
by foreign pressure.  As to the third question, whether the American measures 
were necessary and sufficient to achieve all three-policy goals is not certain.  Time 
will tell whether the net result of the sanctions is one the United States sought and 
with which Iran can live.  Here, then, is a case study with lessons about the past to 





 On November 4, 1979, Iranian protestors stormed the United States 
Embassy in Tehran, taking and holding hostage fifty-two American citizens for 
444 days.  Ten days after the Embassy seizure, U.S. President Jimmy Carter 
imposed trade sanctions against Iran.  Except for a six-year respite in the 1980s, 
America has imposed trade sanctions on Iran ever since.  This has been true 
regardless of who was President, and which political party held power in Congress. 
Simply put, for nearly forty years, America has had a sanctions-based trade policy 
toward Iran.  The template, conscious or not, for this policy may well have been 
Cuba.  Since 1961,4  American trade policy toward what President John F. 
Kennedy called “that imprisoned island” has been nothing but sanctions.5 
 That policy looked unsuccessful, or (to use a contemporary youthful 
colloquialism) appeared to be an epic failure.  American trade sanctions had not 
changed the behavior of Iran.6  Specifically, they had not achieved any of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  See COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 111ST CONG., OVERVIEW & COMPILATION OF U.S. 
TRADE STATUTES (Comm. Print 2013) [hereinafter OVERVIEW, PART I].  America’s trade 
embargo dates from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1)), and is explained in OVERVIEW, PART I at 267-70. 
5  John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on the 
Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba (Oct. 22, 1962), available at http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/ 
cmc/oct22/doc5.html. 
6 Hope springs eternal.  The election in June 2013 of a relatively pragmatic, 
reform-minded President, Hassan Rouhani, offers the possibility that Iran may be more 
transparent with the United States about the operation of its nuclear program.  It was Mr. 
Rouhani, a former nuclear negotiator, who convinced his government to suspend uranium 
enrichment between 2003 and 2005.  He served as National Security Advisor to President 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a pragmatist, and also to President Mohammad Khatami, a 
reformist.  It was the latter capacity in which he agreed to suspend enrichment. 
President Rouhani is well aware of the economic damage American sanctions 
have inflicted on Iran, and the desire of many Iranians to re-integrate into the global 
economy.   But he surely appreciates America would ease those sanctions only if what he 
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goals embraced by six American Presidents, which were most clearly articulated 
by Bill Clinton (in 1996), and by every session of Congress from the 96th (1979-
1980) to the 112th (2011-2012). 7   Declaring sanctions to be a policy of 
containment to isolate Iran, the Clinton Administration claimed they were justified 
because of Iran’s (1) efforts to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction and (2) 
support for international terrorism.  Additional rationales for isolating Iran were 
its (3) subversion of certain governments in the Middle East, (4) undermining of 
the Arab-Israeli peace process, and (5) poor human rights record.8 Of these, the 
first two have loomed the largest for the United States, though human rights 
concerns resurfaced in 2012 as a pertinent rationale for an explicit prohibition.  In 
no publicly observable or material way have the sanctions caused Iran to alter the 
impression of the United States on any of these five points. 
 The reasons for that apparent failure lay partly in inconsistencies in the 
sanctions themselves.  Through successive legislation, the sanctions generally 
tightened the noose around Iran with ever-tougher measures, but also with 
provisions allowing for flexibility or creating ambiguity.  Taken individually, 
indubitably a cogent argument existed in defense of each twist or relaxation.  
Taken collectively, the pattern – especially from the Iranian perspective – was not 
a series of outright flip-flops, to be sure, but was somewhat “on the one hand, . . . 
on the other hand,” and thus intimated occasional legislative tentativeness masked 
by bellicose rhetoric.  In other words, it was not that each particular prohibition, 
sanction, exception, or waiver in isolation was indefensible.  Rather, it was that, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
seeks – constructive engagement and reconciliation – with other countries includes 
stringent limits on Iran’s nuclear program.   
Yet, his room to maneuver is limited, given the consistent hard line stance of 
Āyatollāh Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran.  Akbar Ganji, Who is Ali Khamenei?: 
The Worldview of Iran’s Supreme Leader, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2013, at 25 (arguing 
Khamenei “is not a crazy, irrational, or reckless zealot searching for opportunities for 
aggression.  But his deep-rooted views and intransigence are bound to make any 
negotiations with the West difficult . . . .”).  The Supreme Leader did not support the efforts 
of President Khatami to engage President Bill Clinton, and the next President Mahmoud 
Ahmedinejad spouted fiery, defiant, and sometimes objectionable rhetoric against America 
and her allies.   
In effect, whether President Rouhani can satisfy the United States by submitting 
to its demands to drop its alleged nuclear weapons ambitions, without losing the support of 
the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard Corps that backs the Āyatollāh, is 
dubious.  See Najmeh Bozorgmehr & Monavar Khalaj, Rouhani Nuclear Pledge Raises 
Hopes for Change, FIN. TIMES, June 18, 2013, at 6; Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Tehran Crowds 
Take to Streets to Cheer Reformist’s Triumph, FIN. TIMES, June 17, 2013, at 3; James Blitz, 
West Cautious as Cleric Unlikely to Soften Nuclear Stance Swiftly, FIN. TIMES, June 17, 
2013, at 2; Martin Indyk, The West Must Temper Its Enthusiasm for Iran’s New President, 
FIN. TIMES, June 17, 2013, at 13. 
7  For a chart of the sessions of Congress, see Guide: Congressional Session Chart, 
IND. UNIV. LIBR., http://www.libraries.iub.edu/index.php?pageI d=3373 (last visited Mar. 9, 
2014). 
8  See OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 273. 
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viewed across almost four decades, the overall impression was that the sanctions 
regime had become an evolving work in progress lacking, from its very inception, 
adamantine will and tenacious determination. 
 The reasons the sanctions seemed unsuccessful also lay in the limits of 
American sovereignty.  Never has the long reach of American sanctions 
enforcement powers been endless or the intelligence necessary to exercise that 
power ben flawless.  The ability of third parties – whether allies, friends, or 
neutrals – to comply with American sanctions always has been limited.  Wholly 
apart from their philosophical misgivings about those sanctions and the 
justification for them, the third parties faced domestic and international political 
constraints in that they could not easily subordinate to American trade policy.  In 
sum, external political and economic factors America could not control, and 
internal legislative and regulatory factors that it could, were to blame for the four 
decades of apparent failure. 
 Both factors are ones the United States could have, and should have, 
foreseen.  In their official postures, rarely did American policymakers respect Iran 
as an ancient and grand Persian civilization; understand the distinct nature of 
Shī‘īte (much less Twelver Shī‘īsm) and empathize with the historical Shī‘īte 
sense of persecution by Sunnites; consider modern Iranian sensibilities about the 
August 19, 1953 coup d’état – engineered by the American Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the British MI6 – of democratically elected Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mosaddegh (1882-1967) 9  and subsequent human rights offenses 
committed by the American-backed Shah; or address claims by Iran about its right 
under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to develop peaceful 
nuclear technologies, much less Iranian allegations of American violations of the 
NPT.10  Instead, American officials tended to respond to the worst of Iranian 
rhetoric, especially former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s (1956–) hate 
speech against Israel and monstrous denials of the Holocaust.  Rather than rising 
above the ugliness emanating from some quarters in Tehran and Qom, the 
officials forged a trade sanctions policy in response to it. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  See CIA Documents Acknowledge its Role in Iran’s 1953 Coup, BBC NEWS (Aug. 
20, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23762970.  The United States 
and Britain were angered at the Prime Minister’s nationalization of Iran’s oil industry, 
which Britain effectively had controlled since 1913 through the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (APOC, sometimes called the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, or AIOC).  APOC 
later was renamed “British Petroleum” (BP).  See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC 
QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER (1991).    
10  The NPT was concluded in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.  There are 190 
Parties, including Iran.  Three nuclear nations, India, Pakistan, and North Korea (which 
withdrew in 2003), are not Parties.  See Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF., http://www.un.org/ 
disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2014); Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Status of the Treaty, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF., 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
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 To be sure, that ugliness is utterly indefensible.  Nothing justifies Iranian 
threats to the Jewish State or Jews, or human rights violations committed by the 
Islamic Republic against its own people.  Nothing justifies the ruthless 
suppression of the Green Revolution of June 13, 2009 to February 11, 2010, or of 
prior and subsequent democratic movements and their champions.11  Nothing 
justifies terrorism or support for Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs).  
Whether Iran has a right to peaceful nuclear technologies, or even nuclear 
weaponry, under the NPT is debatable, albeit a debate for another time.  Likewise, 
whether Iran was truthful in its consistent contention that its nuclear program has 
been for peaceful purposes to help it generate electricity, and not for construction 
of an atomic weapon, is debatable. 
 What is certain, indeed palpable, are misunderstandings, ignorance, and 
hardheartedness on both sides.  One side spoke of the leaders of the other as “Evil 
Āyatollāhs.”  Those leaders painted the other side as the “Great Satan.”  Their 





 Is it reasonable to consider American trade policy toward Iran as an “epic 
failure?”  The answer depends on the characterization of that trade policy and 
benchmark for its success. What has been and is American trade policy toward 
Iran, and has it worked?  Those answers, respectively, are “sanctions” and “no.” 
Of course, the work generated for lawyers has been outstanding.  But surely the 
enrichment of the class of juridical service providers cannot be the sole cause to 
sustain any legal regime. 
 Stephen Kinzer, a Visiting Fellow at Brown University, former New York 
Times correspondent who has covered over fifty countries on five continents, and 
author of Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq, 
summarized the reality: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11  The dates of the Green Revolution are indicated at Timeline: Iran After the 
Election, AL JAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/iran/2009/11/2009114112598 
69709.html# (last updated Feb. 11, 2010).  American sanctions legislation does not list an 
end date, but it does indicate a start date one day earlier, namely, July 12, 2009.  See 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-
195, § 105B(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1312-51, amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214, Iran Freedom and Counter-
Proliferation Act of 2012, Pub. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1263, Sub-title D of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (codified as 22 U.S.C. 8512, 8513a, 8514a, 
8514b), reprinted in COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113ST CONG., COMPILATION OF U.S. 
TRADE STATUTES 714-15 (Comm. Print 2013) [hereinafter 2013 COMPILATION] (concerning 
censorship as a sanctionable offense (discussed below)). 
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Years of sanctions and threats have produced only more 
spinning centrifuges in Iran.  An earnest diplomatic effort to 
give Iran an honorable alternative is long overdue.12 
 
Indeed, Mr. Kinzer argued that a different approach was the key not only to 
resolving America’s nuclear dispute with Iran, but also to resolving Middle East 
regional conflicts: 
 
That refusal [of the United States to engage Iran diplomatically] 
is rooted largely in emotion stemming from the hostage crisis of 
1979-80 and the following decades of semi-covert conflict 
between Washington and Tehran. Emotion has pushed 
Washington to adopt doctrine that posits Iran as a strategic 
enemy, meaning that any security gain for Iran implies an 
American loss.  By that logic, allowing Iran a voice in shaping a 
peace settlement for Syria – or in any Middle East process – 
would enhance Iran’s legitimacy and therefore undermine U.S. 
interests. 
 . . . . 
This approach [of isolating Iran as an enemy] is misguided . . . . 
[T]he United States and Iran, though often rivals, have urgent 
security interests in common.  Both want to calm Iraq and 
Afghanistan, deal with the Afghan drug trade and fight radical 
Sunni movements like the Taliban and al-Qaeda.  Together they 
could do far more to achieve those goals than either can alone. 
. . . . 
[N]o long-term stability in the Middle East is possible without 
the cooperation of Iran.  Look at a map of the region: Iran is the 
big country right in the middle.  Its cultural and political 
influence has been a dominant fact of regional life for thousands 
of years.  Freezing it out of peace processes almost guarantees 
that those processes will fail. 
. . . . 
[There is] the larger truth that negotiating with enemies and 
rivals is a way to promote national interest, not a concession or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  Stephen Kinzer, To Resolve the Syrian Crisis, the U.S. Must Negotiate with Iran, 
AL JAZEERA AM. (Sept. 4, 2013), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/4/to-resolve-
the-syriacrisistheusmustnegotiatewithiran.html (emphasis added). 
In this regard, the news that President Barack H. Obama and President Hassan 
Rouhani exchanged letters concerning Syria, and later spoke briefly by telephone, was 
welcome.  See Roula Khalaf, Lionel Barber & Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Rouhani’s 100-Day 
Revolution, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2013, at 6; Syria Hails U.S.-Russia Deal on Chemical 
Weapons, BBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
24100296. 
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surrender.  Hostility between powers – like the United States 
and Iran – should be an incentive to negotiate, not a barrier.13 
 
America and American sanctions, it seemed, did not matter to the “Evil Āyatollāhs” 
in Tehran and Qom, yet it reinforced the metaphor from the Iranian perspective 
that the “Great Satan” was clinging ever more tightly to his scepter.14 
 Indubitably, the sanctions do matter to everyday Iranians throughout their 
country – from Tabriz, near Armenia, in the north to the Persian Gulf port of 
Bandar-e Abbãs in the south, and from the western boundaries with Turkey and 
Iraq to the eastern borders with Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.  Have 
they inflicted economic pain on Iran?  Yes, though some of that pain has been 
self-inflicted (as discussed later).  Have the sanctions hurt innocents in Iran?  
Almost certainly, yes.  Commodities and services enjoyed by a healthy middle 
class are in short supply.  Have these effects inspired greater affection on the 
Iranian street, and in towns and villages across the Persian landscape, for either 
the American or Iranian government?  Probably not.  Have they at least provoked 
a “rally around the flag” effect in Iran, i.e., a sense of love of country if not of its 
politics?  Probably, yes. 
 Have the sanctions helped America understand Iran or its special position 
in Islamic history and religion any better?15  No.  Few Americans could identify 
the first three Shī‘īte Imāms, or the Twelfth one, who has remained in occultation 
since roughly 940 A.D.  They would be shocked to learn orthodox Twelver Shī‘īte 
belief holds that the Hidden Imām will come out of occultation and, with Jesus 
Christ, return to the world to restore peace and justice before a Day of Final 
Judgment. Have the sanctions altered the self-image of Iran?  No.  It is keenly 
aware it is the only Shī‘īte nation in the world, and only the second one in history 
(the first being Fatimid Egypt).  Its Constitution, written and approved after the 
1979 Islamic Revolution, bespeaks its self-proclaimed role of guardian of Shī‘īsm 
and exporter of its sense of socially just revolution on behalf of the poor and 
oppressed. 
 Misunderstanding turned to hardheartedness, hardheartedness to 
prejudice, and prejudice to hatred.  Trade sanctions facilitated, if not contributed 
to, this tragic course.  An unclear effect of the stated aim of compelling Iran to 
abandon its suspected clandestine nuclear weapons program has manifested one 
obvious result: a fat set of laws.  American sanctions on Iran span no less than 
sixty-two single-spaced pages (depending on page, font size, and minor 
exclusions).  That figure, which grew over time with each new try, covered only 
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13  Kinzer, supra note 12. 
14  Notably, in November 2013, the Foreign Minister of Iran, Mohammad Javad 
Zarif (1960–), said to the BBC: “[W]e need to come to understand that a sectarian divide on 
the Islamic world is a threat to all of us.”  David Gardner, Iran Can Be Made a Force for 
Middle East Peace, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2013, at 7. 
15  Concerning the points about Shī‘īsm made herein, see RAJ BHALA, 
UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARI’A) chs. 8-9 (2011). 
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the statutory regime specifically targeting Iran.  It excluded dozens of pages of 
regulations. 
 Was there, then, a justification for this regime?  The conventional 
wisdom was “yes.”  This wisdom said that without sanctions, Iran would have 
acquired nuclear weapons and would have sponsored even more boldly terrorist 
organizations.  The obvious rebuttal is that it was not “wisdom,” but speculation 
about a historical counterfactual question: what would have happened had there 
been no sanctions regime? 
 A different kind of wisdom would have been to say that without the 
sanctions, Iran might not have been a pariah state, and might boast a burgeoning 
emerging market.  It might have been more akin to Turkey than North Korea.  It 
might even have become the first Islamic BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) nation, and a new acronym – the I-BRICS – might have been 
needed.  After all, without sanctions, Iran could have earned and had full access to 
export oil revenues, petrochemical products, and precious metals; invested them 
wisely in long-term infrastructure and human capital development projects; and 
diversified its economy so that it was less reliant on petroleum.  After all, Iran 
incurred an opportunity cost because it could not exploit its energy and natural 
resources sectors via foreign market sales.  It could not use foreign earnings from 
those sectors to fund development and gain an international competitive advantage 
in non-energy sectors.  And, without sanctions on imports of refined gasoline and 
against access to world financial markets and payments systems, Iran might not 
have felt, or reacted with, hostility. 
 So, again, was there a justification – one that did not rely on 
counterfactual speculation – for the sanctions?  The answer is “yes.”  The first 
justification lay in Just War Theory as developed, inter alia, by Catholic moral 
theologians.  The use of force is unjust, unless it comports with specific criteria, 
one of which is that it is truly the last resort to resolving a problem.  All other 
efforts must be exhausted first.  Such efforts may include sanctions.  Accordingly, 
it may be argued that if armed conflict is to occur between America and Iran, it 
could be rationalized – if at all – as the last resort under Just War Theory because 
sanctions were tried and failed.  Of course, this rationalization would be parlous 
on either of two grounds: the sanctions were merely a prelude to war, and another 
last resort – diplomacy – was tried in good faith and failed. 
 The second justification lay in deontology.  Rather than utilitarianism, 
the better – perhaps only sure – argument for trade sanctions against Iran is that if, 
indeed, the behavior of Iran is sinful, even evil, then America ought not to sully 
itself dealing with that country.  Whether sanctions effect a change in Iranian 
behavior then become a secondary matter.  Of primary importance is the effect on 
the American soul of dealing with a perpetrator of bad acts.  Put in individual 
terms, the idea is that “I do not want to damage my soul by selling to or buying 
from Iran because of what I understand to be official Iranian behavior with respect 
of atomic weapons and terrorism.”  However, a deontological justification never 
has been the official American one.  Rather, consequentialism has been the 
cornerstone. 
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 Even in the unlikely event the rationale were to change, despite some 
evidence that utilitarian calculations across four decades appeared negative for the 
United States, the sanctions regime would require modification.  To focus on the 
effect of dealing with Iran has on the American soul – that doing so is morally bad 
for Americans – is not a value judgment that the United States ought to impose on 
other countries or peoples.  Thus, the secondary boycott features of American 
sanctions against Iran, which target foreign entities, would need to be dropped.  It 
would be up to foreign parties, based on the free exercise of their conscience, to 




IV. FIRST 3 OF 10 PHASES TO 1996 
 
 To ask whether American trade rules against Iran worked presumes an 
understanding of how they worked.  That, in turn, requires appreciation of how 
and why they developed over time. 
 There have been ten phases of American trade sanctions against Iran 
(outlined below).16  Of course, it is possible to view them as a totality of rules as 
of the present day, but that static picture would veil an insight: since 1979, and 
especially since 1996, the United States has tightened sanctions progressively on 
Iran, but until the November 2013 interim nuclear deal, Iranian behavior changed 
little, if at all, with regard to the outcomes America sought from the sanctions. 
 The United States applied sanctions to a broader range of commercial 
and financial transactions, identifying an ever-larger number of prohibited forms 
of business conduct.  It insisted on an extraterritorial scope to these prohibitions. 
America mandated an ever-increasing number of penalties for violating the 
prohibitions.  Still, Iran does what it does.  Metaphorically, the “Evil Āyatollāhs” 
did what they did in their neighborhood playground, the Near East, to the irritation 
of the “Great Satan.”  The more they did in disregard of the “Great Satan,” the 
hotter the “Great Satan” got, but each new flame it sent up (or over) only 
emboldened them. 
 The first three Phases of American sanctions against Iran were: 
 
Phase 1: Carter Era 
 November 14, 1979 through January 19, 1981 
Phase 2: Respite Era 
 January 19, 1981 through October 29, 1987 
Phase 3: Reagan-Clinton Era 
 October 29, 1987 through August 5, 1996 
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16  To be sure, this figure depends on how the legal history of the sanctions is 
organized. 
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The first three phases are discussed elsewhere.17 
 The focus here is on the subsequent evolution of the sanctions.  In 
reviewing them, it is important to note, as a practical matter, that all the sanctions 
apply.  That is, the evolution is cumulative: one set of sanctions does not 
substitute another, but rather supplements all previous sanctions.  Each of the Ten 
Phases, perhaps especially the last seven, might be tellingly described as a “try,” 
that is, an effort to knock out the specter of Iran obtaining a WMD, particularly a 
nuclear weapon, and to deter it from sponsoring terrorism and abusing the human 
rights of its citizens.18  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17  See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND 
PRACTICE ch. 19 (3d ed. 2008); Raj Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade 
Law, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1997). 
18  Starting in 2006, Iran was the target of four rounds of United Nations Security 
Council sanctions.  See Iran Says Geneva Nuclear Deal Possible on Friday, BBC NEWS 
(Nov. 7, 2013), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24857981.  Both the United States 
and European Union have implemented their own sanctions regime to reinforce that of the 
United Nations.  GATT Article XXI(c) justifies the American and European sanctions: they 
concern atomic weapons proliferation (covered by Article XXI(b)(i)) and are taken 
pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions (encompassed by Article XXI(c)).   
While not discussed herein, United Nations sanctions are less comprehensive and 
aggressive than American trade sanctions. 
This discussion focuses on the American sanctions regime.  For a brief summary 
of these sanctions, followed by an overview of European, Canadian, and South Korean 
trade measures against Iran, see Edward J. Krauland & Anthony Rapa, Between Scylla and 
Charybdis: Identifying and Managing Secondary Sanctions Risks Arising from Commercial 
Relationships with Iran, 15 BUS. L. INT’L 3 (2014).  Appendix A of that article provides a 
synopsis of non-United States persons on which sanctions were imposed between October 
2010 and May 2013. 
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V. PHASE 4: 1996 ILSA EMPHASIS ON PETROLEUM 
 
A. ILSA, Subsequent Strengthening, and Five Practical Questions 
 
 President Clinton signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) on 
August 5, 1996.19  ILSA – which was renamed the Iran Sanctions Act in 2006 
under the Iran Freedom Support Act – became the most significant statutory 
enactment against Iran.  It remained so until 2010 when Congress passed, and 
President Barack H. Obama signed, another key bill.  Overall, Congress 
strengthened the baseline 1996 statute no fewer than six times via: 
 
(1) ILSA Extension Act of 2001,20 
(2) Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006,21 
(3) Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 
of 2010 (CISADA),22 
(4) National Defense Authorization Act of 2012,23 
(5) Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,24 and 
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19  Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-72, 110 Stat. 1541-51 
(codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 273-
74.  The effective date of the ILSA was the date of enactment, August 5, 1996.  Id. § 13(a); 
see also Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 13(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note, reprinted in COMM. ON 
WAYS & MEANS, 111ST CONG., OVERVIEW & COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 1147 
(Comm. Print 2013) [hereinafter OVERVIEW, PART II]. 
20  ILSA Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-24, 115 Stat. 199-200 (enacted Aug. 3, 
2001) (amending Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996). 
21  Iran Freedom Support Act, Pub. L. 109-293, 120 Stat. 344-50 (enacted Sept. 30, 
2006) (amending Iran Sanctions Act of 1996).  The features of this and successor 
legislation dealing with Libya are not discussed herein.  But see Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys, 
supra note 17 (assessing sanctions on both Iran and Libya).  Likewise, aspects of the 
sanctions regime touching on Iraq – for example, the ILSA Extension Act mandate that the 
President report to Congress on the effect of sanctions on humanitarian interests in Iraq – 
are not discussed in this article. 
Herein, statutory references are to ILSA including amendments to it through 
successive legislation.  The amendments, and when and why they occurred, are explained 
below, with appropriate citations to OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, OVERVIEW, PART II, 
supra note 19, and 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11. 
22  Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. 
L. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312-51 (enacted July 1, 2010) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8501 note & 
50 U.S.C. § 1701 note) (amending Iran Sanctions Act of 1996).   
23  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, § 1245, 
125 Stat. 1298, 1647-50 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8513a).  This Act did not amend either the 
1996 or 2010 legislation, but rather supplemented them with an additional prohibition 
concerning Iranian financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran. 
24  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-158, 
126 Stat. 1214-69 (amending Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 and Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010).  The 2012 legislation also 
supplemented section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year of 
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(6) Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (Sub-Title D of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013)25 
 
Not only did these six Acts amend ILSA, but the fourth and fifth Acts also 
changed the 2010 Act, which with ILSA became the second of the two most 
important statutes targeting Iran.  In turn, the 2010 Act also altered ILSA.26 
 Not surprisingly, for the practitioner and scholar alike, and a fortiori for a 
domestic or foreign commercial or financial enterprise seeking in good faith to 
stay on the right side of American justice, the accretion of legislative enactments 
is dizzying.  To understand the sanctions, it is necessary to study ILSA and 
CISADA, plus sections of those enactments codified in other titles, especially 
Title 22, and thereafter consult pertinent provisions of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (C.F.R.).27 
 Perhaps the easiest path through the legal thicket is to keep these five 
practical questions in mind: 
 
(1) Prohibitions: What transactions are prohibited? 
(2) Penalties: What are the possible sanctions for engaging in a 
prohibited transaction? 
(3) Scope: To what, or to whom, are the prohibitions and sanctions 
applicable? 
(4) Exceptions: What limitations on, or outright exemptions to, the 
prohibitions and sanctions exist? 
(5) End Game: What, if any, criteria exist for removing the prohibitions 
and terminating the sanctions? 
 
The first two questions highlight the fact that a punishment is imposed for 
committing a transgression.  The third question identifies the breadth of 
application of the rules.  The fourth and fifth questions search for flexibility in the 
rules. 
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2012, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8513a, in respect of financial sanctions against Iran and the 
third country short supply exception.  (These points are discussed below.)  The National 
Defense Authorization Act was amended further by the Iran Freedom and Counter-
Proliferation Act of 2012, which is Sub-Title D, Title XII, of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. 
25  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. 112-239, Sub-
Title D, 126 Stat. 1632 (enacted Jan. 2, 2013) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 8801-11). 
26  See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 
at parenthetical note, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 708 (concerning 
2012 amendments to 2010 law); Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, at parenthetical note, 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 685 (concerning 2010 amendments to 
1996 law). 
27  Additionally, recourse to legislative history and various issuances from pertinent 
United States authorities is helpful, and in specific client matters, likely to be essential.  
Research into these sources was beyond the present scope. 





B. Crossing the Rubicon with ILSA (August 5, 1996 Through September 30, 
2006) 
 
 ILSA, which dates back to the 104th Congress,28 marked a significant 
legal and political shift in American sanctions policy against Iran.29  Until ILSA, 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Presidential 
Executive Orders were the legal mechanisms used to implement that policy.30  
Using the broad discretion delegated by the Legislative branch to the Executive 
branch, the President, not Congress, principally determined what sanctions to put 
on Iran, and how to implement them.  Yet, inside and outside the Senate and 
House, doubts arose as to whether this approach was effective in coaxing other 
countries to punish Iran.  To shift international attitudes, in third countries as well 
as Iran, Congress passed ILSA. 
 Congress stated (in findings contained in ILSA) that Iran’s behavior was 
adverse to American national security in two ways: it sought to acquire WMDs 
and it supported international terrorism.31  To further these pursuits, Iran used its 
governmental and quasi-governmental facilities outside of its territory.32  Then-
extant bilateral and multilateral efforts to deter the country were ineffective.  Thus, 
sanctions with real “bite” – ones that cut into Iranian revenues – were needed.33  
Iranian behavior threatened the national security (and foreign policy) interests of 
the United States and its allies and friends, hence Congress: 
 
[D]eclare[d] that it is the policy of the United States to deny Iran 
the ability to support acts of international terrorism and to fund 
the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction 
and the means to deliver them by limiting the development of 
Iran’s ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by 
pipeline petroleum resources of Iran.34 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28  See Guide: Congressional Session Chart, supra note 7. 
29  The statute defines “Iran” as “any agency or instrumentality of Iran.”  Iran 
Sanctions Act of 1996 § 14(10), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1148.  
Albeit circular, this definition suggests a distinction between the government and people. 
30  International Emergency Economic Power Act, Pub. L. 95-223, Title II, 91 Stat. 
1626 (enacted Dec. 28, 1977). 
31  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 2(1)-(3), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1133. 
32  The statute speaks of “Iranian diplomats and representatives of other government 
and military or quasi-military institutions of Iran,” and lists such entities.  They include the 
Foreign, Intelligence and Security, Interior Ministries, Revolutionary Guards, and several 
Foundations.  See id. § 14(11), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1148. 
33  See id. § 2(2)-(3), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1133. 
34  See id. § 2(2), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1133. The 
statutory definition of “act of international terrorism” is discussed infra note 81. 
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So, in ILSA, Congress mandated sanctions against two types of transactions: (1) 
foreign investment in the development of the petroleum sector of Iran; and (2) 
exportation of sensitive weaponry, both WMDs and advanced conventional 
ordnance, to Iran.35 
 With its legal and political shift via ILSA, and its findings in ILSA, 
Congress crossed the Rubicon.  Was there to be any more debate about whether 
Iran had the legal right under the NPT to develop peaceful atomic energy, or even 
perhaps acquire nuclear weapons?  No.  Was there to be any more debate about 
why Iran might be supporting terrorism, and what other measures might deter it 
from doing so?  No.  In 1996, six years before President George W. Bush declared 
in his 2002 State of the Union Address that Iran was part of an “axis of evil” 
(along with Cuba and North Korea), Congress declared Iran to be so.36 
 To be sure, Congress still encouraged the President to pursue multilateral 
channels.  Indeed, ILSA obliged the President to report on his efforts: 
 
[T]o mount a multilateral campaign to persuade all countries to 
pressure Iran to cease its nuclear, chemical, biological, and 
missile weapons programs and its support of acts of 
international terrorism . . . .37 
 
In addition, the President had to report to Congress on his efforts to get other 
countries to reduce their diplomatic ties with Iran and expel any Iranian 
representatives who participated in the November 4, 1979 takeover of the 
American Embassy or holding of hostages during the 444 days afterwards;38 the 
use by Iran of diplomats to acquire WMDs or promote terrorism;39 and the 
inspection activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency of nuclear 
facilities (actual or under construction) in Iran.40 
 But the purpose of pursuing multilateral efforts is manifest from the 
nature of the reporting obligation about them: Congress did not seek to talk with 
Iran; rather, it wanted stringent sanctions on Iran to “limit[] the development of 
[Iran’s] petroleum resources . . . [so as to] inhibit Iran’s efforts to acquire WMDs 
or support terrorism.”41 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35  See id. § 5(a)(1), (b), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1136, 
1138. 
36  The pertinent excerpt from the January 29, 2002 speech may be viewed at 
KellyWurx Films, President Bush Axis of Evil Speech, YOUTUBE (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btkJhAM7hZw. 
37  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 10(a)(1), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1145. 
38  See id. § 10(a)(2), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1145. 
39  See id. § 10(a)(4), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1145. 
40  See id. § 10(a)(3), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1146. 
41  See id. § 4(a), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1133.  In 
addition, section 4(b) mandated Presidential reports to the “appropriate congressional 
committees” on countries that have and have not agreed to support America in its policy 





C. Two Sanctions for Petroleum Resource Development and Sensitive 
Weaponry Export Prohibitions 
 
 With ILSA, Congress aimed to strike Iran’s most significant revenue-
generating sector: energy.  Perhaps Iranian support for the likes of Hezbollah and 
its efforts to acquire nuclear arms technology would be thwarted if Iran did not 
have funds to cover those expenses.  Where else did the bulk of that funding come 
from but oil exports?  In addition, what else made oil exportation possible, but 
foreign investment in exploration, drilling, and transportation of oil in Iran for 
onward shipment abroad? 
 Moreover, via ILSA, Congress specifically targeted any “foreign person.”  
Therein lay a key shift in American strategy, and another feature of the Rubicon 
crossing.  Sanctions were no longer just a primary boycott, barring Americans 
from dealing with Iran.  With ILSA, they became a secondary boycott: no one else 
was supposed to deal with Iran either, at least not in the petroleum sector.  The 
definition of “foreign person” was broad, covering (1) an individual (regardless of 
citizenship), firm, be it a partnership, corporation, or other form of business 
association, and (2) government enterprise, thereby including a wholly or partly 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) or state-trading enterprise (STE).  The trigger for 
sanctions under ILSA (later revised, as discussed below) was U.S. $40 million.  
 The first transaction ILSA forbade, the actus reus (culpable act) was any 
“investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of 
Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources.”42  “Petroleum resources” was 
defined broadly: it referred not only to “petroleum” (i.e., crude oil), “refined 
petroleum products,” “oil or liquefied natural gas” (LNG), and “natural gas 
resources,” but also to tankers and products used to build or maintain pipelines for 
transporting oil or natural gas.43  In turn, “refined petroleum products” covered 
gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.44  So, the term “petroleum resources” covered the 
entire sector pertaining to this form of energy.  
 Without clarification, the key terms “directly and significantly” could be 
read to ensnare virtually any economic transaction connected to that sector, 
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toward Iran.  Those committees were the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations, as well as the House Committees 
of Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, and Ways and Means.  See id. § 14(2), reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1147 (defining “appropriate congressional 
committees”).  The same committees are referred to throughout the legislation as 
“appropriate congressional committees.”  See, e.g., id. § 4(d), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART 
II, supra note 19, at 1135 (concerning interim reports on multilateral sanctions and 
monitoring). 
42  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(1)(b), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, 
supra note 19, at 1136. 
43  See id. § 14(5), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1149. 
44  See id. § 14(16), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1149. 
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including providing buttons for Iranian petroleum workers’ uniforms and 
shoelaces for their shoes, distributing bottled water to them, or selling them goods 
such as prescription eyeglasses or pharmaceuticals like aspirin, which could be 
considered an “investment.”  After all, clothes, shoes, water, glasses, and aspirin 
are all used by those workers, and without them they could not easily perform 
their duties.  Unfortunately, ILSA provided no guidance as to the meaning of 
“directly and significantly.” 
 What the statute did define was “investment” and “develop and 
development.”  An “investment” was any agreement with the government of Iran, 
or a non-governmental entity in Iran, involving: (1) a contract that includes 
responsibility for “the development of petroleum resources” in Iran (including 
supervising or guaranteeing that another person will perform such a contract); (2) 
taking a share ownership (such as an equity interest) in “that development”; or (3) 
a contract for participating in any form in the “royalties, earnings, or profits of that 
development.”45  To “develop” those Iranian petroleum resources was to explore 
for them, extract or refine them, or transport them by pipeline.46  Do those 
definitions, however, suggested a contract to provide Iranian workers with clothes, 
shoes, water, glasses, and aspirin was covered if those workers engaged in 
petroleum exploration, extraction, refining, or pipeline transportation, and that 
work was judged direct and significant?  The answer is no under prongs (2) or (3), 
because no share ownership or profit sharing redounds to the suppliers of the 
clothes, shoes, water, glasses, or aspirin.  However, the answer might be yes under 
prong (1), insofar as these items help guarantee that the workers can develop 
Iranian petroleum resources.  Admittedly that would be a strained interpretation, 
but not one denied by the definitions if an aggressive approach is preferred. 
 ILSA did not establish a strict liability offense.  Rather, it contained a 
mens rea (culpable intent) requirement: “knowingly.”  ILSA defined the term 
broadly to include actual or constructive knowledge: if a foreign person actually 
knew, or should have known, of the conduct, circumstance, or result in respect of 
an investment in the Iranian petroleum resources sector, then that sufficed.47 
 As to the second prohibited transaction, ILSA took aim at helping Iran 
develop WMDs or certain other military capabilities.48  It was illegal for any 
foreign person to export, transfer, or otherwise provide to Iran: 
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45  See id. § 14(9), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1148.  The 
pertinent date at which such contracts became illegal was the date of enactment of ILSA, 
which was its effective date.  See id. § 13(a), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 
19, at 1147.  Any amendment to a contract made on or after June 13, 2001 (a few weeks 
before the entry into force of the ILSA Extension Act) to a pre-existing contract was 
considered entry into a contract and thus was forbidden.  See id. §13(a), reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1147. 
46  See id. § 14(4), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1147.  
Likewise, such activities would constitute “development.” 
47  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 14(12), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1149 
48  See id. § 5(b), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1138. 




[A]ny goods, services, technology, or other items knowing that 
the provision of such goods, services, technologies, or other 
items would contribute materially to the ability of Iran to – 
 
(A) [A]cquire or develop chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons or related technologies; or 
(B) [A]cquire or develop destabilizing numbers and types of 
advanced conventional weapons.49 
 
The statute did not define “chemical” or “biological” weapons, nor did it identify 
what conventional weapons were “advanced,” or how many of them would be 
“destabilizing.”  It offered precision only in respect of “nuclear” weapons, saying 
a “nuclear explosive device” was any item (assembled or disassembled) “designed 
to produce an instantaneous release of . . . nuclear energy from special nuclear 
material . . . greater than the . . . energy . . . from” detonating one pound of 
trinitrotoluene.50 
 Like the first offense, this offense was not a strict liability one: the 
foreign person had to know the items shipped to Iran would help Iran in its 
weapons programs.  Moreover, as the italicized terms indicate, the contribution 
had to be “material,” and as to conventional weapons, they had to be both 
“advanced” and in “destabilizing numbers.”  Assuredly, a missile designed to 
carry a conventional weapon would qualify, all the more so if the item transferred 
to Iran would help it modify the missile to carry a nuclear payload.51  But, as to 
WMDs, “related technologies” were enough, and as to both categories of 
ordnance, the items shipped need not have been weapons.  Any item that helped 
Iran “develop” the forbidden weapons could not be sent to Iran.  So, for example, 
information from research conducted in a laboratory at the University of Kansas 
School of Engineering was within the scope of banned material.  That meant 
faculty had to take special care in sharing information with research assistants, 
particularly ones from overseas. 
 In sum, ILSA, as originally conceived, targeted the development of 
Iranian petroleum resources.52   (As explained below, later changes to ILSA added 
several more sectoral targets, plus individual ones, such as the production of 
refined petroleum products in Iran, and the exportation of refined petroleum 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49  See id. § 5(b)(1), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1138.  
“Goods and technology” are defined in section 14(8) in the same manner as in section 16 of 
the 1979 Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. App. § 2415), but “services” is not 
expressly defined.  See id. § 14(8), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1148. 
50  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 14(13), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1149. 
51  See id. § 5(b)(2)(A), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1138 
(mentioning “missiles or advanced conventional weapons that are designed or modified to 
deliver a nuclear weapon”). 
52  See id. § 5(a), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135-36. 
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products to Iran).  Any foreign person investing more than U.S. $40 million in any 
one year in the country’s petroleum sector was liable. 53   The period of 
measurement was one year, and multiple investments that equaled or exceeded the 
threshold were illegal.  Thus, a foreign person could not lawfully structure a 
transaction into a series of smaller ones and expect that they were going to be 
treated in isolation. 
 ILSA required the President to impose two of six sanctions on a foreign 
person that transgressed its prohibitions, referred to as the “sanctioned person” or 
“sanctioned entity:”54 
 
(1) Export Financing Sanction:55 
 
 The United States Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) had to refuse 
to grant any loan to finance exports of goods or services to a 
sanctioned person.  Such financing otherwise included Ex-Im Bank 
issuance of a guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or 
participation by the Bank in a credit syndicate. 
 
(2) Export License Sanction:56 
 
 A sanctioned person was prohibited from obtaining a specific license 
for exports of controlled items.  Such items were controlled under 
the Export Administration Act of 1979, Arms Export Control Act of 
1976, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or any other legislation 
mandating prior review and approval as a condition for export or re-
export of goods or services. 
 
Note that ILSA contained a second kind of Export License Sanction, which 
applied specifically in instances in which the prohibition against exportation of 
sensitive weaponry was violated.57  No license for the export, transfer, or re-
transfer, direct or indirect, of nuclear material, facilities, components, or related 
goods, services, or technology, could be issued to the government of any country 
with primary jurisdiction over a person who violates that prohibition.  This 
additional species of Export License Sanction was designed to coax foreign 
governments to police their citizens and residents against shipping WMDs or 
destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons to Iran. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53  See id. § 5(a)(1)(A), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1136.  As 
explained below, the ILSA Extension Act of 2001 reduced the permissible investment 
threshold to U.S. $20 million.  See OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 274. 
54  See id. § 5(c), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1139. 
55  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(1), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1141. 
56  See id. § 6(a)(2), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141. 
57  See id. § 5(b)(2), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1138. 
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 This second species was a qualified one.  The President need not have 
imposed the sanction if (1) the government of the pertinent country neither knew 
nor had reason to know about its person violating the prohibition, (2) that 
government had taken “all reasonable steps necessary” to prevent a recurrence of 
the violation and penalize the person, or (3) the approval, on a case-by-case basis, 
of an export license was “vital to the national security interests of the United 
States.”58 
 
(3) American Bank Loans Sanction:59 
 
 Any American bank was obliged to deny a sanctioned person any 
loan over U.S. $10 million in one year.  Any United States “financial 
institution” was defined to include any depository institution, credit 
union, securities firm (e.g., broker or dealer), insurance company, or 
other financial services provider in the United States, including a 
branch or agency of a foreign bank in the United States.60  The 
financial institution was barred from providing loans or credits 
totaling annually U.S. $10 million to a sanctioned person, unless that 
person helped “relieve human suffering,”61 and the financing was for 
that purpose. 
 
(4) Primary Dealer and Repository Sanctions:62 
 
 Any sanctioned person that was an American or foreign “financial 
institution” had to be disallowed from serving as a primary dealer of, 
or repository for, United States government funds.  “Financial 
institution” meant any depository institution, credit union, securities 
firm (e.g., broker or dealer), insurance company, or other financial 
services provider based or operating anywhere in the world.  So, the 
sanctioned financial institution had to be barred from serving as a 
primary dealer in United States government Treasury securities for 
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58  See id. § 5(b)(2)(B)-(C), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1138-
39.  As to the first two grounds for exception for imposing the Sanction, the President had 
to give notification to the appropriate congressional committees.  See id. § 5(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), 
reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1138-39.  As to the third ground, which 
resulted in issuance of a license despite a violation, the President had to justify doing so to 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and House Committee on Foreign Relations.   See 
id. § 5(b)(2)(C)(ii), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1138-39. 
59  See id. § 6(a)(3), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141. 
60  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 14(5), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1147.  The ILSA incorporates by reference the definition of “financial 
institution” from section 3(c)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 and the 
definition of a foreign bank “branch” or “agency” from section 1(b)(7) of the International 
Banking Act of 1978.  See id., reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1147. 
61  See id. § 6(a)(3), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141. 
62  See id. § 6(a)(4)(A)-(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141. 
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the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or a repository for United 
States government funds as agent for the United States 
government. 63   Note that primary dealer status was (and is) 
considered on Wall Street to be both prestigious and potentially 
lucrative. 
 
(5) Government Procurement Sanction:64 
 
 A sanctioned entity had to be excluded from United States 
government procurement contracts.  That is, the United States 
government had to refuse to procure goods or services from that 
entity.  Though not expressly mentioned, presumably, coverage 
extended to intangible merchandise, such as software or databases, 
and to intellectual property (IP). 
 
(6) Additional Sanctions:65 
 
 Import sanctions declared by the President under the IEEPA had to 
be applied to imports from a sanctioned person.66  The point of such 
additional IEEPA sanctions was to prevent importation of goods 
(and, presumably, services) from the sanctioned entity into the 
United States. 
 
Sanctions (unless waived, as discussed below) had to remain in place for at least 
two years from the date of imposition, or until such time (not less than one year) 
when the President received “reliable assurances” that the sanctioned person had 
ceased engagement in any prohibited activity, and would not do so knowingly 
again.67 
 Sanctions decisions were not subject to judicial review.68  Presumably, a 
court might decline jurisdiction under the political question doctrine, but the 
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63  This sanction is potentially two separate sanctions.  If a financial institution is 
denied primary dealer status, or its status as such is revoked, then that action is considered 
one sanction.  If it also is barred from serving as a repository, or its ability to serve as such 
is revoked, that action is considered a second sanction.  Id. § 6(a)(4), reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141. 
64  See id. § 6(a)(5), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141. 
65  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(9), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1142. 
66  See International Emergency Economic Power Act, Pub. L. 95-223, § 202, 91 
Stat. 1626 (1977). 
67  Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 9(b), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, 
at 1144. 
68  See id. § 6(a)(9), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1142.  The 
President must report to the appropriate congressional committee his rationale for the 
waiver.  His report must discuss the nature and significance for Iran’s acquisition of WMDs, 
or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons of the prohibited 
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statute avoided that matter by making it clear that a Presidential decision to 
impose sanctions is not reviewable by any court. 
 Waiver of sanctions was possible as a general matter and via delay.  
ILSA authorized the President to waive imposition of any otherwise-mandatory 
sanction if he decided that “it [wa]s necessary to the national interest” of the 
United States to do so.69  Obviously, the criterion is open-ended: any interest, be it 
national security or otherwise, may be a justification, and the President decided 
what was “necessary.”  The President could delay for up to ninety days 
(renewable for a second ninety-day period) imposition of sanctions, if Congress 
urged him to do so, and in lieu of imposing a punishment, pursue a diplomatic 
course.70  Specifically, Congress could call upon the President, and the President 
could determine that the government of the country with primary jurisdiction over 
the sanctioned person “ha[d] taken specific and effective actions, including, as 
appropriate, the imposition of appropriate penalties” to end the illegal conduct 
with Iran.71 
 So, for example, suppose the Malaysian energy company, Petronas, 
invests in the petroleum sector of Iran in an amount above the trigger threshold.  
The President could waive sanctions, if imposing them on Petronas would damage 
America’s national interests.  Perhaps many American companies have energy 
contracts with Petronas and an interest in bidding on energy projects in Malaysia.  
Petronas and the Malaysian government might retaliate against such companies, if 
the President imposes sanctions.  Or, at least, the President might turn to the 
Malaysian government for satisfaction that it is disciplining Petronas in some way.  
Here, then, would be grounds for waiver or delay, respectively. 
 Relatedly, ILSA created two incentives for joining a multilateral 
sanctions regime led by the United States against Iran.72  As a positive incentive, 
the President could waive sanctions against any foreign person from a country that 
joined such a regime.  As a negative incentive, ILSA dropped the trigger limit for 
permissible investment from U.S. $40 to $20 million for any person from a 
country that did not join. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
conduct in which the sanctioned person engaged; the actions of the government holding 
primary jurisdiction over the person to end or penalize that conduct; and the possible 
American responses if the person resumes the conduct.  See id. § 9(c)(2), reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1142. 
69  Id. § 9(c)(1), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1145. 
70  Id. § 9(a)(1), (3), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1144.  The 
President must report to Congress about the consultations and his decision in favor of delay.  
See id. § 9(a)(4), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1144. 
71  Id. § 9(a)(2), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1144. 
72  See also Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 4(d), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, 
supra note 19, at 1135 (calling for an interim report from the President to the appropriate 
congressional committees on multilateral sanctions as to (1) whether Australia, the 
European Union, Israel, or Japan have trade sanctions on persons or their affiliates from 
doing business with or investing in Iran, and if so, their duration and effect; and (2) any 
decisions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on sanctions against Iran). 
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 All such sanctions, of course, fell into the category of “on the one hand,” 
i.e., disciplines to enforce compliance.  The legislation also contained “on the 
other hand” provisions designed to balance disciplines with flexibilities.  The 
President did not have to impose a sanction if: 
 
(1) Doing so would inhibit procurement of defense articles or services 
under existing contracts or subcontracts (including option contracts 
“to satisfy requirements essential to the national security of the 
United States,” or co-production agreements for goods or services 
“essential to the national security”);73 
 
(2) The person to be sanctioned was “a sole source supplier” of those 
articles, and those articles were “essential” and no substitute was 
“readily or reasonably available”;74 
 
(3) At issue were eligible countries and merchandise under the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) or a pertinent free 
trade agreement (FTA);75 
 
(4) The items involved were (i) pipeline goods, services, or technology 
(i.e., items contracted for before the identity of the sanctioned person 
appeared in the Federal Register),76 (ii) spare parts, components, or 
information technology “essential” to American production or 
products, or routine servicing and maintenance of products where no 
alternative arrangements were “readily or reasonably available,”77 or 
(iii) medicines, medical supplies, or other “humanitarian items.”78 
 
The first two exceptions manifestly were self-interested for defense items essential 
to national security and other items essential to American manufacturing.  The 
third exception, for humanitarian reasons, comported with principles of human 
dignity and minimizing harm to innocent life. 
 How might Iran have escaped from ILSA sanctions?  The 1996 
legislation contained two termination criteria.79  They matched the purposes of the 
statute: Iran had to drop its WMD ambitions and stop supporting terrorism.  Never 
mind the possibility that Iran might have to prove the negative (e.g., that it did not 
actually pursue a WMD).  The termination criteria were linked to American 
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73  Id. § 5(f)(1)(A)(C), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1140. 
74  Id. § 5(f)(1)(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1140. 
75  See id. § 5(f)(2), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1140. 
76  See id. § 5(f)(3), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1140. 
77  Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(f)(4), (6), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1140. 
78  Id. § 5(f)(7), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1140. 
79  See id. § 8(1)-(2), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1143-44. 
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suspicions about Iranian behavior, and those suspicions underpinned the 
prohibitions and sanctions. 
 The first criterion was that Iran “has ceased its efforts to design, develop, 
manufacture, or acquire” a nuclear bomb, chemical or biological weapons, or 
ballistic missiles or ballistic missile launch technology.80  The second criterion 
was that Iran “has been removed” from the list of countries that (under section 6(j) 
of the 1979 Export Administration Act) “have been determined . . . to have 
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.”81  Both criteria 
required Presidential certification to the appropriate Congressional committees, 
and both had to be met for termination. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80  Id. § 8(1)(A)-(C), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1143. 
81  Id. § 8(2), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1144.  The statute 
defined an “act of international terrorism” as any act that is (1) “violent or dangerous to 
human life,” (2) violates Federal or State criminal law (or would do so if committed in the 
United States or a State), and (3) “appears . . . intended” to “intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population,” to influence government policy by intimidation or coercion, or to affect 
government conduct by assassination or kidnapping.”  Id. § 14(A), reprinted in OVERVIEW, 
PART II, supra note 19, at 1144.  Note there was no link between the act and ideology, i.e., 
there is no requirement the act be done in pursuit of a religious or political agenda.  That 
absence distinguished this definition from others used in the United States.  See BHALA, 
supra note 15, § 50.01[A].  Moreover, there was no requirement in the Iran Sanctions Act 
definition that the civilian or government target be American.  See Iran Sanctions Act of 
1996 § 14(1), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1147. 
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VI. PHASES 5 AND 6: 2001 ILSA EXTENSION, 2006 IFSA, AND 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
 
A. Phase 5: ILSA Extension (August 5, 2001 Through September 29, 2006) 
 
 ILSA contained a five-year Sunset Rule, meaning that, but for renewal, it 
would have lapsed on August 5, 2001.  It did not lapse, because the 107th 
Congress produced the ILSA Extension Act of 2001.82  Aside from extending 
ILSA until September 29, 2006, the Extension Act both strengthened the sanctions 
and Congressional oversight. 
 First, the 2001 Extension Act lowered the threshold from U.S. $40 to $20 
million for investment in Iranian petroleum resources that triggered mandatory 
sanctions against any foreign person.83  This eliminated a differential trigger that 
ILSA designed to discourage noncompliance with the multilateral sanctions 
regime.  Since no such regime existed, why not tighten the noose around Iran’s 
most strategic economic sector? 
 Second, via the Extension Act, Congress took another significant step in 
closely managing American trade policy toward Iran.  Congress required the 
President to report to it on three questions: 
 
(1) Were the sanctions achieving their national security objectives?84 
(2) What effect did the sanctions have on humanitarian interests in Iran, 
a country in which a sanctioned person is located, or other 
countries?85 
(3) What impact did the sanctions have on other American security and 
economic interests, “including relations with countries friendly to 
the United States,” and on the American economy?86 
 
Each such matter was sensible enough to warrant the President to report, but two 
points were critical to Congress’ decision. 
 First, the third matter easily allowed for sanctions to be evaluated 
according to Israeli and Gulf Arab interests.  They are countries “friendly” to 
America.  If these friends thought the sanctions useful – as they tended to – then 
so, too, would many in Congress.  Second, predictably, the report largely 
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82  See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-124, 115 Stat. 199-200 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 274; 
Guide: Congressional Session Chart, supra note 7.  To extend ILSA, Section 4 of the 
Extension Act amended Section 13(b) of ILSA.  The renewals and extensions of ILSA are 
summarized in International Law Advisory – Renewal of ILSA Sanctions on Iran, STEPTOE 
(Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-3867.html. 
83  See OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 274, 
84  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 10(b)(1)(A), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, 
supra note 19, at 1146. 
85  See id. § 10(b)(1)(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1146. 
86  See id. § 10(b)(2), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1146. 
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supported the sanctions regime, with one branch of government (the Executive) 
echoing what the other (the Legislature) wanted to hear.87  Yet, arguably a robust 
response to these questions would have been (1) “no, or at least, not clear,” (2) 
“possibly hurting innocent people,” and (3) “annoying, if not alienating, certain 
friends and allies, including India and Japan.”  Consider each suggestion in turn. 
 First, during that period, Iran had not abandoned its nuclear energy 
program, or forsworn weapons of mass destruction.  Second, in contrast to 
Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi (1945–), who called upon the world 
to boycott the regime of General Than Shwe (1933–), Iranian opposition figures 
had not clearly done so.88  In other words, Mrs. Suu Kyi and her National League 
for Democracy (NLD) were willing to accept the pain of sanctions.  The situation 
in Iran was different: continued sanctions risked giving the Āyatollāh’s regime an 
argument to galvanize people against foreign interference and, in effect, to rally 
around the flag.  Third, the likes of India and Japan could not easily and quickly 
substitute Iran for other sources of energy.  American sanctions inflicted 
difficulties on them at a time when their support, respectively, for fighting Islamist 
extremism and ensuring the peaceful rise of China was critical. 
 India is an important case in point of the way in which factors beyond the 
United States’ control may limit its sanctioning power.  To meet its growing 
energy needs as an emerging country and member of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa), India must import up to 80 percent of its energy.  Iran is 
a historical trading partner for India: Mughal emperors like Shah Jahan (1592-
1666) brought architects from Persia to design grand buildings, including the Taj 
Mahal.  Manifestly, with some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves of any 
country in the world,89 Iran has a comparative advantage over India in energy 
production, while India has a comparative advantage over Iran in agricultural 
goods like rice (a staple in Persian cuisine) and industrial products like generic 
pharmaceuticals. 
 As the value of the rupee depreciates against hard currencies like the 
United States dollar, energy prices in India rise, causing import-driven inflation.  
Poor people are hit particularly hard, and government funding to subsidize fuel for 
them is stretched.  If India ceases all imports of Iranian energy, without adequate 
substitutes, then fuel prices rise.  (In effect, the supply curve of energy available in 
the Indian domestic market shifts in, and if demand is steady or increases, then 
prices rise.) 
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87  The report was due between 24 and 30 months after the date of enactment of the 
Extension Act, i.e., twenty-four to thirty months from September 30, 2006.  Id. § 10(b), 
reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1146. 
88  See generally Connie Ng, Comment, Burma and the Road Forward: Lessons 
from Next Door and Possible Avenues Towards Constitutional and Democratic 
Development, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV.  267 (2013) (discussing the transition to democracy 
in Burma). 
89  See Yeganeh Torbati & Lesley Wroughton, Kerry Meets Iran Foreign Minister to 
Close Gaps in Iran Nuclear Talks, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2013), http://mobile.reuters.com/ 
article/topNews/idUSBRE9A709G20131108?irpc=932. 
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 Indeed, American sanctions themselves may contribute to higher fuel 
prices, insofar as they keep Iranian oil off of the world market, thus artificially 
constricting supply (again, in effect, causing an inward shift in the supply curve).  
In India and many other developing countries, fuel price hikes are a well-known 
cause of social and political unrest, and many of India’s poor also happen to be 
Muslim.  Surely these factors weigh heavily in the calculations in South Block 
(the office of the Indian Prime Minister in New Delhi) when considering whether 
and how to accommodate pressure from the White House to “toe the line” on Iran. 
 
 
B. Phase 6: IFSA (September 29, 2006 Through July 1, 2010) 
 
 But for the Iran Freedom Support Act (IFSA), American trade sanctions 
against Iran dating from 1996 under ILSA and renewed under the Extension Act 
until 2006 would have lapsed on September 29 of that year.  Via IFSA, the 109th 
Congress extended the regime for another five years, specifically until December 
31, 2011.90  Cancelling sanctions against Libya, IFSA also changed the rubric 
from “ILSA” to “Iran Sanctions Act,” or “ISA.”  IFSA loosened sanctions in one 
respect, and tightened them in three others. 
 As for relaxation of the sanctions, IFSA empowered the President to 
waive application of sanctions on a person of any country, for up to six months, 
“on a case by case basis,” which otherwise would have been imposed on that 
person for investing in the development of Iranian petroleum resources.91  To 
exercise this authority, called a “General Waiver,” the President needed to certify 
to the appropriate Congressional Committees that the waiver was “vital to the 
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90  Iran Freedom Support Act, Pub. L. 109-293, 120 Stat. 344-50 (enacted Sept. 30, 
2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note); see also OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 274.  
Section 204 contained the extended sunset date. 
On April 23, 2004, President George W. Bush waived the application of 
sanctions on Libya because of the agreement of that country to abandon pursuit of WMDs 
and cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism.  See Determination and 
Certification Under Section 8(b) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 69 Fed. Reg. 24,907 
(Apr. 23, 2004); OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 274.   Pursuant to the Iran Freedom 
Support Act, enacted September 30, 2006, Libya no longer was subject to ILSA sanctions.  
See id.  Under the 1996 legislation and ILSA Extension Act of 2001, the ISA initially was 
known as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.  But when sanctions were removed on Libya 
under the 2006 Iran Freedom Support Act, the nomenclature of “Iran Sanctions Act,” or 
“ISA,” was used instead.  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 1, reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART 
II, supra note 19, at 1133. 
91  Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 4(c)(1)(A), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1134. 
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national security interests of the United States.”92  The President could renew the 
waiver, if “appropriate,” for periods not to exceed six months.93 
 Similarly, IFSA allowed for a “Waiver with respect to Persons in 
Countries that Cooperate in Multilateral Efforts with Respect to Iran.”94  In 
particular, on a case by case basis for up to twelve months, the President could 
waive imposition of sanctions on a person if the government with primary 
jurisdiction over that person was “closely cooperating” with America in its efforts 
to keep Iran from acquiring WMDs or destabilizing numbers and types of 
advanced conventional weaponry.  Such a waiver was “vital to the national 
security interests” of the United States.  The President could renew this waiver, if 
“appropriate,” for periods not to exceed twelve months.95 
 As for strengthening of the sanctions, first, IFSA created the possibility 
for the President to launch an investigation into imposing sanctions against a 
person involved in petroleum investment activity in Iran.  If he did invoke such an 
investigation, which he would upon receipt of “credible information indicating” 
the person was engaged in a sanctionable activity, then the results of the 
investigation would be due in 180 days.96 
 Second, IFSA made the termination of sanctions more difficult: it added 
as a third criterion for termination of trade sanctions that (based on Presidential 
certification to the appropriate Congressional committees) Iran pose “no 
significant threat” to the national security or interests of the United States or its 
allies.97  Israel – though it is the only country in the Middle East not a signatory to 
the NPT, and reputed to be the only nuclear-armed power in that region – could 
claim both an alliance with the United States and a threat to its security or 
interests. 
 Indeed, it did so again after President Obama spoke by telephone with 
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (1948–).  Their fifteen-minute discussion on 
September 27, 2013 was the first direct communication between the leaders of the 
two countries since before the fall of the Shah of Iran.98  Fearing a possible 
rapprochement between Washington and Tehran on issues of WMDs and 
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92  Id. § 4(c)(1)(A), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1134.  The 
President must make this certification at least 30 days before the waiver takes effect.  Id. § 
4(c)(1)(A), reprinted in OVERVIEW PART II, supra note 19, at 1134. 
93  See id. § 4(c)(2)(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1134-35. 
94  See id. § 4(c)(1)(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1134.  As 
with the general waiver, with the waiver for a person from a cooperating country, the 
President must make this certification at least thirty days before the waiver takes effect.  
See id. § 4(c)(1)(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1134.   
95  See id. § 4(c)(2)(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1134-35. 
96  See OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 275; Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 4(e)(2), 
reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135. 
97  See OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 275; Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 8(3), 
reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1144. 
98  See Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Obama and Rouhani’s Telephone Call of Huge 
Significance, Says Iranian Deputy, GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/02/obama-rouhani-phone-call-us-iran. 
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terrorism that could involve loosening or eliminating sanctions, Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (1949–) flew to the American capital, and met with 
President Obama just three days after his historic phone call with President 
Rouhani.  That the Iranian President had the backing of the Iranian Supreme 
Leader, Āyatollāh Ali Khamenei, who authorized his team to show “heroic 
flexibility,” surely worried Prime Minister Netanyahu. 99   The Israeli leader 
dubbed stopping the Iranian nuclear program the “defining issue of his 
premiership” and demanded that Iran “stop all uranium enrichment, close the 
enrichment facility at Qom, remove all enriched uranium, and halt its 
development of plutonium.”100 
 True enough, by the account of President Rouhani in his September 2013 
address to the United Nations General Assembly, Iranian “nuclear technology has 
already reached industrial scale.” 101   Its program included roughly 18,000 
centrifuges across multiple uranium enrichment sites and stockpiles of enriched 
uranium to various degrees.102  But, Israeli demands set a considerably higher 
threshold for termination of sanctions: without enriching uranium at all, Iran could 
not have even a peaceful nuclear energy program.  Denying Iran such a program, 
however, never was the aim of the American sanctions. 
 Prime Minister Netanyahu continued his counter-offensive against what 
he sarcastically called “sweet talk and the onslaught of smiles” from Iran 
surrounding the September 2013 United Nations General Assembly meeting.103  
The Israeli delegation at the United Nations walked out of President Rouhani’s 
September 2013 speech, making Israel – in the words of Yair Lapid (1963–), the 
Israeli Finance Minister – look like a “serial objector to negotiations.”  And, so it 
was.  The Israeli Prime Minister used his time at the General Assembly podium to 
launch an ad hominem attack on the Iranian President, calling him a “wolf in 
sheep’s clothing.”104  Surely, the charm offensive from Tehran was a devilishly 
clever plot to buy Iran time to enrich more plutonium over the 85 percent 
threshold needed for a nuclear device.  In sum, the third criterion for termination 
of sanctions added by IFSA nearly sub-contracted American policy on Iran to 
Israel.  As a practical matter, given the overwhelming influence of Israel through 
the American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) in Congress, it would be 
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99  Quoted in Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Rouhani Lifts Hope for Solutions, FIN. TIMES, 
Sept. 30, 2013, at 4. 
100  John Reed & Geoff Dyer, Netanyahu to Talk Tough on Iran to Obama, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, at 4. 
101  Quoted in Richard Haass, A Diplomatic Dance Will Be No Waltz for Either Iran 
or America, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, at 11. 
102  See id.  In December 2013, Iran was estimated to have 19,000 centrifuges.  See 
Geoff Dyer & John Reed, Israel Opts to Shift Tactics on Iran Talks, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 7-8, 
2013, at 4. 
103  Reed & Dyer, supra note 100. 
104  Quoted in Geoff Dyer, Iran’s “Good Cop, Bad Cop” Breeds Divided Feelings in 
Washington, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2013, at 12. 
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difficult to get sanctions lifted without Israeli support – and that support looked 
well nigh impossible.105 
 Third, and most importantly in respect of strengthening the sanctions, 
IFSA clarified the sanctions regime applies to any “person,” not just any “foreign 
person.”  By “person,” the legislation means: 
 
(i) [A] natural person; 
 
(ii) [A] corporation, business association, partnership, society, 
trust, financial institution, insurer, underwriter, guarantor, 
and any other business organization, any other non-
governmental entity, organization, or group, and any 
governmental entity operating as a business enterprise; and 
 
(iii) [A]ny successor to any entity described in clause (ii).106 
 
Crucially, the term includes any kind of financial institution or provider of 
financial services.  This inclusion facilitated yet tighter prohibitions and tougher 
sanctions ushered in 2010, 2012, and 2013 (discussed below). 
 The only explicit exclusion from the term “person” was a government or 
governmental entity that did not operate as a business enterprise.107  So, to the 
extent the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ran a business, they were within the 
scope of the sanctions – an understandable inclusion.  So, too, was a Chinese SOE, 
or an Australian STE, or for that matter – and arguably less understandably – the 
Canadian Wheat Board, or the Indian Coffee Marketing Board. 
 So IFSA expanded the universe of potential sanctions targets, and this 
expansion applied to both prohibitions.  No longer were foreign persons investing 
in the Iranian petroleum sector the only targets.  Now, any person materially 
contributing to the ability of Iran to develop a WMD, or even “advanced 
conventional weapons in destabilizing numbers and types,” was a target.108  
Indeed, sanctions were mandatory against such a person. 
 As for the terms “United States person” and “foreign person,” they 
remained in the sanctions statute.109  This distinction was drawn in terms of the 
nationality of an individual or the place of organization of a business.  A “United 
States person” was a (1) natural person who is an American citizen, or who owed 
“permanent allegiance to the United States” (presumably, a holder of a permanent 
residency or green card), or (2) a legal person, that is, a corporation or other legal 
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105  Reed & Dyer, supra note 100. 
106  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 14(14)(A), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note, reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1149. 
107  See id. § 14(14)(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1149. 
108  See OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 275. 
109  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 14(7), (18), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, 
supra note 19, at 1148-49 (defining “foreign person” and “United States person,” 
respectively). 
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entity organized under Federal or State law, if over 50 percent of the capital stock 
or beneficial interest in the capital stock was owned (directly or indirectly) by an 
American citizen or green card holder.110  A “foreign person” was a foreign 
citizen who does not hold a United States permanent residency or green card, or a 
corporation, partnership, or NGO that is not a “United States person.”111  So, for 
example, a subsidiary corporation incorporated in Kansas, the majority of the 
shares of which were held by one or more foreign persons (such as an Indian 
parent company), was a foreign, not a United States, person.  
 But, was there much practical difference in this distinction?  No, because 
the sanctions apply equally to both types of persons.  Simply put, by switching to 
the term “person,” the United States made clear anyone anywhere was a potential 
target.  Once sanctions were imposed, the person on whom or which they were 
imposed was dubbed – as before – a “sanctioned person” (sometimes called a 
“sanctioned entity”).112  The punishments applied to (1) any successor entity, (2) 
any person owning or controlling the sanctioned entity with “actual knowledge or 
[that] should have known” of the illegal activities of the sanctioned person, and (3) 
any person owned or controlled by, or under common control with, the sanctioned 
person, if that person “knowingly engaged” in the illegal activities.113 
 What principles of Public International Law jurisdiction justified the 
switch from “foreign person” to “person”?  While the question is beyond the 
present scope, a brief digression is worthwhile.  Manifestly, neither nationality nor 
territoriality principles did: the sanctions did not apply only to “United States 
persons” or acts on American soil. 
 The rationale would have to lie in the “acts outside, effects inside” 
standard, whereby an action in support of Iran occurring outside American 
territory had effects inside the United States.  What might those effects be?  If Iran 
acquired a WMD, then it could threaten the national security of the United States, 
or even launch an attack on it or its overseas posts (such as embassies and military 




110  See id. § 14(18), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1149 
(defining “United States person”). 
111  See id. § 14(7), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1148 (defining 
“foreign person”). 
112  See id. § 5(c), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1139.  Such 
persons are identified in the Federal Register, as is a list of all significant oil and gas 
projects that Iran has put for public tender.  See id. § 5(d)-(e), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART 
II, supra note 19, at 1139-40. 
113  See id. § 5(c)(2), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1139 
(defining “sanctioned person”). 
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VII. PHASE 7: 2010 CISADA EMPHASES ON TRADE EMBARGO, 
REFINED GASOLINE, ASSET FREEZES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
A. Getting Tougher with Eight New Measures (July 1 Through December 31, 
2016) 
 
 The 111th Congress enacted the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010. 114   The legislation extended 
sanctions through December 31, 2016.115  This six-year extension of the ISA 
contrasted with the five-year extension by the Extension Act (2001-2006), and the 
five-year extension by the IFSA (2006-2011).  CISADA “expanded significantly” 
the original ILSA sanctions.116  Having crossed the Rubicon with ILSA in 1996, 
The United States, with CISADA enacted, pushed more aggressively in 2010 than 
ever before, broadening and deepening its unilateral prohibitions and punishments. 
 By no means did the United States abandon multilateral efforts.  Indeed, 
CISADA expressed a preference for multilateral over unilateral measures to 
compel behavioral change in Iran.117  The problem was multilateral sanctions were 
not causing that change.  So, America had to lead a “get tougher” approach.  Eight 
new measures defined its push. 
 Notably, America reaffirmed its justifications for its rules against Iran 
through the termination criteria, or Sunset Rule, in CISADA.  This Rule stated: 
 
The provisions of this Act (other than sections 105 and 305 [22 
U.S.C. §§ 8514 and 8544, concerning the human rights abuse 
prohibition, discussed below, and enforcement authority, 
respectively] and the amendments made by sections 102, 107, 
109, and 205 [concerning expansion of ISA sanctions, 
harmonization of criminal penalties, capacity to combat terrorist 
financing, and technical corrections to sanctions rules against 
Sudan]) shall terminate, and section 80a-13(c)(1)(B) of title 15 
[concerning changes in investment policy by registered 
investment companies], as added by section 203(a), shall cease 
to be effective, on the date that is 30 days after the date on 
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114  See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312-51 (enacted July 1, 2010), amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214, Iran 
Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632, Sub-Title 
D of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 
8501 note, 8512, 8513a, 8514, 8514a, 8514b & 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note); see also 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 8512, 8513a, 8514, 8514a, 8514b, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
708-21. 
115  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 §13(b), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1147. 
116  See OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 275. 
117  See CISADA § 114(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 717. 
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which the President certifies to Congress that – 
 
(1) [T]he Government of Iran has ceased providing support for 
acts of international terrorism and no longer satisfies the 
requirements for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism 
(as defined in section 301 [22 U.S.C. Section 8541] . . . 
 and 
(2) Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisition, and development of, 
and verifiably dismantled its, nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and ballistic 
missile launch technology.118 
 
Thus, CISADA terminated when the long-standing goals of the United States to 
change Iranian behavior on WMDs and terrorism nuclear weaponry were met. 
 
 
B. Measures 1 and 2: Import and Export Prohibitions 
 
 The first two measures constituted a total trade embargo on Iran.  First, 
the United States banned importation from Iran.119  That ban covered direct or 
indirect importation of goods or services. 120   Consequently, buying saffron 
harvested in Iran, but selling it in a market in Sharjah, and bringing it into the 
United States, was illegal.  There were precious few exceptions, namely, those 
allowed under the IEEPA, and for information or informational materials.121 
 Note the import ban applied to products of “Iranian origin.”  CISADA 
did not specify what rules of origin (ROO) should be used to determine whether a 
product indeed came from Iran.  The example of saffron is an easy case of the 
well-known grown and harvested ROO: a product grown and harvested in a 
particular country is the product of that country, even if the seeds planted or 
fertilizer used came from another country, or the water for the crop was irrigated 
from another country.  A harder case could be woven from the famed Iranian 
carpet industry.  Suppose silk for a carpet comes from India, the design is the 
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118  Id. § 401(a) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8551(a)) (emphasis added). 
119  Id. § 103(a), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 708-09. 
120 It appeared that the addition of services to the import ban was the result of an 
amendment by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
112-81, 125 Stat. 1298, Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-
239, 126 Stat. 1632, Sub-Title D of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2013, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 721-36.  Note that unlike the 
export ban (discussed below), the import ban did not apply to technology, i.e., Iranian 
technology could be imported into the United States, but American technology could not be 
exported to Iran. 
121  See CISADA § 103(b)(1)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra, at 708-09; 
OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 275.  The IEEPA exceptions are set out at 50 U.S.C. § 
1702(b). 
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lovely Qom style, weaving occurs in Iran, and brushing, cleaning, and finishing 
occurs in Turkey.  Is the carpet “Iranian” based on the place in which it is woven? 
 The question may be even trickier with respect to services, for which 
there are no clear ROOs.  Imagine a film crew consisting of Iranian and non-
Iranian nationals, based in Tehran, seeking to make a movie about a family that 
migrated from Shiraz to Kansas City just before the fall of the Shah in 1979.  The 
movie is a co-production with a Hollywood studio.  Services are provided through 
various modes: via the internet (cross-border supply, i.e., Mode I), travel by 
Iranian-American actors portraying the family members from the United States to 
Iran (consumption abroad, i.e., Mode II), and the joint venture (JV) with the 
Hollywood studio (foreign direct investment, i.e., Mode III).  Are these services 
“from” Iran, and thus barred?  
 Relatedly, CISADA required the President to report annually to the 
appropriate Congressional committees on global trade relating to Iran.122  In 
particular, he was supposed to identify the dollar value amount of trade between 
Iran and each country holding membership in the Group of 20 (G-20) Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors.  Plainly, the requirement was designed to 
give the United States data to use to pressure its G-20 partners not to export to or 
import from Iran.  Such data, for instance, not only could identify the “outlaw” G-
20 countries, but also highlights the relevant merchandise, for which (presumably) 
the United States could assist in finding alternative markets or sources.  In turn, G-
20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank officials could work to block trade 
financing and payments transactions. 
 Second, by closing various loopholes, CISADA barred essentially all 
exports from the United States to Iran.  All exports from the United States, 
whether goods, services, or technology, including those of or containing Iranian-
originating merchandise, and including luxury items (e.g., Persian carpets or 
processed pistachios), were illegal.123  Notably, the ban applied to exports from 
the United States, or from a “United States person, wherever located.”124  In other 
words, a foreign citizen shipping to Iran from Kansas City, or a Kansas citizen 
residing in Dubai shipping to Iran, would run afoul of the ban. 
 The only exceptions to the export ban were for: (1) personal 
communications, (2) informational material, (3) transactions incident to travel, (4) 
services for Internet communications, (5) agricultural commodities (i.e., food), (6) 
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122  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 10(d), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note, reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1146. 
123  See CISADA § 103(a), (b)(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
708-09.  Note there had been a ban on exports, and CISADA introduced the exemption for 
Internet communications, or exports of goods or services, to help support democracy in Iran.  
See OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 275.  It appeared the addition of services to the 
import ban was the result of an amendment by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 721-36. 
124 See CISADA § 103(b)(2)(A), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
709; Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 14(18), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, 
at 1149-50. 
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medicine or medical devices, (7) humanitarian assistance and/or articles to relieve 
human suffering, (8) goods, services, or technology necessary to ensure the safe 
operation of commercial aircraft made in the United States (e.g., components for 
Boeing aircraft used by Iran Air), with the approval of the Treasury Secretary in 
consultation with the Commerce Secretary, (9) goods, services, or technology to 
support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its work in Iran or 
international or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in their efforts to build 
democracy in Iran, and (10) exports in the national interest of the United States.125 
 As the tenth category intimated, the exceptions advanced the goals 
underlying the sanctions by facilitating political change in Iran.  Leaflets, Twitter 
and Facebook accounts, and NGOs all could help in this regard.  So, for example, 
under exceptions (1) and (2), a law professor at the University of Kansas could 
respond to an email from a prospective law student in Iran about degree programs 
at the university, and also honor a request from that student, or a researcher, to 
email a PDF copy of a previously published, publicly available, law journal article.  
Arguably, educating Iranians in the American legal system also is in the national 
interest of the United States (item (10)). 
 
 
C. Measures 3, 4, and 5: Refined Gasoline Prohibitions 
 
 The third, fourth, and fifth measures were mutually reinforcing and 
reflected a broadening of the type of sanctionable activity.  No longer was 
investment in the Iranian petroleum sector the only forbidden activity.  With 
CISADA, the refined gasoline sector also was off limits.  America sought to deny 
Iran not only the ability to find and extract crude oil, but also to refine that oil into 
gasoline or to import gasoline. 
 So, the third new measure made illegal any “knowing” transaction by any 
“person” that would assist Iran in producing refined petroleum products.126  
Supplying equipment to, or helping to construct, oil refineries in Iran became 
forbidden.  The sale, lease, or provision to Iran of “goods, services, technology, 
information, or support” that “could directly and significantly facilitate the 
maintenance or expansion of Iran’s domestic production of refined petroleum 
products, including any direct and significant assistance . . . [for] the construction, 
modernization, or repair of petroleum refineries” was illegal.127  By barring Iran 
from expanding its refining capacity, another potential source of export revenues – 
and thus of funds for WMDs or terrorist activities – would be closed off. 
 Like the original 1996 ILSA bar on investment in the Iranian petroleum 
sector, which had a U.S. $40 million threshold that the 2001 Extension Act 
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125  See CISADA § 103(b)(2)(B)(i)-(vi), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 
11, at 709; OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 275. 
126  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1136. 
127  See id. § 5(a)(2)(A)-(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1136. 
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reduced to U.S. $20 million, the CISADA measure had a threshold of U.S. $1 
million.  Any sale, lease, or provision of a good, service, technology, information, 
or support with a fair market value (FMV) of U.S. $1 million or more (or, to 
prevent structuring, multiple items aggregating to a FMV of U.S. $5 million or 
more in one year) was illegal.128  The market in which “fair value” was to be 
tested was unclear: Iran?  United States?  A third country?  The world market? 
 Interestingly, the problem of the relevant market is one that occurs in 
WTO subsidies jurisprudence, when a panel or the Appellate Body needs to 
decide whether a challenged measure confers a benefit on a recipient.  The test 
typically is to measure the support against a market-based benchmark, but 
deciding on the correct market can be controversial – as the arguments between 
the United States and Brazil in the famous 2005 Cotton case bespeak. 
 This CISADA change bore the same ambiguity as did the initial ILSA 
legislation in 1996 forbidding “direct and significant” investments to help Iran 
with its petroleum resources: what kind of transaction “could directly and 
significantly” help it with gasoline refining?  But, the change introduced a new 
strategic ambiguity by virtue of one word: “could.”  The pertinent verbs in the 
initial legislation were “directly and significantly contributes,” which demands 
proof an investment does, in fact, achieve the end of assisting Iran.  In CISADA, 
the relevant verbs were “could directly and significantly facilitate.”  No proof was 
required; speculation as to what Iran might be able to do with the goods, services, 
technology, information, or support is enough. 
 That ambiguity surely allowed for aggressive American enforcement.  
Recall the above hypothetical about supplying Iran with buttons, shoelaces, 
bottled water, prescription eyeglasses, and aspirin.  It remains apposite, indeed, 
even more so than before CISADA.  That is because selling U.S. $20 million 
worth of such merchandise is a high value threshold to meet, but selling U.S. $1 
million is not.  It also is because any such items “could” constitute direct, 
significant, facilitation. 
 Foreseeably, if the third measure worked and Iran could not refine crude 
oil into gasoline, then it would look for a substitute: importation.  The fourth new 
measure anticipated and sought to block this move: CISADA barred sale of 
refined gasoline to Iran.  With a view to constrict export revenues that Iran could 
use to acquire WMDs or support terrorism, ILSA had long made it illegal to buy 
petroleum from Iran.  Now, CISADA also forbid selling gas to Iran.  Iran 
(redolent of Nigeria) has substantial petroleum reserves, but with little refining 
capacity, it must import gas for domestic consumption.  CISADA would choke off 
those imports, forcing up gas prices in Iran.  In turn, Iranians might pressure their 
government to comply with American demands for international inspections of 
nuclear facilities, and abjuring WMDs and terrorists. It might even lead to a 
change in the government of Iran. 
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128  See id. § 55(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 
1136. 
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 So, in legal terms, CISADA forbade exportation of refined petroleum 
products to Iran.  No person could sell or otherwise provide Iran with them.129  
Likewise, helping Iran upgrade its capacity to import these products was illegal: 
no person could “sell[], lease[], or provide[] to Iran goods, services, technology, 
information, or support . . . that could directly and significantly contribute to the 
enhancement of Iran’s ability to import refined petroleum products.”130  Again, the 
valuation thresholds were U.S. $1 million in FMV terms (or U.S. $5 million in 
annual aggregate FMV), with no guidance on where or how to calculate FMV.131  
Again, speculation was enough – what “could” happen is what mattered.  And, 
again, the mens rea requirement, “knowingly,” could be met with actual or 
constructive knowledge.  In brief, by expanding prohibited engagement from the 
export to the import sector, the rule deliberately sought to weaken, if not wreck, 
the Iranian economy. 
 As for the fifth measure, consider again the hypothetical example 
concerning buttons, shoelaces, bottled water, prescription eyeglasses, and aspirin, 
as well as insurance, financial, and shipping services.  Suppose a Russian trading 
house in Vladivostok brokers a transaction, denominated in Indian rupees, 
between a supplier and an importer in Iran.  The deal is a contract for refined 
petroleum (or, alternatively, for the sale, lease, or provision of goods, services, 
technology, information, or support that could substantially help Iran import 
gasoline).  Siam Bank in Bangkok issues a commercial letter of credit (L/C) on 
behalf of the importer.  The importer pays the supplier via the L/C when 
appropriate and conforming documents, as called for under the terms of the L/C, 
are presented to its bank, the Bank of Baroda, in Bombay.  The documents are 
couriered between the banks, from Bombay to Bangkok, by DHL.  Lloyd’s of 
London underwrites an insurance or reinsurance contract for this transaction.  
Finally, suppose the Danish freight company, Maersk, provides a Liberian-flagged 
tanker to carry the refined oil from Busan, South Korea, via Singapore, to Bandar 
Abbas, Iran. 
 What parties in the above hypothetical transaction are potentially liable 
for violating the ban on exporting refined petroleum products to Iran?  The answer 
is “everybody.”  Brokering and financing a deal is a sanctionable act, rendering 
the Russian trading house and Siam Bank liable.132  Providing ships and shipping 
services are forbidden, rendering Maersk liable, and possibly also DHL, if 
“shipping services” includes air courier (thus making DHL, a “courier,” a 
“shipper”), and “support” covers transmission of L/C documents.133  Underwriting 
insurance or reinsurance contracts is forbidden, putting Lloyd’s in legal peril.134   
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129  See id. § 5(a)(3)(A)(i), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1137. 
130  See id. § 5(a)(3)(A)(ii)-(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 
1137. 
131  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART 
II, supra note 19, at 1137. 
132  See id. § 5(a)(3)(B)(ii), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1137. 
133  See id. § 5(a)(3)(B)(ii), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1137. 
134  See id. § 5(a)(3)(B)(i), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1137. 
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Simply put, the fifth CISADA measure created a new sanctionable prohibition: 
shipping and insurance services. 
 Consider an alteration to the hypothetical: instead of using the formal 
banking and payments system, the Russian trading house arranges a barter trade.  
Indian Oil will import crude oil from Iran and pay Iran for it with Basmati rice.  
Refined petroleum is not involved in the transaction, nor is any merchandise, or 
any services, used to build a refinery.  There is no liability under the original 
ILSA for the sanctionable act of investing U.S. $20 million in the Iranian 
petroleum sector.  Indian Oil made no such investment, and the barter deal was 
not worth such a high figure.  Is there liability under the CISADA measures for 
exporting refined petroleum products to Iran or helping it to produce them? 
 Arguably, yes.  Iranian workers whose job it is to build a refinery or 
upgrade seaport facilities might eat the Indian rice and thereby ingest the 
carbohydrates they need to work.  Moreover, by paying for the rice with crude oil, 
Iran does not incur the opportunity cost of using precious hard currency.  That 
saving “could directly and significantly contribute” to Iran’s ability to import 
gasoline.135  Iran could use that hard currency to import materials to build a new 
or repair an existing refinery, or for gasoline, which in both cases would be overt 
sanctions violations. 
 The hypothetical and its alteration manifest how broad ILSA became 
thanks to the fifth CISADA measure.  CISADA barred shipping, insurance, and 
related services that might help Iran import gasoline: not only was it illegal to sell 
gasoline to Iran, but it was also unlawful to facilitate gasoline importation to Iran 
by insuring vessels or other transport modes for that gasoline. 
 “Ubiquitous” might be an overstatement, as the amended sanctions did 
not invariably apply to every transaction involving Iran.  For example, CISADA 
offered a safe harbor for underwriters and insurers.  If they: 
 
[E]xercised due diligence in establishing and enforcing official 
policies, procedures, and controls to ensure that the person [did] 
not underwrite or enter into a contract to provide insurance or 
reinsurance for the sale, lease, or provision of goods, services, 
technology, or information [that could help Iran improve its 
ability to import refined petroleum products,] 
 
then they were exempt from sanctions.136  Still, with CISADA, American trade 
sanctions against Iran rightly could be characterized as a “brooding global 
omnipresence,” casting a shadow of caution, if not doubt, on nearly all dealings 
with Iran. 
 In brief, by supplementing the trade embargo of the first two measures, 
the third, fourth, and fifth measures suggest “CISADA” might have been more 
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135  See id. § 5(a)(3)(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1137. 
136  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(3)(C), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, 
supra note 19, at 1137. 
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succinctly and accurately labeled the “Trade Embargo and No Gasoline for Iran 
Act” (TENGIA).  American rules denied Iran the ability to refine crude oil into or 
to import petroleum products. 
 From an American perspective, a TENGIA seemed logical: Iran had 
plenty of petroleum (albeit unrefined), so why should it need nuclear power as an 
energy source?  If Iran insisted on developing nuclear power, and concomitantly 
nuclear weapons, then surely America was right to choke off a potential source of 
support funds for that development, namely, refined gasoline.  But from an Iranian 
perspective, opportunity cost was the rationale for developing its petroleum and 
refined gasoline sectors, plus peaceful nuclear energy. 
 Suppose Iran consumed all its petroleum domestically, and shipped any 
surplus overseas.  By the time it exhausted this natural resource, would it have 
diversified its economic and export base?  Or would peaceful nuclear energy have 
allowed allow Iran to stretch out the period before it exhausted its precious natural 
resource, and in that extra time allowed it to nurture broad-based industrial and 
service sector development?  Put differently, might energy diversification help 
Iran avoid the resource curse afflicting so many other countries in the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)? 
 Such questions suggest the opportunity cost for Iran of not developing a 
nuclear energy program was time for prudent diversification beyond oil 
dependency.  Pursuing that alternative energy source could avoid the opportunity 
cost of a faster run down of its petroleum reserves, giving it more time for a major, 
successful structural adjustment.  All that could occur, of course, without pursuing 
a WMD or supporting terrorism.  Indeed, diverting funds for those activities 
would inhibit Iran from avoiding this opportunity cost. 
 
 
D. Measure 6: Asset Freeze Prohibition 
 
 The sixth measure took the form of another prohibition, namely, 
violation of an asset freeze. 137  Any funds or other assets belonging to a person in 
Iran that satisfied the criteria for sanctions under the IEEPA were blocked via 
Presidential order.  Those persons included governmental and quasi-governmental 
officials, and individuals connected with the Iranian military, Revolutionary 
Guard Corps, or their affiliates.  Transfers of funds or assets to their family 
members were forbidden.  Any American financial institution holding such funds 
or assets was required to report those holdings to the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury, and the President was obliged 
to report to appropriate Congressional committees on the persons subject to these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137  CISADA § 103(b)(3)(A), (D), 22 U.S.C. §§ 8512, 8513a, 8514, 8514a, 8514b, 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 710-11. 
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freeze orders.138  Penalties for violation of any asset freeze order were the same as 
those for all others.139 
 Why did the statute expressly mention the Revolutionary Guards?  
Congress explained its sense that America should “persistently target” economic 
sanctions against the Guards because of “its support for terrorism, its role in 
proliferation, and its oppressive activities against the people of Iran.”140  That was 
because, according to Congress, the Guards were the locus among hardliners 
pursuing the most vehemently anti-American policies, and the principal 
instrument for crushing the Green Revolution (as discussed below).  Hence, 
Congress sought to force the hand of the President: he was to impose sanctions on 
individual Guard officials, such as travel restrictions or other punishments 
available to him via the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act, as amended in the 2010 
CISADA, and under the IEEPA.141 
 Most obviously, then, the asset freeze prevented Iranian officials from 
taking money out of American banks to assist their country in obtaining a WMD 
or supporting terrorism.  A less obvious consequence was they could not as easily 
shop for designer brand items at luxury stores like Harrods in London or Chanel in 
Paris.  That consequence may seem insignificant.  Yet, as the examples of some 
North Korean and Syrian government officials indicate, elites enjoy shopping 
regardless of the plight of their country or fellow nationals.  Circumscribing what 
they regard as a personal entitlement potentially “hits” them in a poignant manner. 
 
 
E. Measure 7: Human Rights Prohibition 
 
 The seventh measure represented a policy addition to the American 
sanctions regime: two more types of behavior became illegal, but they did not 
involve the energy sector of Iran.  For the first time, America took aim at human 
rights abuses and press censorship in Iran, declaring them to be punishable under 
the regime.  The goal of the regime thereby expanded from preventing Iran from 
acquiring WMDs and disrupting its support for terrorism, to deterring it from 
committing human rights abuses or censorship. 
 Why bother to seek even more behavioral modification in Iran?  The 
repression of pro-democracy movement by Iranian authorities and their thuggish 
proxies in the Green Revolution certainly was one reason.  That violence, splashed 
across the world’s media, was too monstrous to ignore; if the Āyatollāhs and their 
minions were “evil” for pursuing nuclear weapons and supporting terrorists, then 
surely they were condemnable for crushing street protests.  
 So, the President was obliged to identify and update the appropriate 
Congressional committees on officials of the Iranian government, or their agents, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138  See id. § 103(b)(3)(B)-(C), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
710-11. 
139  See id. § 103(c), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 711. 
140  See id. § 112(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 716. 
141  See id. § 112(3), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 716. 
294 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law      Vol. 31, No. 2        2014!
!
!
including Hezbollah and the Basij-e militia, which were responsible for, or 
complicit in, “serious human rights abuses” against Iranians, wherever located.142  
(That Congress thought America should strike hard at these officials for their 
support of Hezbollah, which posed an overt threat to Israel, as well as Lebanon 
and the United States, was clear from its declared sense.143)  “Credible evidence,” 
which could include announcements or information about the activities of a 
person by a “reputable” public or private sector entity, or by a foreign government 
(e.g., Israeli intelligence services), or non-governmental organization (e.g., 
Amnesty International), was needed to support this blacklisting.144 
 Because this prohibition targeted individuals, the sanctions the President 
was required to impose differed from the normal menu.  They were targeted at the 
individuals namely through denying visas to enter the United States (save for an 
appearance at the United Nations Headquarters in New York), blocking personal 
property or its importation or exportation (assuming it was within reach of 
American authorities), and barring financial transactions (assuming American 
authorities could identify and stop them).  Such punishments could be lifted only 
when Iran meets four requirements: (1) unconditionally release “all political 
prisoners”; (2) cease “violence, unlawful detention, torture, and abuse” against 
Iranians engaged in “peaceful political activity”; (3) conduct a “transparent 
investigation” of the repression of political activists following the Green 
Revolution; and (4) make “demonstrable progress” towards an “independent 
judiciary” and implementing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.145 
 
 
F. Measure 8: Expanded and Increased Sanctions 
 
 As for the eighth measure, the 2010 legislation expanded the ILSA list of 
sanctions from six to nine and increased the number of sanctions the President had 
to impose from at least two to three.146  The new sanctions on the President’s 
menu, all prohibitions, were (numbering consecutively from ILSA): 
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142  See CISADA § 105(a)-(b), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
711-12. 
143  See id. § 113(1)-(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 716. 
144  See id. § 105(b), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 711; Iran 
Sanctions Act of 1996 § 14(4), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note, reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, 
supra note 19, at 705 (defining “credible information”). 
145  See CISADA § 105(c)-(d), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
712-13. 
146  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 §§ 5(a)(1)(A) (mandating the President impose 
three or more sanctions for a violation of the Petroleum Resource Development 
Prohibition), 5(a)(2)(A) (mandating the President impose three or more sanctions for 
violation of the Refined Petroleum Production Prohibition), 5(a)(3)(A) (mandating three or 
more sanctions for violations of the Refined Petroleum Export Sanction), 5(a)(b) 
(mandating the President impose three or more sanctions for the Sensitive Weapons Export 
Prohibition), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135-38. 




(7) Foreign Exchange Sanction:147 
 
 Any foreign exchange (FX) transaction with a sanctioned person was 
forbidden.  That party could be barred from any foreign exchange 
transactions over which the United States claims jurisdiction and in 
which that entity had an interest. 
 
 That might mean the United States did not claim jurisdiction over all 
dollar transactions under a lex monetaire (i.e., a theory of the law of 
the currency), so the sanctioned entity might be able to enter into 
certain FX deals in offshore dollars not involving United States 
financial institutions.  But, if the transaction cleared or settled 
through the United States payments system, such as Fedwire or 
CHIPS (the New York Clearing House Interbank Payments System), 
or involved an American financial institution, then it could be 
blocked.148 
 
 An obvious example, coupled with the Property Transaction sanction 
(below) would be where a sanctioned entity from Yemen sought to 
sell financial assets or real property in the United States, convert the 
proceeds from dollars to Yemeni rial, and repatriate those funds to 
Yemen.  Both the sale and the FX conversion could be blocked. 
 
(8) Inter-bank Transactions Sanction:149 
  
 Any transfer of credit to, or payment transaction, with a sanctioned 
entity, by, through, or between any “financial institutions” was 
barred.150  That is, to the extent a transfer or payment is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States and involves any interest of a 
sanctioned person, it may be blocked. 
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147  See id. § 6(a)(6), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141. 
148  See Delphine Strauss, America’s “Exorbitant Privilege” Is Ebbing, FIN. TIMES, 
Jan. 27, 2014, at 8 (reviewing THE POWER OF CURRENCIES AND CURRENCIES OF POWER 
(Alan Wheatley ed., 2013) and correctly stating “because payment in dollars ultimately 
involves a transfer on the books of the Federal Reserve, the United States can enforce a 
financial blockade”). 
149  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(7), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1141. 
150  See id. § 14(5), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1147.  Again, 
the statute incorporates by reference the definition of “financial institution” from section 
3(c)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, and the definition of a foreign bank 
“branch” or “agency” from section 1(b)(7) of the International Banking Act of 1978.  See id. 
§ 14(5), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1147. 
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 As with the FX Sanction, the Inter-Bank Transactions Sanction 
could be interpreted broadly to cover any electronic funds transfer 
through Fedwire or CHIPS, insofar as movements of funds through 
these systems involve electronic debit and credit entries on banks 
located in or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 
including, of course, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  
Unlike the FX Sanction, however, the Inter-Bank Transactions 
Sanction covered any “financial institution,” i.e., both American and 
foreign.  Thus, for example, a foreign bank branch or agency in the 
United States was covered (because it operates on American 
territory), as well as a United States bank overseas (because it is 
subject to supervision by American bank regulators). 
 
 Arguably, so too was a foreign bank branch or agency located 
overseas, though exactly how far the reach could extend, as a 
practical matter, was unclear.  It was not easy for American 
authorities to block dollar transfers through every office of every 
offshore foreign bank, and a fortiori for them to do so with respect to 
transfers in other currencies. 
 
 Not surprisingly, that is why Iran had little choice but to substitute 
dollars for other currencies for payment purposes.  This response, 
whereby Iranians reduced their legal risk of losing funds 
denominated in dollars, raised a general policy problem created by 
the purported long-arm reach of the sanction, i.e., it injected legal 
risk into operating in United States dollars. 
 
 Parties, both Iranian and non-Iranian, preferred to transact in other 
currencies, so as to argue those transactions were not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.  The dollar, then, became a less 
desirable currency to hold because of the greater legal risk associated 
with it than with, for instance, Japan’s yen or even India’s rupee.  
Similarly, this sanction also created an incentive for barter trade 
(discussed below), as occurred between Iran and India in respect of 
petroleum products (from Iran to India) and rice (vice versa). 
 
(9) Property Transaction Sanction:151 
 
 Any transaction involving property of a sanctioned entity subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States was prohibited.  In effect, this 
sanction tied up assets of the sanctioned person.  Accordingly, the 
sanctioned person could be barred from “acquiring, holding, 
withholding, using, transferring, withdrawing, transporting, 
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151  See id. § 6(a)(8), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141. 
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importing, or exporting any property,” or “conducting any 
transaction involving such property” in or otherwise within the reach 
of the United States in which that person had an interest.152 
 
 For instance, a sanctioned entity owning an apartment on the Kansas 
City Country Club Plaza could be barred from staying in it or selling 
it to a non-sanctioned party.  The Property Transaction Sanction 
extended to “dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege 
with respect to such property.”153  Thus, for example, a sanctioned 
entity could be prohibited from exercising voting rights associated 
with stock, or exercising rights on a call or put option on a financial 
instrument.  The term “property” was not restricted to tangible items, 
so the stock or other financial instrument could be un-certificated 
(electronic book entry) securities. 
 
To continue the hypothetical illustration with Lloyd’s, suppose it underwrites an 
insurance policy for a vessel owned by Maersk that shipped gasoline to Iran. 
 Suppose further that the President chooses as the three sanctions on 
Lloyd’s (7), (8), and (9).  It would be illegal to enter into a foreign exchange 
transaction, such as exchanging Iranian rial for Indian rupees, or to lend funds to 
Lloyd’s.  If Lloyd’s held property in Kansas City, then it would be unlawful to 
buy that property, or (interpreting “any transaction” broadly) provide services 
(such as air conditioning or gardening) to that property.  Furthermore, CISADA 
mandated sanctions for any financial institution that helped a sanctioned entity.  
So, if Bangkok Bank assists Lloyd’s by acting as a correspondent bank (e.g., 
holding an account of Lloyd’s through which Lloyd’s made or received payments 
to or from Maersk), then those banks would be sanctioned.  
 Two final aspects of CISADA buttressed its aggressive stance: any firm 
seeking a United States government contract had to certify it was in compliance 
with ILSA;154 and any country that the parent country of an entity sanctioned for 
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152  See id. § 6(a)(8)(A), (C), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1142. 
153  See id. § 6(a)(8)(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1142. 
154  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(b)(1), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1142.  Parties excluded from federal procurement are listed in the Federal 
Acquisitions Register.  See id. § 6(b)(2)(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, 
at 1142.  “Eligible products” from designated “eligible countries” are exempt from the 
certification requirement.  See id. § 6(b)(2)(B), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 
19, at 1142; Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4), 2511(b) (defining 
“eligible products” in section 2518(4) and defining “eligible countries” in section 2511(b)).   
Essentially, they are products originating in a country in the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA) (or willing to assume GPA obligations) or North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a least developed country, a country that will 
provide reciprocal procurement opportunities for American suppliers, or a country with 
which the United States has a free trade agreement that took effect after December 31, 2003 
and before January 2, 2005, i.e., Australia (effective January 1, 2005), Chile (effective 
January 1, 2004), and Singapore (also effective January 1, 2004). 
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providing Iran with WMD technology had to be refused a license of nuclear 
materials, facilities, or technology.155 
 To be sure, CISADA was not all “on the one hand,” i.e., not entirely 
aggressive.  Its “on the other hand” measures were a waiver of any sanctions on 
“vital national security interest grounds,”156 and a waiver of the government 
contract certification obligation on the basis of “the national interest of the United 
States.”157  Note the ambiguity created by the lack of a uniform waiver standard: 
only the first waiver had the adjective “vital.” 
 Moreover, while CISADA amended IFSA to make mandatory a 
Presidential investigation, to be completed within 180 days total of potentially 
sanctionable activity, it also contained a “Special Rule.”158  So, on the one hand, 
the President had to initiate an investigation with a view to impose sanctions 
against any person if the United States received “credible information” that the 
person had engaged in sanctionable activity.  Such activity (as noted earlier), 
concerns the (1) development of petroleum resources in Iran; (2) production of 
refined petroleum products in Iran; or (3) exportation of refined petroleum to 
Iran.159 
 On the other hand, there was a Special Rule – literally dubbed that.160  If 
a person ceased, or took “significant verifiable steps” to cease, activity that was 
sanctionable, and if that person provided “reliable assurances” to the President 
that he or she would “not knowingly engage” in any such activity in the future, 
then no investigation ensued (or one that has commenced was terminated).161 
 There remained textual ambiguities.  What information was “credible”? 
What steps were “significant”?  How was verification to occur?  What assurances 
are “reliable”?  There also remained interpretative problems relating to the scope 
of application of the sanctions.  For example, suppose an air courier company, 
such as FedEx, transported a package from an exporter in North Korea to Iran.  
Did it have the same liability as the exporter, or was it an innocent transporter? 
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155  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(b)(2)(A), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, 
supra note 19, at 1138. 
156  See OVERVIEW, PART I, supra note 4, at 275. 
157  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(b)(5), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra 
note 19, at 1143. 
158  See id. § 4(e), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19 at 1135; OVERVIEW, 
PART I, supra note 4, at 275. 
159  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 §§ 4(e)(1), 5(a), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART I, 
supra note 19, at 1135-37. 
160  See id. §§ 4(e)(3), 5(a), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135-
37.  The President invoked the Special Rule by written certification to the appropriate 
congressional committees. 
161 See id. § 4(e), reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135. 
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VIII. PHASE 8: 2012 DEFENSE ACT TIGHTENING FINANCIAL 
SANCTIONS 
 
A. Targeting Iranian Financial Sector (January 1, 2012 Through December 
31, 2016)162 
 
 The 1996 and 2010 legislation did not establish a comprehensive set of 
prohibitions and sanctions in respect to the Iranian financial sector.  The 2010 
changes included new measures against foreign exchange and inter-bank 
transactions involving a sanctioned person or entity, and dealings with property in 
the United States of a sanctioned person.  But they did not target the Central Bank 
of Iran (CBI), nor did they address specific concerns of Iranian banks in money 
laundering or financing WMD proliferation or terrorism.163  And they did nothing 
to help third countries eschew purchases of Iranian crude oil, so as to cut their 
dependence on it or constrict sale proceeds flowing to Iran that it would use to 
fund WMD acquisitions or terrorist causes. 
 After the 2010 legislation, in November 2011, the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FINCEN) of the United States Department found that the 
CBI transferred billions of dollars to the Export Development Bank of Iran 
(EDBI),164 Bank Mellat (“Bank of the Nation”),165 Bank Melli (“National Bank of 
Iran”),166 Bank Sadrat Iran (The Export Bank of Iran),167 and other Iranian banks 
that the CBI is supposed to regulate.168  Doing so facilitated evasion of sanctions 
by reducing the involvement of American and other non-Iranian banks, which 
were trying to comply with the prohibitions set out in the 1996 and 2010 
legislation, with the CBI and Iranian banks.  In effect, via schemes to funnel 
payments to Iranian banks, the CBI covered for the loss of banking relationships 
they incurred thanks to the pressure of sanctions on American and other 
international banks to eschew dealings with them. 
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162  The implementation dates of certain provisions discussed below varied.  For 
example, the payments system prohibition took effect 60 days after the legislation entered 
into force, i.e., February 29, 2012, while the provision on applicability of sanctions to 
foreign central banks other than that of Iran took effect 180 days thereafter, i.e., June 28, 
2012.  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245, reprinted in 
2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 718. 
163  See id. § 1245(a)(1), (3), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 717-
21. 
164  See EDBI at a Glance, EXPORT DEV. BANK OF IRAN, http://en.edbi.ir/lang-
en/EDBI-At-a-Glance/default.edbi (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
165  See A Brief Look at Bank Mellat, BANK MELLAT, 
http://en.bankmellat.ir/tab389.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
166  See Concise History of Bank Melli Iran, BANK MELLI IRAN, 
http://www.bmi.ir/En/BMIHistory.aspx?smnuid=10011  (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
167 See History, BANK SADERAT IRAN, 
http://www.bsi.ir/en/Pages/About_BSI/History.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
168  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245(a)(2), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 717-21. 
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 Thus, in the defense budget bill for fiscal year (FY) 2012, namely, 
section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (Defense Act), 
Congress took aim at the financial sector of Iran. 169  This new legislation 
contained three key measures, as follows. 
 
 
B. Measure 1: Primary Money Laundering Concern Designation 
 
 First, Congress expressly designated the entire Iranian financial sector, 
including the CBI, to be of “primary money laundering concern.”170  This sector 
posed a threat to the American government and banks because it laundered 
proceeds from illicit activities in pursuit of WMDs and terrorist causes, evaded 
sanctions, and deceived the government and banks about its operations.  Such 
designations were made pursuant to section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which 
Congress passed in 2001 and which is codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318A.  That Act 
has ten titles, the third of which is called the International Money Laundering 
Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act.  This name bespeaks the purpose of 
Title III: to bolster the ability of American authorities to detect, deter, and 
prosecute money laundering and terrorist financing. 
 Under section 5318A, the Secretary of the Treasury could order, on a 
temporary basis, that financial institutions implement special measures for any 
transaction outside the United States in an area of primary money laundering 
concern.  Those measures pertained to detailed record keeping, such as the 
identities, addresses, and roles of all participants in a transaction, including a wire 
transfer, and the identity of any foreigner authorized to use or route a transaction 
through a payable-through account (discussed below).  In short, designation as a 
primary money laundering concern opened the possibility of obtaining more and 
better information about proliferation and terrorist financing.171 
 
 
C. Measure 2: Iranian Bank Asset Freeze 
 
 Second, section 1245 of the 2012 Defense Act established a freeze on all 
assets of Iranian financial institutions within reach of American authorities.172  In 
particular, Congress ordered the President to block all transactions in any property 
or property interests of any Iranian financial institution if the property or interests 
were in, or came within, the United States, or within the possession of a United 
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169  See id. § 1245, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 717-21. 
170  See id. § 1245(b), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 717. 
171  Section 5318A also contained the criteria by which a jurisdiction is designated to 
be of “primary money laundering concern.”  Those criteria included evidence of organized 
crime, terrorism or corruption, pervasive bank secrecy, and a high ratio of the volume of 
financial transactions to the size of the economy of the jurisdiction. 
172  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245(c), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 717. 
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States person.173  Here, then, was an extension of the Property Transaction 
sanction from the 1996 to the 2010 legislation from dealings with assets of a 
sanctioned entity to those of Iranian banks, including Iran’s Central Bank.  
Likewise, the new measure went beyond the 2010 CISADA freeze of assets 
belonging to individual Iranian government officials. 
 For example, suppose the CBI held funds in the Kansas City, Missouri 
branch of a foreign bank.  Those funds would be frozen in that branch, 
notwithstanding the fact the branch was of a non-American bank, it was located in 
the United States, and hence subject to the freeze order. 
 Likewise, consider a wire transfer of United States dollars from the 
account of an Iranian bank held in an Australian bank in Singapore, to a South 
Korean bank in Seoul.  Insofar as the wire transfer is routed through the United 
States, via Fedwire, or clears and settles on the books of an institution in the 
United States, such as the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, it comes within the 
United States, and thus could be frozen – even though the originator, originator’s 
bank, beneficiary’s bank, and beneficiary are all non-United States persons.  Still 
another example, hypothetically, would be bonds owned by an Iranian bank for 
investment purposes, and held at the New Delhi branch of Citibank.  The Iranian 
investor could not move them.  While the investment account was in an overseas 
branch, the branch was that of a United States person, namely, an American 
bank.174 
 Curiously, the asset freeze did not specify a punishment.  In one sense, 
the prohibition was its own punishment: Iranian banks could not get their property 
if American officials got to it first, as they were likely assuming holders of the 
property alerted the officials as to what was in their possession.  But what if a 
foreign bank in the United States, or a United States person abroad, violated the 
asset freeze by relinquishing funds, other property, or property interests pursuant 
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173  On February 6, 2012, President Barack H. Obama signed Executive Order 13599 
implementing the financial sanctions in the 2012 Defense Act, particularly the freezing of 
assets and other property held by Iranian banks, including the CBI, in the United States or 
by United States persons.  See Exec. Order 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012).  The 
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (discussed below) answered a 
question the Defense Act failed to address: under what conditions would the assets be 
unfrozen?  The second Act said the blocking would continue until the President certified to 
the appropriate congressional committees in a written report (which could contain a 
classified Annex) that the CBI no longer provided financial services to help Iran acquire a 
WMD, or help or facilitate transactions for the Revolutionary Guard Corps.  See Iran 
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-158, § 217(a), (c)-
(d)(1)-(2), 126 Stat. 1214-69 (codified as 22 U.S.C. 8711, 8721-24, 8741-44, 8781), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 727-28. 
174  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245(h)(4), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 721 (defining “United States person” to 
mean a natural person who is a citizen or resident of the United States, or an entity 
organized under United States or State law). 
302 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law      Vol. 31, No. 2        2014!
!
!
to Iranian orders?  Possibly, IEEPA sanctions would apply, because the basic 
statutory authority for the asset freeze was the IEEPA.175 
 A dramatic instance of the effect of the prohibition on transactions 
involving Iranian bank assets came on September 18, 2013.  The case involved 
Bank Melli.176  United States District Judge Katherine Forrest approved the 
seizure by federal law enforcement authorities of the entire office block building 
at 650 Fifth Avenue in Manhattan.  Led by the United States Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, prosecutors explained that a non-
profit organization operated by the Shah of Iran built the thirty-six-story structure 
in the 1970s.  A loan from Bank Melli funded the construction. 
 Following the Islamic Revolution, the new government expropriated the 
building in 1979, and re-named the non-profit organization the “Alavi Foundation.”  
Alavi then co-owned the building with Assa Corporation, and the owners 
transferred rental income to Bank Melli.  Those co-owners acted as “fronts” for 
Bank Melli, and their transfers to it violated both the American sanctions 
prohibition and money laundering laws.  The forfeiture of the building was the 
largest-ever related to terrorism, and Mr. Bharara said proceeds from its sale 
would be used to compensate victims of terrorism sponsored by Iran. 
 
 
D. Measure 3: Payments System Prohibition 
 
 To be engaged in international banking is to work with foreign banks. 
Even the largest of multinational banking organizations do not have subsidiaries, 
branches, agencies, or representative offices in all the countries of the world.  
Only in the minority of cases can they make and receive payments, and move 
assets, from one owner to another, and from one jurisdiction to another, as an “in-
house transfer.”  Frequently, they must work with one or more banks with which 
they hold an account, and in which the ultimate transferee, or beneficiary, also has 
an account. 
 Technically, those “accounts” are known as  “correspondent.”  As 




175  See id. § 1245(c), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 717.  The 
basic statutory authority for the asset freeze was the IEEPA.  Note the expansion of the 
menu of mandatory sanctions from three to five out of nine occurred via the other bill 
Congress passed against Iran in 2012, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights 
Act of 2012 (discussed below). 
176  See New York Office Tower Seized over Payments to Iran, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24146454. 
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[A]n account established to receive deposits from, make 
payments on behalf of a foreign financial institution, or handle 
other financial transactions related to such institution.177 
 
Logically, a bank holding a “correspondent account” is called a “correspondent 
bank.” 
 For example, consider a transfer of funds from the Indonesian rupiah-
denominated account of a Jakarta-based importer of Persian carpets held at Hong 
Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) in Jakarta.  The transfer is to pay 
for carpets shipped by an Iranian exporter in Tabriz, but the exporter seeks 
payment in Indian rupees, not Indonesian rupiah.  (The payment could be 
pursuant to a commercial letter of credit issued by HSBC for the benefit of the 
Tabriz exporter.)  Could the rupee transfer be in house?  That could happen only if 
HSBC holds a rupee-denominated account for both the importer-originator-payor 
and exporter-beneficiary-payee. 
 Assume HSBC does not hold both accounts. But suppose the exporter 
has a rupee-denominated account at Bank Melli that is held at Karnataka Bank 
(KB), which is a private-sector entity, in Bangalore.178  (That is, KB holds a rupee 
account for Bank Melli, which in turn holds a rupee account for the exporter.)  
Also, assume HSBC also has a rupee account at KB.179  Then, HSBC in Jakarta 
can: (1) debit the rupiah account of the importer for the rupee-equivalent of the 
price of the carpets; (2) transfer electronically the rupees to its account at KB; and 
(3) instruct KB to debit its account with KB and credit the account of Bank Melli 
at KB for onward payment to the exporter at KB. 
 In this instance, KB serves as a correspondent bank, with the HSBC 
account at KB being the correspondent account.  KB links the Jakarta importer 
with the Tabriz exporter because it (KB) holds the accounts of both the importer’s 
bank and the exporter.  As this hypothetical example suggests, correspondent 
banking is essential to the smooth flow of international trade transactions.  The 
example also intimates there are foreign banks, like KB, that maintain 
correspondent accounts and that conduct financial transactions with Iranian banks, 
like Melli. 
 Accordingly, via the third key measure in the 2012 Defense Act, 
Congress sought to cut off Iranian financial institutions from correspondent 
banking, with limited exceptions.  Congress prohibited the opening or maintaining 
of a correspondent account (or the imposition of strict conditions on any extant 
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177  31 U.S.C. § 5318A(e)(1)(B); see also National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245(h)(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 721.  
(defining “correspondent account” by reference to Section 5318A). 
178 See List of Banks in India, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ 
banks_in_India (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
179  A correspondent account may be classified as “nostro” or “vostro.”  From the 
perspective of HSBC, its account with SBI is a “nostro” account, meaning “our account 
with you.”  Conversely, from the perspective of SBI, the account is a “vostro” one – “your 
account with us.” 
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such account) by a “foreign financial institution” that the President decides “has 
knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction” with the 
CBI or any Iranian bank the Secretary of the Treasury designated for imposition 
of IEEPA sanctions. 
 The same ban applied to payable-through accounts (PTA) at a foreign 
financial institution: they were forbidden (or strictures could be imposed on them) 
if that institution knowingly did big business with the CBI or sanctioned Iranian 
banks.  Under section 311(e)(1)(C) of the USA PATRIOT Act, a: 
 
“[P]ayable-through account” means an account, including a 
transaction account (as defined in section 19(b)(1)(C) of the 
Federal Reserve Act), opened at a depository institution [in the 
United States] by a foreign financial institution by means of 
which the foreign financial institution permits its customers to 
engage, either directly or through a subaccount, in banking 
activities usual in connection with the business of banking in the 
United States.180 
 
Essentially, a PTA is a demand deposit (i.e., checking) account at a U.S. bank 
whereby a customer of a foreign bank can write checks.  Such a customer – the 
end user – may not be subject to the same scrutiny by the American bank as is a 
regular customer of that bank, meaning an Iranian customer could use the account 
to launder funds from, or make payments for, unlawful purposes. 
 Accordingly, to alter the above hypothetical, suppose KB holds a rupee-
denominated PTA for HSBC.  That would mean customers of HSBC, such as the 
Jakarta importer, could make payments via checks, money orders, and other 
instruments from that PTA.  The Jakarta exporter then could draw such an 
instrument, in rupees, on that PTA for the order of the Tabriz exporter. 
 So, in the original and modified version of the above hypothetical, 
suppose the President determines KB has knowingly engaged in significant 
financial dealings with CBI or an Iranian bank to which American sanctions apply.  
Then, the President could forbid KB from maintaining the correspondent account 
or PTA of HSBC (or impose strict conditions on either). 
 As with the Iranian bank asset freeze, Congress did not mandate a 
sanction with the payments system prohibition.  That is, Congress authorized (but 
did not require) the President to impose IEEPA sanctions on the CBI.181  As for 
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180 See 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(e)(1)(C); see also National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245(h)(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 721 
(defining “payable through account” by reference to section 5318A). 
181  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245(d)(1)(B), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 718 (stating the President “may” impose 
IEEPA sanctions on the CBI).  The sanctions potentially applied to an individual, as well as 
the CBI, who violated, attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of 
the payments system prohibition.  See id. § 1245(g)(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, 
supra note 11, at 721. 
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other Iranian banks, there was no need for Congress to specify a penalty.  The 
Treasury Secretary already had designated them for IEEPA sanctions under the 
existing 1996 and 2010 Act regime, or did so contemporaneously with application 
of the prohibition.182 
 Manifestly, the prohibition was designed to ostracize Iranian banks from 
the international banking network, making payments to or for them all but 
impossible.  Of significance was that the prohibition vastly expanded the 
architecture of measures against Iran from the energy sector to all sectors.  
Whether payments were made in connection with petroleum or petroleum 
products did not matter: Iran was to be denied the use of correspondent banking 
facilities and PTAs for all purposes.  So, even if, as in the hypothetical, Iran could 
sell Persian carpets, or for that matter, pistachios, to a non-United States buyer, it 
could not get paid for them, and therefore, it would have to resort to barter trade, 
if not subterfuge. 
 
 
E. Payments System Prohibition Definitional Issues 
 
 Taking specific aim at Iran’s Central Bank was a key to ostracizing the 
entire Iranian financial sector.  As in any country, Iranian banks rely on their 
Central Bank for a variety of foreign exchange, clearing and settlement, and 
payments functions in transactions with the rest of the world.  Yet, as its language 
and the hypothetical suggest, that objective was not easy to enforce. 
 There were definitional issues. First, a “foreign financial institution” 
under section 104(i) of CISADA was not defined at all: instead, it depended on 
what the Treasury Secretary thought.183  Though not a major difficulty, recourse to 
Treasury regulations was necessary. 
 Second, exactly what did Congress mean by “significant” financial 
transactions between a foreign financial institution and the CBI or a sanctioned 
Iranian bank?  Was the President to look at the volume or value of transactions, or 
both?  How would a single U.S. $100 million event occurring six years ago rate in 
comparison to three U.S. $25 million events occurring three years ago?  Similarly, 
how would the President determine whether the foreign financial institution 
intentionally engaged in the deal, thus meeting the “knowingly” requirement?  
Third, precisely how was the President to go about convincing a foreign financial 
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182  See id. § 1245(d)(1)(A), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 718 
(referring to “another Iranian financial institution designated by the Secretary of the 
Treasury for the imposition of sanctions”).  The sanctions potentially applied to an 
individual, as well as a foreign financial institution, who violated, attempted to violate, 
conspired to violate, or caused a violation of the payments system prohibition.  See id. § 
1245(g)(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 721. 
183 See id. § 1245(h)(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 721 
(referring to CISADA § 104(i), 22 U.S.C. §§ 8512, 8513a, 8514, 8514a, 8514b).  Section 
8513(i), Sub-Section (1)(D) leaves to the discretion of the Treasury Secretary the 
delineation of “foreign” from “domestic” financial institutions. 
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institution, like SBI, to close a correspondent account in furtherance of America’s 
sanctions policy goal of ostracizing Iran from the world of international banking? 
 
 
F. Third Country Central Bank Exception to Payments System Prohibition 
 
 More serious issues than those of definitions surrounding enforcement of 
the payments system prohibition were navigating its exceptions.  The 2012 
Defense Act contained an obvious exception for sales of food and medicine to 
Iran.184  A person supplying agricultural commodities, medicines, or medical 
devices could do so under the 1996 and 2010 sanctions rules.  Thus, it would be 
illogical to forbid a foreign financial institution from opening or maintaining a 
correspondent account or PTA used by or for the benefit of the CBI for these 
essentially humanitarian transactions. 
 A greater controversy concerned potential application of the prohibition 
and sanctions to a foreign central bank other than the CBI.  In the above 
hypothetical, could the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), or a state-owned bank like 
Punjab National Bank, be in trouble?  Surely Congress did not mean to threaten 
the RBI – or, for that matter, the likes of the Bank of England and Bank of Japan – 
and all nationalized, public sector banks in India.  Indeed, to avoid ensnaring all 
non-Iranian foreign central banks, Congress deemed that sanctions would apply to 
these banks only if they engaged in a financial transaction for the sale or purchase 
of petroleum or petroleum products to or from Iran.185  In doing so, Congress both 
created the necessary exemption and tightened the prohibitions on Iran’s energy 
sector. 
 To illustrate, suppose Iran sold crude oil to or purchased refined gasoline 
from the Indian Oil Corporation, the state-owned oil and gas firm headquartered 
in New Delhi and India’s largest commercial enterprise.186  Indian Oil seeks to 
pay for the crude oil or receive payment for the gasoline via its account held with 
SBI, which in turn holds an account at the RBI.  If RBI conducts the payment 
transaction for Indian Oil, then the President must apply sanctions to the RBI.  
Obviously, then, Congress sought to knock out any central bank from assisting 
Iran in receiving or transferring funds in connection with its energy resources. 
 It is difficult, if not impossible, to find a precedent for this kind of 
measure.  It is unilateral, undertaken by the United States, against sovereign 
foreign central banks of third countries not accused directly of wrongdoing.  
Denying access to the payments system itself was an aggressive move against 
foreign financial institutions.  Threatening foreign central banks, too, albeit in 
respect of energy dealings with Iran, was all the more dramatic.  Traditionally, the 
world of central banks is a collegial, if not clubby, one.  For the United States to 
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184  See id. § 1245(d)(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 721. 
185  See id. § 1245(d)(3), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 718. 
186  See generally Homepage, INDIAN OIL CORP., http://www.iocl.com/home.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
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take a potentially adversarial approach to foreign central banks, essentially 
declaring it would not tolerate them as accomplices of Iran, was incongruous with 
the trusting, diplomatic culture central banks enjoyed. 
 
 
G. Third Country Short Supply Exception to Payments System Prohibition 
 
 Still another exception to imposition of sanctions was for short supplies 
of crude oil to third countries.187  Congress mandated bi-monthly reporting on 
non-Iranian petroleum and petroleum product prices and availability.188  It did so 
in connection with a mandate that the President determine whether non-Iranian 
crude oil sources were sufficient to allow buyers in third countries around the 
world to “reduce significantly” the volume of their purchases from Iran.189  By 
that, Congress meant cutting dependence (as shown by paying lower prices or 
buying less quantities) on Iranian energy, specifically crude oil, with a view 
toward complete cessation of dependence on Iran.190 
 The link to sanctions was this: suppose a foreign financial institution, 
such as KB in the above hypothetical, engaged in a financial transaction via a 
correspondent account or PTA, where the underlying commercial deal involved 
Iranian petroleum or petroleum products and a third country.  For instance, 
assume that deal entailed an Indian oil importer, like Indian Oil Corporation, 
buying Iranian crude.  Suppose Iran is paid via funds credited to the correspondent 
account or PTA held by KB. 
 Without the third country short supply exception, a foreign bank, like KB, 
was vulnerable to sanctions because of the correspondent account or PTA used to 
conduct payment from the third country, India, to Iran for the oil.  With this 
exception, however, sanctions would apply only if the supply of crude oil from 
non-Iranian sources was sufficient to permit a significant reduction in sourcing 
crude oil from Iran.  After all, it would be unfair to India or other third countries 
to penalize their banks if they had no choice but to buy oil from Iran to meet their 
energy needs. 
 Yet, administering the third country short supply exception was fraught 
with economic and political difficulties.  The President had to ascertain the energy 
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187  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245(d)(4)(C), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 719. 
188  See id. § 1245(d)(4)(A), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 718.   
The Energy Information Administration prepares the reports, in consultation with the State 
and Treasury Departments, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
189  See id. § 1245(d)(4)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 718-
19. 
190  See id. § 1245(d)(4)(C)-(D)(i)(II), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, 
at 719.  Note section 1245(d)(4)(C) called for reporting on “petroleum and petroleum 
products,” whereas the sanctions exception in section 1245(d)(4)(D)(i)(I)-(II) focused on 
crude oil, i.e., third countries had to cut their dependence on unrefined Iranian oil to avoid 
imposition of sanctions on their financial institutions. 
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demand and supply situation in every country, and then compare and contrast 
Iranian and non-Iranian sources.  In evaluating what third countries could or 
should have done, the President risked looking like he was dictating to them what 
their energy policies ought to be.  India, China, and other energy-hungry emerging 
countries hardly were happy with that scenario, one in which they might wind up 
dependent on sources controlled, directly or indirectly, by the United States. 
 In fact, third countries persisted in buying Iranian crude, evidenced by 
Iranian oil revenues: “Astonishingly, Iran earned $600 bn [billion] in oil revenues 
over the past eight years [2006–2013], more than its total accumulation since oil 
was discovered more than a century ago.”191  Of course, due to American financial 
sanctions, between U.S. $50 and $100 billion of Iran’s holdings of foreign 
exchange were in frozen bank accounts. 192   Thus, “[o]ne of Mr. [Hassan] 
Rouhani’s most troubling discoveries upon taking office [as President in August 
2013] was to find the treasury empty.”193 
 Moreover, pressure from America on India (or other third countries) 
created an internal political dynamic within India.  Sanction relief for a foreign 
financial institution (e.g., an Indian bank like KB) would be based on the country 
with primary jurisdiction (India) over that institution cutting its dependence on 
Iranian oil.194  A foreign bank then had the choice of pleasing the United States by 
lobbying its government to push its oil importers to eschew Iranian crude, or 
pleasing its government by rejecting the role of American agents.  Being in this 
position hardly would endear the foreign bank, its government, or its oil importers 
to the American sanctions regime. 
 Perhaps in anticipation of this dynamic, Congress obligated the President 
to “carry out an initiative of multilateral diplomacy to persuade [third] countries 
purchasing oil from Iran” that they should limit the use by Iran of revenues Iran 
earned from oil sales to those third countries to buy non-luxury consumer goods 
from those countries.195  For example, if India buys oil from Iran, then it should 
try to cut sales of consumer items to Iran.  In effect, the initiative was designed to 
weaken bilateral trade ties between Iran and third countries.  (It also aimed to 
prohibit Iran from buying military or dual use items, or any other material that 
could enhance its WMD capabilities.196) 
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191 Roula Khalaf, Lionel Barber & Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Rouhani’s 100-day 
Revolution, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2013, at 6. 
192  Id.  As to where some oil revenues not in frozen accounts may have gone, the 
Financial Times reported the previous Administration of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad 
“used Iran’s central bank as a piggy bank, ordering it to dole out loans [e.g., on politically 
favorable projects that were not economically viable] that had little chance of being repaid.”  
Id. 
193  Id. 
194  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245(d)(4)(B), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 718-19. 
195  See id. § 1245(e)(1)(A)(i), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 720.  
196 See id. § 1245(e)(1)(A)(ii), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 720. 
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 That this initiative was multilateral hardly changed the optics of the 
sanctions regime.  From the perspective of third countries like India, the initiative 
was impelled by an American statute, led by an American President, and designed 
to suit American foreign policy and national security goals.  Indeed, the 
unilateralism-cloaked-in-multilateralism affected not only third country oil 
consumers like India, but also non-Iranian oil sources, like Iran’s partners in the 
Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  Congress instructed the 
President to “conduct outreach” to the likes of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia to 
encourage them: 
 
[T]o increase their output of crude oil to ensure there is a 
sufficient supply of crude oil from countries other than Iran, and 
to minimize any impact on the [world market] price of oil 
resulting from the imposition of [the asset freeze and payments 
system] sanctions under [section 1245 of the 2012 Defense 
Act].197   
 
Simply put, the United States was to lead a multi-country charge at third country 
suppliers to cajole them into boosting production to fill the diminution in Iranian 
oil caused by third country purchasers, under pressure, looking elsewhere than 
Iran.198 
 It must be underscored that the overall goal of these provisions was 
breathtaking: the United States aimed to change the pattern of world trade in crude 
oil by knocking Iran out of that pattern.  That is why the President had to monitor 
the supply-demand picture in third countries and sign on as many countries as 
possible to a coalition of the willing. 
 That the United States was one potential supplier also cannot go 
unmentioned.199  Thanks to new drilling technologies (including the controversial 
hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking”), the Energy Information Administration 
forecast that, by 2016, the United States would produce more crude oil than at any 
time since the banner year of 1970 (9.6 million barrels per day).  Yet, because of 
an export ban on oil implemented in 1975, following the 1973 Arab oil embargo, 
the United States could not ship crude abroad.  Why not remove the statutory ban 
and thereby not only help third countries forego Iranian oil, but also hand over to 
American producers the market share in those countries held by Iran?200 
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197  See id. 
198  The President was obliged to report to Congress biannually on these efforts, and 
the reports could have a classified Annex.  See id. § 1245(e)(2), reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 720. 
199 See Ari Natter, Wyden “Hopes” to Hold Hearing on Crude Oil Exports Soon; 
Spokesman Cites Concerns, 31 INT’L TRADE REP. 103 (2014); see also Ari Natter, Chamber 
of Commerce President Predicts End of 40-Year Ban on Crude Oil Exports, 31 INT’L 
TRADE REP. 103 (2014). 
200  See generally Ajay Makan & Neil Hume, The Cartel’s Challenge, FIN. TIMES, 
Dec. 2, 2013, at 10 (discussing the shale gas revolution and prospects for the United States 
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 The third country short supply exception also was problematic from a 
practical legal perspective.  The kind of financial transaction for which a foreign 
bank could be penalized had to be one involving (1) “trade in goods or services 
between the country with primary jurisdiction [e.g., India] over the foreign 
financial institution [e.g., KB] and Iran” and (2) “any funds owed to Iran as a 
result of such trade [which] are credited to an account located in the country with 
primary jurisdiction over the foreign financial institution.” 201   The above 
hypothetical easily meets both prongs.  But what if Indian Oil Corporation was a 
middle party, brokering an oil sale by Iran to Bhutan?  Would a payment routed 
from the Bhutanese capital, Thimpu, to Tehran via KB render KB liable?  Or, 
what if the underlying transaction was not for “goods,” that is, crude oil, but for 
consulting provided by Iranian petroleum engineers to the Bhutanese government?  




H. Sanctions Waiver Criteria Ambiguities 
 
 Congress granted the President discretion to waive sanctions on a foreign 
financial institution for violations of the payments system prohibition.  To qualify, 
the President had to apply four criteria.  First, it had to be in the “national security 
interest of the United States” not to impose sanctions on that institution.202  
Second, the President had to justify the waiver to Congress.203  Third, there had to 
be “exceptional circumstances” preventing the country with primary jurisdiction 
over the foreign financial institution from reducing significantly its purchases of 
Iranian petroleum and petroleum products.204  Fourth, the President had to explain 
the “concrete cooperation” he received, or would receive, thanks to the waiver.205  
Even if all four criteria were met, the President could waive sanctions for only up 
to 120 days, with additional 120-day renewals possible under those same criteria. 
 The language of the first criterion was commonplace among sanctions 
waiver provisions, and the second criterion was unsurprising.  The third and fourth 
were ambiguous. “Exceptional circumstances” were undefined, as was “concrete 
cooperation.”  Suppose in the above hypothetical India argued to the President 
that a surge in energy consumption in India, thanks to strong growth in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
to become the largest oil producer in the world); Ed Crooks & Geoff Dyer, Strength in 
Reserve, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at 5 (discussing how the shale boom, while not likely to 
allow the United States to disengage from the Middle East, will enhance its international 
diplomatic authority). 
201  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 
1245(d)(4)(D)(ii)(I)-(II), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 719. 
202  See id. § 1245(d)(5)(A), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 719. 
203  See id. § 1245(d)(5)(B)(i), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 719. 
204  See id. § 1245(d)(5)(B)(ii), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 720. 
205  See id. § 1245(d)(5)(B)(iii), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
720. 
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manufacturing sector, caused India to import more oil than expected from Iran.  
Was this scenario exceptional, or one to be expected given India’s efforts at 
industrialization?  To take another example, suppose China outmaneuvered India 
in trying to obtain sources of oil in Africa to substitute for Iran.  That is, China 
was able to secure FDI and energy supply contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa for 
which India had also competed, but lost.  Consequently, India could not lessen its 
dependence on Iranian crude oil.  Would these circumstances be “exceptional?”  
Even what might be traditionally thought of as “exceptional” – war or other 
violent conflict – arguably could be regarded as expected.  For example, if India 
urged that it could not lessen its dependence on oil from Iran because of unrest in 
three substitute countries – Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela – would that be 
“exceptional?” 
 Likewise, hypothetical illustrations point out the difficulty in ascertaining 
what kind of cooperation from India would be “concrete.”  Would the cooperation 
need to be related directly to Iran?  Or, would help on other matters – such as 
stepped up patrols against piracy in the Straits of Malacca by Indian Naval vessels, 
or increased FDI in Afghanistan to help it repair its infrastructure – suffice? 
 
 
IX. PHASE 9: 2012 IRAN-SYRIA ACT’S NEW EXPANSIVE 
CONSTRICTIONS  (AUGUST 10, 2012 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2016) 
 
A. Ten Further Measures (August 10, 2012 Through December 31, 2016) 
 
 With the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 
(Iran-Syria Act), the United States continued its traverse far across the Rubicon, as 
it were, tightening the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act, as amended in 2010 by CISADA, 
and tightening CISADA, yet again.206  It did so in ten principal manners: six 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
206  See generally Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
112-158, 126 Stat. 1214-69, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 721. 
To be clear, some of the changes ushered by the Iran-Syria Act were to the 1996 
Iran Sanctions Act as amended by the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010, 22 U.S.C. §§ 8512, 8513a, 8514, 8514a, 8514b, while other 
changes made by the Iran-Syria Act were to the 2010 CISADA.  That is evident from the 
2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 685, 708, which indicates that the 1996 and 2010 
legislations were amended by Public Law 112-158 (Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
Human Rights Act of 2012), which is, of course, the 2012 Act.  It also is clear simply by 
comparing the OVERVIEW, PART I, supra notes 4, 19, which includes the 1996 and 2010 
Acts before the 2012 Act, with the 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, which includes the 
2012 Act amendments. 
 Also, the changes discussed above occurred via the 2012 Iran-Syria Act, as well 
as via the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Sub-Title D of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 736.  But, they applied retroactively to ninety days after enactment of the 
original CISADA.  See, e.g., CISADA §§ 103(a), 105(b)(1), reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 708, 711. 
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concerning illegal business conduct with Iran; one dealing with human rights; one 
pertaining to punishments for engaging in prohibited conduct; and one affecting 
criteria for waiving those punishments.207  Succinctly put, America dubbed more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
207  Various features of the sanctions regime did not need amendment and thus 
remained unchanged.  These included provisions on publication in the Federal Register and 
publication of projects.  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(d)-(e), amended by 
CISADA, reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1139-40, with Iran Sanctions 
Act of 1996 §§ 5(d)-(e), amended further by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 696. 
No substantive changes (only minor renumbering) were made under the 2012 Act 
to the list of exceptions under which the President was not mandated to apply sanctions.  
Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(f), amended by CISADA, reprinted in OVERVIEW, 
PART II, supra note 19, at 1140, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(f), further amended by 
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 696-97.  That is, the key exceptions remained for (1) 
procurement of defense goods and services “essential to the national security of the United 
States,” defense goods or services supplied by a “sole source supplier” with no “readily or 
reasonably available” alternative, or defense goods or services “essential to the national 
Security” under coproduction agreements; (2) spare parts or components (but not finished 
goods) “essential” to American manufacturing; (3) service and maintenance of products 
where there is no “readily or reasonably available” alternative; (4) information and 
technology “essential” to American products or production; or (5) humanitarian items, such 
as medicines.  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(f)(1)-(6), amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 696-97. 
 Likewise, the 2012 Act did not change (aside from minor cross-referencing 
updates) the statutory provisions on advisory opinions, the termination, delay, or duration 
of sanctions, the contents of any report in support of a Presidential waiver of sanctions, 
required reports to the appropriate congressional committees, the non-reviewability of 
sanctions, exclusion of certain activities, or the December 31, 2016 sunset date.  Compare 
Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 §§ 7-8, 9(a)-(b), 9(c)(2), 10-13, amended by CISADA, 
reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1143-47, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
§§ 7-8, 9(a)-(b), 9(c)(2), 10-13, further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria 
Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 700-04. 
 Definitions of key terms – namely, “act of international terrorism,” “appropriate 
congressional committees,” “component part,” “develop and development,” “financial 
institution,” “finished product,” “foreign person,” “goods and technology,” “investment,” 
“Iran,” “Iranian diplomats and representatives of other government and military or quasi-
governmental institutions of Iran,” “knowingly,” “nuclear explosive device,” “person,” 
“petroleum resources,” “refined petroleum products,” “services,” “United States or State,” 
and “United States Person” – also remained the same.  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
§§ 14(a)(1)-(18), amended by CISADA, reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 
1147-50, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 §§ 14(1)-(3), (5)-(15), (17)-(21), further amended 
by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 704-07.  But, the 2012 Act added three new terms: 
“credible information,” “petrochemical product,” and “services.”  See Iran Sanctions Act of 
1996 §§ 14(4), (16), (19), amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 705, 707.  As explained above, 
all three terms helped delineate an enlarged scope of behavior prohibited under section 5. 
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activities with Iran illegal, closed loopholes to behavior it previously identified as 
unlawful, set additional sanctions for transgressions, and increased the difficulty 
of obtaining a waiver of penalties.208  All in all, the new constrictions were 
expansive. 
 As with ILSA in 1996, CISADA in 2010, and the Iran-Syria Act in 2012, 
the 112th Congress professed not to abandon multilateralism.209  The problem 
with a team approach, however, was that even after – or maybe because of – 
decades of sanctions, not everyone was playing on the American team against Iran 
by the rules America set. 
 So, Congress called for “prompt enforcement of the current multilateral 
sanctions regime with respect to Iran” and “expanded cooperation with 
international sanctions enforcement,” thereby intimating its displeasure that third 
countries were not adhering to United Nations or American rules.210  Congress, 
convinced that the sanctions imposed by the Security Council and allies did not go 
far enough, urged the President to “intensify diplomatic efforts” aimed at 
convincing the United Nations and individual allies to expand prohibitions and 
sanctions to: (1) forbid issuing visas to Iranian officials involved in WMD 
development, terrorist support, or human rights abuses; (2) bar landing at seaports 
by vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and at airports of cargo 
flights of Iran Air, because of their “role . . . in proliferation and illegal arms 
sales”; (3) limit the development of petroleum resources in Iran; and (4) restrict 
Iran’s importation of refined petroleum.211 
 In keeping with the 2012 Budget Act, Congress instructed the President 
to coax out increased crude oil production in third country suppliers to help third 
country buyers wean themselves off Iranian energy, and thereby reduce revenues 
Iran could generate from those sales to zero.212  To be sure the rest of the world 
understood what Congress wanted, and perhaps to jawbone compliance, Congress 
told the President he had to report biannually on third countries that were not 
imposing measures against Iran.213  Interestingly, Congress has influence in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
208  Among the loopholes closed was a clarification that sanctions could be imposed 
on foreign persons who assisted in the evasion of American sanctions.  The clarification 
came, however, not via the 2012 Iran-Syria Act statutory language, but via Executive Order 
Number 13608.  President Barack H. Obama signed this Order on May 1, 2012, invoking 
the authority (inter alia) of the IEEPA.  See Exec. Order No. 13,608, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,409 
(May 1, 2012).  Sanctions on evaders could be lifted only if the criteria for the CISADA 
Sunset Rule (discussed earlier) were met, namely, Iran changed its behavior with respect to 
WMDs and terrorism.  See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 
217(b), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 727; CISADA § 401(a), 22 
U.S.C. § 8513a. 
209  For a chart of the sessions of Congress, see Guide: Congressional Session Chart, 
supra note 7. 
210 See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 101(1), (2)(D), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 721-22. 
211  See id. § 102(a), (a)(1)-(3), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 723. 
212  See id. § 102(a)(4)-(5), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 723. 
213  See id. § 102(b), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 723-24. 
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actions related to Iran of the World Trade Organization, and its predecessor, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  If either body adjudicated a decision 
about sanctions on Iran, then Congress wanted to know beforehand, perhaps it 
could make an a priori admonition against an adverse outcome or a notification 
that it would take countermeasures against such an outcome.214 
 
 
B. 1st: Expanded Prohibitions Against Iranian Energy Sector 
 
 The 2012 Iran-Syria Act clarified – in effect, expanded – the list of 
prohibited transactions.  The two broad sanctionable behaviors remained the same: 
(1) economic transactions in the energy (meaning petroleum or refined gasoline) 
sector of Iran, and (2) dealings relating to WMDs or advanced conventional 
weaponry.  But comparing the lists of prohibited transactions under the 1996 Iran 
Sanctions Act, as amended in 2010 by CISADA, and the 2012 legislation showed 
how Congress plugged gaps, sometimes with expansive language, and other times 
with precise terms. 
 Its main target again was the sector in which Iran traditionally held an 
international comparative advantage: energy.  In both the 1996-2010 and 2012 
iterations of the legislation, the prohibition against investing more than U.S. $20 
million in a twelve-month period in the petroleum sector of Iran remained the 
same.215  However, the new legislation effectively lowered the threshold to U.S. 
$1 million per transaction, or U.S. $5 million annually.  That was because it 
barred provision of goods, services, technology, or support to Iran that “could” 
help it develop its petroleum resources.216  In other words, not only was foreign 
direct investment in that sector illegal, but so too was nearly any transaction. 
 Moreover, the 2012 Iran-Syria Act tightened other economic prohibitions 




214  See id. § 102(b)(6), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 724. 
215  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(1), amended by CISADA, reprinted 
in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135-36, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(1), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 688. 
216  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(1), amended by CISADA, reprinted 
in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135-36, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 
5(a)(5(A), (B)(i), further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 690. 
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1. Prohibition Against Helping Iran Produce Refined Petroleum 
Products217 
 
 In the 2012 legislation, Congress clarified this prohibition applied not 
just to providing Iran with goods, services, technology, information, or support for 
it to construct, modernize, or repair petroleum refineries (as under the 1996 and 
2010 legislation).  It also covered any “direct and significant assistance . . . 
directly associated with infrastructure, including construction of port facilities, 
railways, and roads, the primary use of which is to support the delivery of refined 
petroleum products.”218  This expansive language essentially barred any trade or 
investment in the infrastructure of Iran, as long as such transactions were entered 
into “knowingly” (meaning actual or constructive knowledge),219 exceeded a U.S. 
$1 million threshold (or U.S. $5 million in twelve months), and “could” possibly 
help Iran. 
 Exactly how the United States would determine whether a particular 
Iranian port, railway, or road was “primarily used” by petroleum refiners was 
unclear.  Did “primary use” mean 51 percent of the traffic?  Over what period?  
By what measure (value or volume)?  Who would obtain the data and check the 
figures?  Would a telecommunications facility, or a petroleum engineering school, 
be considered “infrastructure” (given that the new language was non-exclusive by 
virtue of the preposition “including”).  Perhaps these questions were what 
Congress intended, namely, to deter traders and investors by injecting uncertainty 
into their dealings with Iran. 
 
 
2. Prohibition Against Exportation of Refined Petroleum Products to 
Iran220 
 
 It remained illegal to sell refined petroleum to Iran and to provide it with 
goods, services, technology, information, or support that might help it import 
refined petroleum.  But the 2012 language closed a loophole and broadened the 
meaning of what “could directly and significantly contribute” to Iran’s ability to 
import gasoline.  The loophole concerned barter trade. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
217  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(2)(B), amended by CISADA, 
reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135-36, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
§ 5(a)(2)(B), further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 688. 
218  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(2)(A)-(B), (5)(A), (B)(ii), amended by Iran 
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, 
supra note 11, at 688, 690. 
219  See id. § 14(13), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 706. 
220  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(3)(B)(i)-(iii), amended by CISADA, 
reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1137, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 
5(a)(3)(B)(i)-(v), further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 689. 
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 Suppose a country, such as China or India, shipped gasoline it refined 
(possibly from Iranian crude oil) to Iran, in exchange for pistachios.  Such 
bartering, and any insurance for it, was illegal under the new language.221  After 
all, barter trade easily “could” be a “significant contribution” to Iran’s ability to 
import refined petroleum – indeed, it was. 
  
 
3. Prohibition Against JVs for Iranian Petroleum Resource 
Development222 
 
 American sanctions under the 1996 legislation, as amended in 2010, 
barred investments above U.S. $20 million in petroleum resource development in 
Iran.  They did not expressly forbid investments in petroleum resources outside of 
Iran that may redound to the benefit of Iran.  For instance, a person could enter 
into a JV agreement for petroleum resources in Venezuela, and the deal might 
help Iran develop its petroleum resources within Iran.  It could do so if Iran was a 
JV partner, or otherwise obtained goods, services, or know-how from the 
Venezuelan project that Iran could transfer and apply to its own sector. 
 Once again, Congress moved to close the loophole, and in so doing, 
unilaterally expanded the extraterritorial reach of the sanctions.  Via the 2012 
amendments, Congress forbade any JV in petroleum resources anywhere in the 
world outside of Iran if the Iranian government was a “substantial partner or 
investor,” or Iran “could, through a direct operational role . . . or by other means, 
receive technological knowledge or equipment not previously available to Iran 
that could directly and significantly contribute to the enhancement of Iran’s ability 
to develop petroleum resources in Iran.”223  The italicized terms gave wide latitude 
for interpretation.  In turn, prospective JV partners would be uncertain as to 
whether a project might run afoul of the prohibition, and likely eschew the project 
– an effect Congress no doubt sought. 
 Two points about this amendment were remarkable.  First, the fact that 
the JV might help a developing or least developed country, such as in West Africa, 
was irrelevant.  If a deal had the potential to help Iran, then it did not matter if it 
might also help a poor country seeking to grow, alleviate internal poverty, or 
combat Islamist extremism. 
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221  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(3)(B)(iv), amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 689. 
222  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a), amended by CISADA, reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135-37, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(4), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 689-90. 
223  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(4)(A)(ii), amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 690.  The mens rea requirement again was “knowingly.”  See id. § 14(13), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 706. 
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 Second, the amendment applied retroactively to all JVs on or after 
January 1, 2002 through enactment of the 2012 Iran-Syria Act.224  That is, any JVs 
established in the last decade were sanctionable.  The only way to avoid sanctions 
was to terminate the JV within 180 days of enactment of the 2012 Act.225  Bluntly 
put, this sanction not only barred future investments in all third countries, but it 
also demanded disinvestment around the world.  That such retroactivity might be 
an unconstitutional taking, or at least an unfair one, seemed not to matter. 
 
 
4. Prohibition Against Buying Iranian Petrochemical Products226  
 
 So eager was Congress in 2012 to impede Iran from developing its 
petroleum resources that it expanded the sanctions regime to cover “petrochemical 
products.”  These downstream articles included “any aromatic, olefin, or synthesis 
gas, and any derivative of such a gas, including ethylene, propylene, butadiene, 
benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, methanol, and urea.”227 
 Suppose Iran produced ammonia for use in household cleaning solutions, 
or urea as a component in agricultural fertilizer.  Suppose, further, a British firm 
making such solutions, or a Swiss company producing fertilizer, bought the 
component petrochemicals from Iran. If the fair market value of their purchases 
exceeded U.S. $250,000 (or $1 million annually), then Congress forbade them.228 
 As this hypothetical example illustrates, this prohibition meant persons in 
third countries could not source petrochemical inputs – sometimes called 
“feedstock” – from Iran.  In turn, Iran, even if it could develop the feedstock, 
would have a difficult time finding foreign markets for it if persons in those 
markets complied with the sanctions. 
 
 
5. Prohibition Against Transporting Crude Oil from Iran229  
 
 Shipping crude oil out of Iran certainly could help Iran develop both its 
petroleum resources and ability to obtain gasoline.  Presumably, Congress meant 
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224  See id. § 5(a)(4)(A)(i), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 690. 
225  See id. § 5(a)(4)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 690. 
226  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a), amended by CISADA, reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135-37, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(6), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 691. 
227  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 14(16), amended by Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 707. 
228  Id. § 5(a)(6)(A)(i)-(ii), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 691. 
229  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a), amended by CISADA, reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135-37, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(7), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 691-92. 
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to bar such shipments under its 1996 and 2010 legislation, but with major oil 
importers like China, India, and Japan dependent on foreign – including Iranian – 
crude, ferrying oil out of Iran persisted.  With its 2012 changes, Congress made 
clear it wanted them to cease such transportation by targeting not just persons in 
the importing countries, but also the shippers themselves. 
 Carriage companies thus found themselves in the sight line of Congress: 
anyone who was a “controlling beneficial owner,” or who otherwise owned, 
operated, controlled, or insured a vessel used to transport crude oil from Iran to 
any other country in the world, was liable.230  Congress allowed a small safe 
harbor for underwriters or insurers that “exercised due diligence” to ensure the 
persons for which they were providing protective policies were not shipping from 
Iran.231 
 Interestingly, for this particular prohibition, Congress limited the 
circumstances in which sanctions could be imposed in three ways.  First, Congress 
bifurcated the mens rea requirement: a “controlling beneficial owner” had to have 
“actual knowledge” of the use of their vessel, whereas for all other owners, 
operators, controllers, or insurers, actual or constructive knowledge (“knew or 
should have known”) was sufficient.232  This adjustment made it more difficult to 
impose sanctions on controlling beneficial owners, but easier on all others 
involved in shipping crude oil from Iran.  Why Congress chose to do so is unclear, 
if its goal was to tighten sanctions unreservedly. 
 Second, sanctions were inapplicable if the President determined that a 
third country to which Iranian crude oil was shipped had an “[in]sufficient supply 
or petroleum and petroleum products” of non-Iranian origin. 233   Congress 
apparently appreciated that some third countries could not easily or swiftly 
substitute their supply sources for Iran, so it did not want to impose sanctions on 
transporting Iranian crude to them unless they could “reduce significantly their 
purchases from Iran.”234 
 Third, sanctions also were inapplicable to any foreign financial 
institution from a country that had “significantly reduced its volume of crude oil 
purchases from Iran.”235  This limitation, linked to the 2012 National Defense 
Authorization Act (discussed below), referred to successive 180-day periods in 
which the President must report on the extent to which third countries were 
complying with sanctions against transactions with the CBI and Iranian financial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
230  Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(7)(A)(i), amended by Iran Threat Reduction 
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
691. 
231  See id. § 5(a)(9), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 693. 
232  Id. § 5(a)(7)(A)(ii)(I)-(II), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 691. 
233  Id. § 5(a)(7)(B)(i), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 691. 
234  Id. 
235  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1245(d)(4)(D), 22 
U.S.C. § 8513a(d)(4)(D); Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(7)(B)(ii), amended by Iran 
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, 
supra note 11, at 691-92. 
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institutions.  Essentially, a country had six months to reduce its dependence on 
Iranian crude oil; otherwise, its banks could be targeted for sanctions. 
 
 
6. Prohibition Against Concealing Iranian Origin of Crude Oil or Refined 
Petroleum Products236  
 
 Any person determined to skirt the American prohibition against 
shipping crude oil or refined petroleum from Iran would find smuggling to be an 
obvious, albeit wicked, solution.! !Setting moral or reputational concerns aside, a 
prospective smuggler might balance reward against risk to calculate whether 
concealing the true origin of energy resources it transports is worthwhile.  As 
sanctions tightened around Iran, the price of those resources would rise.  
Depending on how high the price rose, the potential reward for shipping Iranian 
crude oil or refined petroleum products, disguised as originating elsewhere, could 
offset the expected value (i.e., probability of imposition multiplied by dollar value 
of penalty) of any sanction. 
 To deter smuggling, Congress made concealment itself a sanctionable 
offense.237  In doing so, it was not breaking new legal ground; accurate country of 
origin reporting is required under United States Customs Law.  But what was 
novel was – again – the extraterritorial reach of the sanction.  It now was illegal to 
falsely report the true Iranian origin of crude oil or refined petroleum products, 
regardless of the recipient of the report.  Whether the products were American or 
foreign was irrelevant; it was the act of concealment that mattered. 
 Congress applied the prohibition against concealing Iran as the country 
of origin of crude oil or refined petroleum products coextensively with the 
prohibition against transporting crude oil: it applied to any person that was “a 
controlling beneficial owner” of, or that “otherwise owns, operates, or controls,” a 
vessel used to transport Iranian energy resources.238  It used the same bifurcated 
mens rea requirement – “actual knowledge” to the first group, and “knowingly” 
(i.e., actual or constructive knowledge) for the second group – as before.  And, as 
before, it granted a small safe harbor to underwriters or insurers if they “exercised 
due diligence” to ensure the persons for which they were providing protective 
policies were not transporting energy products out of Iran.239 
 Two points are noteworthy.  First, lest prospective smugglers have any 
doubt as to whether American legislators were aware of how they might conceal 
what they were transporting, Congress listed two non-exclusive examples of 
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236  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a), amended by CISADA, reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1135-37, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(8), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 692-93. 
237  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(8), amended by Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 692. 
238  Id. § 5(a)(8)(A), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 692. 
239  See id. § 5(a)(9), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 693. 
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sanctionable behavior: allowing the vessel operator to disenable the satellite 
tracking device on the vessel, or obscuring the fact that the vessel is owned, 
operated, or controlled by the Iranian government, National Iranian Tanker 
Company (NITC), or Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) (or by 
entities controlled by them).240  Moreover, a prospective smuggler was deemed to 
have “actual knowledge” that Iran, the NITC, or IRISL had an interest in a vessel 
if OFAC listed the International Maritime Organization (IMO) of that vessel.241  
In effect, if OFAC published the IMO number of the vessel, then every person, 
regardless of location, was deemed to know that the vessel was Iranian, and use of 
it to ship crude oil or petroleum products out of Iran was barred. 
 Second, lest prospective smugglers have any doubt as to how serious 
Congress was in its intention to ensure countries of origin of crude oil and refined 
petroleum products were reported accurately and transparently, it empowered the 
President to impose a supplemental sanction on them.242  In addition to choosing 
and applying five of nine sanctions from the standard menu, the President could 
impose a sixth punishment, namely, on the vessel used to ship Iranian energy 
resources – a ban.  The President could bar that vessel from landing at any 
American port for up to two years. 
 The prohibition against smuggling adduced two other dimensions of the 
sanctions amendments wrought by the 2012 Iran-Syria Act.  First, Congress 
effectively widened the ban on FDI in the Iranian energy sector and trade in 
Iranian energy products to a ban on cargo ships in which Iran had an interest.  
Doing so was consistent with the 2010 CISADA expansion of sanctions from the 
petroleum sector per se to downstream products, namely, refined petroleum.  
(That same kind of expansion is seen below with respect to allied services such as 
financing and insurance.) 
 Second, Congress anticipated how particular prohibitions might be 
violated, and tried to block such moves.  Doing so was consistent with the 2010 
CISADA expansion of sanctions from FDI to exportation and importation, and 
with the 2012 Iran-Syria Act’s further expansion to JVs.  In brief, the 
unmistakable trend was one from an initial narrow definition, targeting one 
product’s category and behavior, to downstream products, supporting services, 
and anticipated reactions by would-be wrongdoers. 
In sum, the 2012 Iran-Syria Act amendments to the 1996 sanctions 
regime, as amended by the 2010 legislation, were breathtaking.  America closed 
loopholes quite literally to strangle the Iranian energy sector, and did so in the 
most extraterritorial of manners.  
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240  See id. § 5(a)(8)(A)(i)-(ii), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 692. 
241  See id. § 5(a)(8)(C)(i)-(ii), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
692-93. 
242  See id. § 5(a)(8)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 692. 
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C. 2nd: Barring Transshipment of Military Items 
 
 The 2012 Iran-Syria Act rewrote the prohibition in the 1996 Iran 
Sanctions Act aimed at preventing Iran from obtaining a WMD.  The 1996 Act, 
coupled with the 2010 CISADA amendments, barred knowing exportation of 
goods, services, or technology that would contribute materially to the ability of 
Iran to obtain a WMD or destabilizing numbers of advanced conventional 
weaponry.  That prohibition left open three loopholes: transshipment, constructive 
knowledge, and JVs in uranium mining.  Congress closed them with the 2012 
Act.243 
 First, any “person” that “exported or transferred, or permitted or 
otherwise facilitated the transshipment of, any goods, services, technology, or 
other items to any other person” now was liable.244  Second, actual knowledge 
was not necessary; constructive knowledge – that a person “should have known” – 
was enough.245  Of what did a person need actual or constructive knowledge?  
Two points: first, that the export, transfer, or transshipment to another person 
“would likely result” in that other person exporting, transferring, or transshipping 
prohibited items to Iran, and second, that the result “would contribute materially 
to the ability of Iran” to develop WMDs or destabilizing numbers of advanced 
conventional weapons. 
 To be clear, closing the first two loopholes meant: 
 
(1) A person need not ship forbidden items directly to Iran.  Shipping 
them through one or more intermediaries was enough.  For example, 
a person in Belarus could export such items to another person in 
Singapore.  If that other person in Singapore subsequently 
transferred the items to Iran, directly or through another stage of 
transshipment, for example, through Yemen, then liability could 
attach to the first person, and indeed every person in the 
transactional chain. 
 
(2) The first person in the chain need not know for sure that the second 
or a subsequent person is sending the forbidden items onward to Iran.  
If that person ought to have known the next or a subsequent person 
likely would send the items to Iran, then that rather speculative 
anticipation was enough.  Presumably, constructive knowledge 
would exist if the first person should have known the goods, services, 
technology, or other items at issue were headed to Dubai, and that 
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243  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(b), amended by CISADA, reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1138-39, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(b), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 693-95. 
244  Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(b)(1)(A), amended by Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 693. 
245  Id. § 5(b)(1)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 693. 
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Dubai was a prominent location for smuggling items in small vessels 
across the Gulf to Iran. 
 
(3) As for the second of the two mens rea elements – actual or 
constructive knowledge that the items “would contribute materially” 
to Iran’s weapons programs – there was no need for a person to have 
detailed knowledge of those programs.  Rather, that knowledge 
presumably could be inferred from the nature of the goods, services, 
technology, or items that were exported, transferred, or trans-shipped.  
For example, if the goods were centrifuges for enriching uranium, or 
the technology was used for drones, then could there be doubt that 
the contribution would be material? 
 
Yet, even with these changes, arguably, a rather large and threatening loophole 
remained: a person might not ship or transship anything to Iran, but might engage 
in a JV that involves mining, producing, or transporting uranium.  Would that 
participation be sanctionable? 
 Even reading the amended statutory language broadly, with the closure of 
the first two loopholes, the answer was “no.”  Uranium is a “good,” but helping to 
mine or produce it is not the same as “exporting,” “transferring,” or transshipping 
it.”  For example, a person could simply assist in removal of uranium from Russia, 
even in partnership with an Iranian government entity or person connected to that 
entity.  If the first person did no more, then it did not engage in a prohibited 
transaction.  (Note the person did not invest in Iran, much less in the petroleum 
resources sector of Iran.)  Yet, if the uranium mined in Russia found its way to 
Iran, then surely Iran’s ability to construct a nuclear weapon would be enhanced. 
 So, with the 2012 Iran-Syria Act, Congress closed this loophole.  Any 
person, anywhere in the world, was barred from participating in a JV “that 
involve[d] any activity relating to the mining, production, or transportation of 
uranium” with (1) the government of Iran, 2) an entity incorporated in or subject 
to the jurisdiction of Iran, or (3) a person acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or 
owned or controlled by that government or such an entity.246  The mens rea 
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246  Id. § 5(b)(2)(A)(i), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 693-94.  
Note this proscription applied on or after February 2, 2012.  Before that date, an additional 
set of criteria applied: the uranium had to be transferred directly or indirectly to Iran, the 
Iranian government had to receive “significant revenue,” or Iran could have obtained 
technology or equipment it did not previously have that could have contributed materially 
to it developing nuclear weapons.  See id. § 5(b)(2)(A)(ii), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, 
supra note 11, at 694.  This prohibition and attendant sanctions thus applied retroactively, 
unless a person agreed to terminate its JV participation within 180 days of enactment of the 
Iran-Syria Act.  See id. § 5(b)(2)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 694. 
The other aspects of the prohibition against helping Iran obtain WMDs or 
destabilizing numbers of advanced conventional weapons remained the same, namely, the 
statutory provisions concerning the additional mandatory sanction, and the exception 
thereto, about export licensing.  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(b)(2), amended by 
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requirement, “knowingly,” covered actual or constructive knowledge.247  So, for 
example, Rio Tinto Zinc, the Australian mining multinational corporation, could 
not participate in a JV with Tata Mining, the Indian natural resources company, if 
Tata had an understanding with a business association located in Tehran, and that 
JV engaged in manufacturing apparel to protect mining workers against radiation.  
After all, tracking the statutory language, making such apparel is an “activity” that 
“relat[es] to” uranium mining. 
 Here again, it is worth reminding that in closing all three loopholes, 
Congress again asserted its extraterritorial reach.  None of the persons in the 






CISADA, reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1138-39, with Iran Sanctions 
Act of 1996 § 5(b)(3), further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights 
Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 694-95. 
247  Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 §§ 5(b)(2)(A), 14(13), amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 693. 
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D. 3rd: Government Procurement Certification Against Revolutionary 
Guards 
 
 The 2012 Iran-Syria Act also ushered in a notable change to government 
contracting certifications.248  Any prospective contractor for the United States 
government was obligated not only to certify it was not engaging in a prohibited 
activity (as before), but also that it was not “knowingly” involved in a “significant 
transaction” with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. 249   This certification 
extended to any officials, agents, or affiliates of the Guard, the property or interest 
in property of which were blocked by the United States under the IEEPA.  False 
certification was punishable by exclusion from the list of approved government 
contractors (again, as before) for at least two years (a curious decrease from three 
years).250  
 The additional certification rule, while seemingly minor, reflected a 
continuation of the earlier shift in American sanctions policy.  Up until the 2010 
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248  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(b), amended by CISADA, reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1142-43, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(b), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 698-700. 
The basic requirement concerning Iran certifications relating to section 5 
prohibitions remained the same, but with minor renumbering.  Compare Iran Sanctions Act 
of 1996 § 6(b)(1), amended by CISADA, reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 
1142, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(b)(1)(A), further amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 698-99. 
Likewise, clarifications regarding certain products, the rule of construction, and 
waivers were unchanged.  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(b)(3)-(5), amended by 
CISADA, reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1143, with Iran Sanctions Act 
of 1996 § 6(b)(3)-(5), further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights 
Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 699-700. 
The definition of “executive agency” stayed the same, and to it, the 2012 Act 
added a definition of “federal acquisition regulation.”  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
§ 6(b)(6), amended by CISADA, reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1143, 
with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(b)(6)(A)-(B), further amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 699-700.  The 2012 Act amended the provisions on applicability to reflect its 
certification requirement against dealing with the Guards.  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 
1996 § 6(b)(7), amended by CISADA, reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 
1143, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(b)(7)(A)-(B), further amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 699-700. 
249  Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(b)(1)(B), amended by Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 699. 
250  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(b)(2)(A)-(B), amended by CISADA, 
reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1138-39, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
§ 6(b)(2)(A)-(B), further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 699-700. 
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CISADA, and aside from IEEPA asset freezes, the United States had not focused 
on targeting the Guard.  Prohibited transactions took aim at economic sectors of 
Iran, especially petroleum and refined gasoline, not necessarily at economic 
agents within Iran.  From an American perspective, the problem with looking at 
transactions, not transactors, was that the Guard actually controlled (directly or 
indirectly) businesses in Iran.  Moreover, the Guard was politically powerful, and 
close to the Supreme Leader.  Consequently, the 2012 Iran-Syria Act certification 
requirement was a step toward weakening the Guard as an anti-American 
economic and political force. 
 
 
E. 4th: Diversion Prohibition 
 
 Pursuant to CISADA, America had a trade embargo against Iran, and a 
humanitarian exception thereto. 251   Unscrupulous individuals, in public and 
private areas, sometimes exploited such an exception for their own benefit.  They 
diverted goods, such as food and medicine, or they misappropriated the proceeds 
from the sale or resale of the excepted goods.  The embargo did not expressly 
prohibit these corrupt behaviors.  The 2012 Iran-Syria Act closed this loophole. 
 The Act directed the President to submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a list of persons he determined had channeled goods (be they food, 
medicine, or other humanitarian items) intended for the Iranian people away from 
them, or made off with funds from their sale or resale.252  Here, too, there was no 
intent requirement – the offense was a strict liability one.  The Act then required 
the President to impose punishment upon those persons that were applicable to 
human rights abusers (except, logically, for the sanction of forbidding importation 
of goods, as that would be counter-productive to the aim of humanitarian goods 
reaching needy Iranians).253  The fact that diverting goods was a strict liability 
offense made sense, because at issue was corruption interfering with aid reaching 
the Iranian people, and thus undermining any pretense that the punishments 





251  See CISADA § 103(a), (b)(1)(A), (b)(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 708-09. 
252  See id. § 105C(b)(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 715; Iran 
Freedom Support Act, Pub. L. 109-293, § 1249, 120 Stat. 344-50 (2006), reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 748. 
253  See CISADA § 105C(a)(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
715; Iran Freedom Support Act § 1249, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
748. 
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F. 5th: Shipping and Insurance Prohibition 
 
 None of the aforementioned constrictions affected carriage of goods to or 
from Iran if those goods were unrelated to the energy sector.  However, what if a 
shipping company provided a vessel used to transport goods to Iran on which Iran 
could use to acquire WMDs or support terrorists?  Centrifuges and rocket-
propelled grenades (RPGs) would be quintessential examples, and perhaps a state-
owned Chinese freight company, such as the Chinese Ocean Shipping Company 
(COSCO) or China Shipping Container Lines (CSCL), might carry them from 
their port of origin to Bandar Abbas.254  Similarly, suppose P&I Clubs or Munich 
Re provided marine cargo insurance or reinsurance for the transportation of these 
items.255 
 To discourage the likes of COSCO and CSCL, and non-state owned 
enterprise (SOE) carriage companies, from shipping goods to Iran, the 2012 Iran-
Syria Act rendered them liable for any “knowing” (that is, actual or constructive 
knowledge) sale, lease, or provision of a vessel used to carry “to or from Iran . . . 
goods that could materially contribute to” the WMD or terrorist activities of 
Iran.256  Likewise, the Act sought to bar financial institutions, indeed, any person, 
from providing marine cargo insurance for transporting the forbidden merchandise 
to Iran.257  So expansive was the prohibition that it covered “any other shipping 
service.”258  Hence, supplying merchant marine crews, catering, or sanitation, or 
possibly even tugboat assistance, was barred.  Ironically, pre-shipment inspection 
(PSI) services might even be ensnared in this phraseology. 
 Any “person,” American or otherwise, legal or natural, was potentially 
liable, as was any person in a position of ownership, control, or common 
ownership control.259  The sanction was a blocking one: the United States would 
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254 See List of Freight Ship Companies, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/List_of_freight_ship_companies (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
255  These companies are among the top insurers in the world.  See Top 10 Insurance 
Players, LLOYD’S LIST INTELLIGENCE, http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/top100/insurance/ 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2014).   
256  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 211(a), 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 8711, 8721-24, 8741-44, 8781, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 724.  
In respect of the definition of “knowing,” see Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 §§ 5(b)(2), 14(13), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 693, 706. 
257  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 211(a), reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 724. 
258 Id. 
259  Id.; see also id. § 211(e), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 725 
(containing a rule of construction to ensure section 211 does not restrict the authority of the 
President under the IEEPA to sanction a person).  The mens rea requirement for owners or 
controllers was “actual knowledge or should have known,” and for a one owned, controlled 
by, or under common ownership of the primary person was “knowing[] engage[ment]” in 
the provision of a vessel, marine insurance, or other shipping service.  Id. § 211(b)(2)(C), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 725. 
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forbid any transaction in the property or interests of that person on which it could 
lay hands.  So, for instance, a COSCO or CSCL vessel in the port of Baltimore 
might be seized, or accounts of P&I Clubs or Munich Re in New York might be 
frozen.  Even the assets of companies that hired workers from impoverished towns 
and villages in developing countries, such as Magsaysay, a Philippine provider of 
(inter alia) shipping personnel from captains to bakers, were at risk.260  A 
Presidential waiver was possible, but only if it was “vital to the national interests” 
of the United States, and the President explained his decision to Congress.261 
 Notably, however, the sanction was different if the National Iranian Oil 
Company (NOIC) or National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) was involved. 
Suppose P&I Clubs or Munich Re underwrote insurance (or reinsurance) for the 
NIOC or NITC.  Then the insurer would be subject to five of the nine sanctions 
(discussed below).262  The tough insurance penalties, apparently, were premised 
on the view that NIOC and NITC were directly engaged in helping Iran obtain 
revenues for its petroleum and petroleum resources that Iran funneled to WMD 
and terrorist activities.  Only if P&I Clubs or Munich Re exercised due diligence 
to avoid underwriting policies for NIOC or NITC, or if their policies were for 
shipments of food, medicine, or humanitarian assistance, could they escape 
sanctions.263 
 To be sure, it remained lawful to carry or insure goods, or give shipping 
services for, transportation between Iran and third countries not related to these 
activities.  But doing so meant freight companies had to ascertain what truly was 
inside the containers on vessels they provided.  That meant more rigorous 
inspections, which drove up shipping costs to Iran.  The possibility of mishaps, 
coupled with the threat of American penalties, pressed up insurance premiums. 
Why bother with the headaches, transactions costs, and risks associated with 
compliance?  Perhaps it was better not to carry or insure, or give attendant 
shipping services for, goods to or from Iran.  That would be an outcome Congress 
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260 See generally MAGSAYSAY, www.magsaysay.com.ph (last visited Apr. 4, 2014); 
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, WORKABROAD.PH, www.workabroad.ph/list_spe 
cific_jobs.php?by_what=agency&id=2459 (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (providing available 
jobs for the Magsaysay corporation). 
261  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 211(c)(1)-(2), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 724.  In this instance, vessel operators or 
others conducting or facilitating “significant financial transactions with persons managing 
ports in Iran” were also subject to reporting every ninety days.  Id. § 211(d)(1), reprinted in 
2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 725.  Such reports could contain a classified Annex.  
See id. § 211(d)(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 725. 
262  Id. § 212(a), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 725. 
263  Id. § 212(b)(1)-(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 725-26.  If 
an insurer (or reinsurer) already had been underwriting policies for the NIOC or NITC, then 
it could escape sanctions by terminating its provision of those services to them.  See id. § 
212(b)(3), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 726; see also id. § 212(e), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 726-27 (containing a rule of construction 
to ensure section 211 does not restrict the authority of the President under the IEEPA to 
sanction a person). 
328 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law      Vol. 31, No. 2        2014!
!
!
would approve of, as it would turn the de jure American trade embargo against 
Iran into a de facto global trade ban. 
 
 
G. 6th: Sovereign Debt Prohibition  
 
 Continuing its efforts to ostracize Iran from the world of international 
finance, Congress moved to deny Iran access to sovereign debt markets.  Congress 
identified sovereign debt as potential assistance to the energy sector of Iran.  
Central and sub-central governments around the world issue debt to finance 
infrastructure development projects.  In the case of Iran, FDI projects valued 
above a defined threshold in the energy sector had been illegal since 1996, but 
Iran could finance them by tapping financial markets outside of the United States.  
Simply put, Iran could substitute portfolio for direct investment.  To the extent 
Iran did so, it could funnel the consequent revenues from successful energy 
projects toward production of a nuclear bomb or support for Hezbollah. 
 Congress endeavored to choke off this source of funds by making it 
illegal to buy, subscribe to, or otherwise facilitate in the issuance by the Iranian 
government bonds or other debt instruments. 264   This move exerted bold 
extraterritorial force over world financial markets: no person, wherever located, 
could purchase, or even clear or settle trades, in Iranian sovereign debt.  Where 
that potential investor was located, the financial market or markets on which Iran 
attempted to float its bonds, or the place at which its debt instruments were 
cleared and settled, did not matter.  Of importance was whether the person acted 
“knowingly,” i.e., with active or constructive knowledge that the debt was that of 
the Iranian government or any entity, such as an SOE, owned or controlled by 
it.265  If the President found a person violated this prohibition, then he had to 
impose five of nine sanctions (discussed below) on that violator. 
 So, for instance, suppose a prominent hedge fund, such as Apollo 
Management Asia Pacific Limited, based in Hong Kong,266 invested in an over-
the-counter (OTC) issuance or private placement of convertible bonds by the 
NIOC.  The bonds are denominated in euro.  The Spanish bank, Santander, 
underwrites the offering.267  Would the fact that Apollo and Santander are not 
United States persons immunize them from liability?  Would the fact that the 
bonds are not denominated in dollars, or that they may be converted to equity, 
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264  Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(3)(B)(v), further amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 689. 
265  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 213(a)(1)-(2), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 727. 
266  See generally APOLLO GLOBAL MGMT., http://www.agm.com/Home.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2014) (discussing the activities and locations of the hedge fund).  
267  See generally SANTANDER BANK, https://www.santanderbank.com/us/ (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2014) (discussing the activities and locations of the bank). 
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matter?  Would the fact that the transaction is not conducted on an organized 
exchange, and performed entirely overseas, matter? 
 The answer to these questions is “no”: nothing on the face of the 
pertinent statute circumscribed the prohibition and attendant sanctions in 
accordance with these facts.  Similarly, whether the investors in Apollo were high 
net worth Americans would be immaterial.  To the contrary, the reality that 
Apollo and Santander have offices in New York, and Apollo surely has American 
investors, renders them and their assets vulnerable. 
 
 
H. 7th: Affiliates Prohibition  
 
 Thanks to CISADA, assets of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps to 
which the United States could obtain jurisdiction were frozen.  But, what about 
foreigners, especially non-Iranians, who operated as agents for the Guard?  What 
if they entered into energy or financial transactions with the Guard, or bartered 
deals for the Guard that did not involve a monetary payment?  CISADA did not 
directly target these aiders and abettors, nor put their assets at risk, and did not 
cover counter-trade.  The 2012 Iran-Syria Act addressed these questions, while 
maintaining the extant primary sanctions on the Guard.268 
 First, the Act closed the loophole by which a foreigner could help the 
Guard with impunity.269  Congress directed the President to identify and designate 
for sanctions any foreign person who was an “official[], agent[], or affiliate[]” of 
the Guard and to “block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests 
in property of that foreign person” that were in the United States or in the 
possession or control of a United States person.270  Likewise, the President was to 
deny entry of a Guard agent into the United States (unless that agent was coming 
to speak at the United Nations, or it was “vital to . . . [American] national security 
interests” to permit him entry).271 
 Read literally, this language could apply to a salesperson for Nestlé who 
sold baby formula to the spouse of an official in the Guard.  To screen out 
inconsequential agency relationships, Congress conveyed to the President the 
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268 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 301(d)-(f), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 729-30. 
269  Id. § 301, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 728-30. 
270  Id. § 301(a)(1)-(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 729. 
271  Id. § 301(d)-(e), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 729-30.  The 
first exception was needed if the United States was to comply with its United Nations treaty 
obligation, namely, the June 26, 1947 Agreement Between the United Nations and the 
United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, which entered 
into force on November 21, 1947.  See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 
of 2012 § 301(d)(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 730.   Invocation of 
the second exception required a Presidential report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, which could contain a classified Annex.  Id. § 301(e)(1)-(2), reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 730.  
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agents in which it had special interest: the President was to give priority in 
investigation to those persons who conducted, or tried to conduct, a “sensitive 
transaction” with the Guard.272  “Sensitive transactions” meant (exclusively) any 
(1) financial deal involving a non-Iranian bank in excess of U.S. $1 million (or 
summing above that threshold in a 12-month period); (2) manufacture, 
importation, or exportation of items Iran needed to develop a WMD; (3) 
production, purchase, or sale of any goods, services, or technology relating to the 
Iranian energy or petrochemical sector; or (4) procurement of restricted 
technology that would aid Iran in restricting the flow of news or expression of free 
speech.273  Thus, respectively, a bank account manager in a Malaysian bank who 
provided investment advice, a mine director in Russia who supervised the 
extraction of uranium, a port official in Rotterdam who oversaw shipments of 
crude oil, or an engineering professor at the University of Kansas who conducted 
research into plastics — all were potentially liable for violations of the agency 
prohibition if their dealings involved the Guard and the President identified them 
as “officials, agents, or affiliates” of the Guard.274 
 Significantly, Congress wrote the prohibition expansively to include 
another step downstream in the chain of a financial or commercial transaction. 
Suppose a foreign person “knowingly materially assist[s]” the Guard, or an agent 
or affiliate thereof who has been sanctioned, by providing funds, goods, services, 
or technology to Guard officials or agents.275  For example, suppose a Dutch 
commodities trader at ABN AMRO in Amsterdam brokers a sale of liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) by NatGaz, which is headquartered in Beirut, to the 
Bangkok office of the United Kingdom-based ITS Trading Company.276  If the 
President has sanctioned ITS Bangkok as a Guard agent, then the broker 
potentially is liable for having materially assisted the agent by arranging the sale 
of goods (LPG) and concomitant payment of funds.277 
 Likewise, suppose a foreign person enters into a “significant transaction” 
with the Guard or one of its affiliates.278  For instance, suppose a Singaporean 
businessman brokers an exchange of basmati rice from India for Iranian crude oil.  
The businessman is potentially liable, because “significant transaction” includes 
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272  Id. § 301(b)(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 729. 
273  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 301(c)(1)-(5), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 729; see also CISADA § 106(c), 22 
U.S.C. § 8515(c) (concerning the last defined type of “sensitive transaction”).  
274  See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 301(a)(1), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 729. 
275  Id. § 301(a)(1)(A), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 730. 
276  See ABN-AMRO GRP., http://www.abnamro.com/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 
17, 2014); NATGAZ, http://www.natgaz.com.lb/aboutus.aspx?aspxerrorpath=/default.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014); ITS TRADING CO., http://www.itstradingcompany.com (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2014).  
277  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 302(b), reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 731. 
278  Id. § 302(a)(1)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 730. 
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barter trade involving the Guard or its network, assuming the President designated 
and sanctioned him as an affiliate.279 
 In sum, the affiliate prohibition was up to two steps removed from the 
Guard: it extended not only to (1) the agent, but also to (2) any foreign person 
who supports that agent.  In both hypothetical transactions, the statutory language 
did not require that the Guard itself buy the LPG or sell the crude oil.  And, in 
both cases, the mandatory penalty was imposition of five from the standard menu 
of nine sanctions (discussed below).280  Sanctions on the foreign person-supporter 
could not be waived unless that person had ceased the forbidden behavior, or a 
waiver was “essential” to American national security interests, and would not 
terminate until the person stopped the behavior and gave assurances against re-
engagement.281 
 In this two-step chain, foreign agents or supporters of the Guard the 
President had to identify and punish were not limited to private natural or legal 
persons, but public sector bodies were also included.  Congress made sure in the 
2012 Iran-Syria Act to forbid any foreign government agency of any country in 
the world from transacting with the Guard or its agents.  That is, suppose the 
President determined a third-country government entity: “[K]nowingly and 
materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological 
support for, or goods or services in support of, or knowingly and materially 
engaged in a significant financial transaction with” a foreign person, and that this 
person was an “official, agent, or affiliate” of the Guard.282  Then, the entity was 
potentially liable. 
 To illustrate via modest modifications to the above hypotheticals, 
suppose the Dutch Ministry of Finance renders advisory services to the ABN 
AMRO trader on the application of bank secrecy laws to commodity brokerage, or 
the Ministry of Commerce in India lends support in the form of material and 
technology on the proper conduct of barter trade to the Singaporean businessman 
broker.  Assuming the trader or broker qualifies as Guard agents or affiliates, then 
the Dutch and Indian government bodies could be held to account.283 
 Sanctions on those sovereign bodies were not mandatory, but Congress 
clearly nudged the President to enforce them by listing the possible punishments: 
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279  Id. § 302(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (b), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
730-31. 
280  Id. § 302(b)(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 731. 
281  Id. § 302(b), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 731; see also id. § 
302(e), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 732 (concerning waiver of 
Presidential identifications and designations of foreign person-supporters on the ground of 
“damage” to national security). 
282  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 303(a)(1), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 732.  Culpability also could arise if the 
foreign person was subject to financial sanctions under pertinent United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions.  See id. § 303(a)(2)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 
11, at 732-33. 
283  See id. § 303(a)(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 733. 
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denial of foreign aid, defense assistance, and financial or credit support; rejection 
of export licenses for controlled items (in particular, weapons); opposition to 
official international financial institution lending and technical assistance; and 
IEEPA penalties.284  Once imposed, sanctions could be terminated only if doing so 
was “essential” to United States national security, the foreign government entity 
ceased its behavior, or the foreign person with whom or which it dealt no longer 
acted for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.285  Congress further indicated its 
preference for sanctions against foreign government agencies that transacted with 
the Guard or its supporters by obliging the President to explain to it why he opted 
(if he did) for clemency.286  Manifestly, then, Congress sought to isolate the Guard 
as much as possible by telling the private and public sectors around the world not 
to deal with them or their affiliates. 
 
 
I. 8th: Tightening Human Rights and Censorship Prohibitions  
 
 The 2012 Iran-Syria Act amended the 2010 CISADA rules on human 
rights abuses.  Those rules directed sanctions against individual Iranian officials 
for disrespecting the human rights of Iranians during and after the Green 
Revolution.  But who, specifically, were those officials?  Moreover, should not the 
supply to Iran of the physical instruments of torture and devices for censorship be 
forbidden?  Finally, ought not the faceless transferors, sometimes white-collar 
professionals, who gave torturers and censors their tools, be held accountable? 
 CISADA did not answer these three questions.  The Act essentially 
closed the loopholes by naming names and establishing as prohibited behaviors 
the shipment of those heinous tools.287   First, Congress stated its sense that: 
 
[T]he Supreme Leader of Iran, the President of Iran, senior 
members of the Intelligence Ministry of Iran, senior members of 
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ansar-e-Hezbollah and 
Basij-e-Mostaz’afin, and the Ministries of Defense, Interior, 
Justice, and Telecommunications are ultimately responsible for 
ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing a pattern and 
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284  Id. § 303(b)(1)(A)-(G), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 733-34; 
see also id. § 304, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 735 (containing a rule 
of construction against limiting Presidential authority to impose sanctions under the 
IEEPA). 
285  Id. § 303(c)(1)-(3), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 734. 
286  See id. § 303(d), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 734.  
Reporting was to be to all House and Senate Committees with jurisdiction over foreign 
relations, appropriations, financial institutions, armed services, and intelligence.  See id. § 
303(e)(1)-(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 734-35. 
287  See CISADA §§ 105A(a)-(b), 105B(a)-(b), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, 
supra note 11, at 713-15. 
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practice of serious human rights abuses against the Iranian 
people . . . .288 
 
Thus, the President “should” include those people on the CISADA list of human 
rights violators.289  To be sure the President understood what “should” meant, 
Congress ordered a “detailed report” to the appropriate committees on whether 
each named person was on the blacklist, and if not, why not.290 
 Second, the amended statute directed the President to provide (and 
regularly update) the appropriate congressional committees with the name of any 
person the President thinks “knowingly engaged” in transferring (or facilitating 
the transfer) to Iran, or any Iranian, “goods or technologies he decides are likely to 
be used by Iran to commit serious human rights abuses against the people of 
Iran.”291  Whether it was “likely” an item would be put to abusive use or whether 
an abuse was “serious” might be unclear. 
 But, lest the President doubt what Congress intended with respect to 
“goods or technologies,” the legislature provided him with a non-exclusive list of 
examples: ammunition, batons, electroshock weapons, firearms, rubber bullets, 
spray (chemical or pepper), stun grenades, surveillance technology, tear gas, and 
water cannons.292  So, for instance, dual use items such as pepper spray, which 
some American runners carry for protection while training, was off limits.  The 
list was non-exclusive, as it had to be: an evil mind can turn everyday items like 
cigarettes or pliers into an instrument of repression, so better to be potentially 
over- than under-inclusive if the human rights facilitation prohibition is not to be 
easily circumvented.  The prohibition applied regardless of whether the 
engagement involved a formal contract, and its scope included services (e.g., 
consulting, engineering, hardware, or software) to support forbidden goods or 
technologies.293 
 Third, the amended statute directed the President to provide the 
appropriate congressional committees with a list (and updates to it) of persons he 
thinks “engaged in censorship.”294  By that, Congress meant they barred, restricted, 
or punished the freedom of expression, or limited access to the media (including, 
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288 Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 401(a), reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 735. 
289  Id. 
290  Id. § 401(b)(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 735.  Those 
committees were the Senate Foreign Relations and Banking, and House Foreign Affairs and 
Financial Services, Committees.  See id. § 401(b)(3)(A)-(B), reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 735-36. 
291  CISADA § 105A(b)(1), (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B), (b)(4), reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 713-14. 
292  Id. § 105A(b)(C), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 713. 
293  Id. § 105A(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(C), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, 
at 713. 
294  Id. § 105B(b)(1)-(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 714-15. 
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for instance, by jamming or manipulating international frequency signals).295  
Note that Congress did not preface the forbidden behavior with the adverb 
“knowingly.”  But, that preface was implicit.  Censors surely know what they are 
doing, i.e., why interfere with freedom of expression unless suppression of 
thought, word, and picture is the intended consequence? 
 The 2012 Act relied on the same individually targeted sanctions 
CISADA specified for human rights abusers.296  Hence, officials transferring 
goods, services, or technologies used for serious human rights abusers, or 
censoring the press, were subject to restrictions on their bank accounts and other 
property.  There was one exception to those sanctions, which concerned a 
particularly infamous recipient of torture instruments: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 
Corps.  If it was the transferee of a banned item, then any other sanction from the 
standard twelve-item menu (discussed below) under the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act 
(i.e., ILSA, as amended) as supplemented in 2010 by CISADA, also could be 
imposed on the transferor.297 
 
 
J. 9th: Five of Twelve Sanctions 
 
 The aforementioned amendments to the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act and 
2010 CISADA concerned forbidden transactions with Iran.  Beyond tightening the 
sanctions regime by making more transactions unlawful, the 2012 Iran-Syria Act 
heightened penalties for illegal conduct.  Instead of requiring the President to 
impose just three of nine sanctions on any person that knowingly engaged in a 
prohibited transaction, the 2012 Iran-Syria Act mandated imposition of 5 of 12 
punishments.298  In upping the penalties, Congress further restricted the discretion 
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295  See id. § 105B(b)(1)(A)-(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
715. 
296  See id. § 105A(c), B(a), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 714-15; 
see also Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 601(a)(3), (b)(1), 
(b)(2)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 736 (authorizing the President 
to use his IEEPA authority to implement penalties under sections 105A and 105B of 
CISADA as amended by the 2012 Act). 
297  See CISADA § 105A(c)(2)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
714. 
298  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 5(a)(1)(A) (concerning development of 
petroleum resources), 5(a)(2)(A) (concerning production of refined petroleum products), 
5(a)(3)(A) (concerning exportation of refined petroleum products to Iran), 5(a)(4)(A) 
(concerning joint ventures with Iran relating to developing petroleum resources), 5(a)(5)(A) 
(concerning support for the development of petroleum resources and petroleum products in 
Iran), 5(a)(6)(A) (concerning development of petrochemical products from Iran), 5(a)(7)(A) 
(concerning transportation of crude oil from Iran), 5(a)(8)(A) (concerning concealment of 
Iranian origin of crude oil and refined petroleum products), 5(b)(1) (concerning exports, 
transfers, or transshipments of goods, services, or technology relating to WMD or advanced 
conventional weapons), 5(b)(2)(A) (concerning joint ventures relating to mining, 
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of the President, thereby asserting more control over American trade policy 
toward Iran. 
 That is, Congress compelled the President to impose five, not just three, 
sanctions.  But, it gave the President three more options from which to choose.  
Accordingly, the sanctions menu under the 2012 Iran-Syria Act contained the 
same nine items as those under the 1996 ILSA and 2010 CISADA scheme: 
 
(1) Export Financing Sanction,299 
(2) Export License Sanction,300 
(3) American Bank Loans Sanction,301 
(4) Primary Dealer and Repository Sanctions,302 
(5) Government Procurement Sanction,303 
(6) Foreign Exchange Sanction,304 
(7) Inter-bank Transactions Sanction,305 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
production, or transportation of uranium), further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights At of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 688-94.  
That the changes discussed were made by the 2012 Iran-Syria Act may be 
inferred from the facts that mandating imposition of five of nine sanctions was not in the 
2010 CISADA, and such a mandate would have been unlikely to be included in section 
1245 or Sub-Title D, as those 2012 laws both were simply National Defense Authorizations. 
299  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(1), amended by CISADA, reprinted 
in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(1), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 697. 
300  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(2), amended by CISADA, reprinted 
in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(2), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 697. 
301  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(3), amended by CISADA, reprinted 
in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(3), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 697. 
302  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(4)(A)-(B), amended by CISADA, 
reprinted in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 
6(a)(4)(A)-(B), further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 697. 
303  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(5), amended by CISADA, reprinted 
in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(5), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 698. 
304  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(6), amended by CISADA, reprinted 
in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(6), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 698. 
305  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(7), amended by CISADA, reprinted 
in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(7), 
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(8) Property Transaction Sanction, and306 
(9) Additional Sanctions307 
 
Plus, the 2012 legislation added the following three new punishment choices. 
 
(10) Equity or Debt Investment Sanction:308 
 
 First, the President could bar any United States person (natural or legal) 
from buying “significant amounts” of the equity or debt of a sanctioned 
person.  So, hypothetically, if the Japanese multinational electronics 
corporation, Panasonic, were a sanctioned person, then the President 
could prohibit American individuals or firms from investing in Panasonic 
stock or bonds.  (Whether he could compel divestment was uncertain, but 
not an option expressly listed in the menu.)  
 
(11) Corporate Officer Exclusion Sanction:309 
 
 Second, the President could exclude corporate officers.  In particular, he 
could order the Department of Homeland Security to deny issuance of a 
visa to visit the United States to any officer, principal, or shareholder 
with a controlling interest in a sanctioned person. 
 
 To illustrate, consider a modified version of the facts in United States v. 
Kaiga, a 2013 criminal case involving export control violations. 310  
Suppose the allegations in the Kaiga criminal complaint by the United 
States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois are true: a 
Belgian businessman, living in Brussels, and affiliated with the Belgian 
company Industrial Metal and Commodities (IMC) shipped 7075 T6 
aluminum tubes with an outside diameter of 4.125 inches and an ultimate 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 698. 
306  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(8), amended by CISADA, reprinted 
in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(8), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 698. 
307  Compare Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(9), amended by CISADA, reprinted 
in OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1141, with Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(12), 
further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 698. 
308  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(9), further amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 698. 
309  See id. § 6(a)(10), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 698. 
310  Plea, 13 C.R. 00531 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2013). 
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tensile strength of 572 megapascals.311  These tubes are used in aerospace 
products, and are controlled items for nuclear non-proliferation purposes 
under the Export Administration Act and International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act.  The Belgian businessman did not obtain an 
export license as the shipment was from the tube supplier in Schaumburg, 
Illinois, to IMC in Brussels; none was needed for shipments to Brussels.  
In fact, the tubes were shipped from Schaumburg to a front company in 
Malaysia that was operated by a party with ties to Iran.  This shipment 
violated American export control regulations because a license is needed 
for shipments to Malaysia. 
 
 Suppose the party with ties to Iran arranged for the tubes to be sent from 
Malaysia to Iran.  Consequently, the Belgian businessman also violated 
American trade prohibitions against Iran. Assume IMC and the 
Malaysian intermediary also are found liable.  Under the corporate 
officer exclusion sanction, any officer, principal, or controlling 
shareholder in IMC or the Malaysian intermediary – the sanctioned 
persons – could be barred from obtaining a visa to the United States.  
Note that the 2012 legislation did not define “controlling” in a rigid 
fashion.  So a 51 percent shareholder might be considered to control IMC, 
but – given a more diffuse pattern of shareholding in the intermediary – 
perhaps a 15 percent stake would suffice. 
 
(12) Principal Executive Officer Sanction:312 
 
 Third, the President could impose any of the aforementioned 11 
sanctions on high-ranking officials working for a sanctioned person.  
Such officials included “the principal executive officer or officers, or . . . 
persons performing similar functions and with similar authorities as such 
officer or officers.”  This sanction was not tied to formal business titles, 
but rather targeted individuals with decision-making authority.  The idea 
was that none of them should feel safe with the thought that they, 
personally, did not engage in prohibited conduct with Iran.  All that 
mattered is they held an important post with an entity that did. 
 
 So, for example, in the above hypothetical based on the Kaiga case, 
consider the predicament of colleagues of the Belgian businessman 
working for IMC.  They could be sanctioned, as could senior officers in 
the Malaysian intermediary. 
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311  See Michael Bologna, Importer Charged in Scheme to Ship Controlled Aluminum 
Sources to Iran, 30 INT’L TRADE REP. 1731 (2013). 
312  See Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 6(a)(11), further amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 698. 
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Collectively, the three new sanctions pertained to corporate finance and officials.  
Their thrust was to strangle the Iranian economy by scaring individuals who might 
invest in or work for companies that did business with Iran.  Put differently, they 
were an extension of the American strategy of imposing a secondary boycott on 
Iran, with this extension addressing private parties. 
 
 
K. 10th: Arguably Tougher Waiver Criteria 
 
 The 2012 Act altered the criteria under which the President could waive 
the imposition of sanctions.  Until that Act, the President could do so for any 
illegal transaction with Iran if he determined it was “necessary to the national 
interest” to do so.313  Prior law did not clarify how long the waiver would last and 
did not give explicit authority to renew the waiver.  The 2012 Act explicitly 
limited any waiver to one year, and concomitantly allowed for renewals of up to 
one year on a case-by-case basis.314 
 The Act also bifurcated the substantive waiver criteria according to the 
type of prohibited conduct that occurred.  Suppose that conduct concerned the 
energy sector of Iran.  Then, the President could waive sanctions if it was 
“essential to the national security interests of the United States” to do so.315  
However, suppose the transgression was helping Iran develop WMDs or advanced 
military capabilities by Iran.  Then, the President could waive sanctions if it was 
“vital to the national security interests” of America.316 
 What is the difference between “essential” and “vital”?  The Act did not 
answer that question.  Arguably, helping Iran acquire a WMD was an even more 
serious violation than investing in its energy sector, or trading in its energy 




313  Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 9(c)(1), amended by CISADA, reprinted in 
OVERVIEW, PART II, supra note 19, at 1145. 
314  Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 § 9(c)(1)(C), further amended by Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 702. 
315 Id. § 9(c)(1)(A), further amended by Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human 
Rights Act of 2012, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 702. 
316  Id. § 9(c)(1)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 702. 
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X. PHASE 10: 2013 DEFENSE ACT TIGHTENING ENERGY, SHIPPING, 
AND FINANCIAL SANCTIONS, PLUS SHIPBUILDING, PORT, AND 
PRECIOUS METAL SANCTIONS 
 
A. Novel Link Between Iranian Human Rights Abuses and American 
National Security  (January 2, 2013 Through December 31, 2016) 
 
The Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 was the final 
legislation against Iran before the November 2013 to January 2014 preliminary 
nuclear agreement.  This legislation was Sub-Title D of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (2013 Budget Act).317  Thus, like the 2012 
Budget Act, it tacked on sanctions against Iran to a defense appropriation bill, as 
doing so minimizes difficulties with congressional passage vis-à-vis a stand-alone 
measure concerning Iran.318  In the 2013 Budget Act, the 113th Congress stressed 
the third and newest of its three rationales for the sanctions regime: fighting 
human rights abuses.319 
 Congress expressly linked “the interests of the United States and 
international peace” to the “threat” of the “ongoing and destabilizing actions of 
the Government of Iran, including its massive, systematic, and extraordinary 
violations of the human rights of its own citizens.”320  That linkage was novel: 
Congress had not tied those violations to American national security in prior 
sanctions legislation.  Why exactly those violations might undermine that security 
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317  See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Sub-Title D of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 §§ 1241-55, reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 736-48.  Section 1241 sets out the short title. 
318 IEEPA penalties applied to actual or attempted conspiracies to violate the 2013 
Defense Act, and the Act did not limit the authority of the President to apply yet more 
sanctions on Iran.  See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 §§ 1253(a)-(b), 
1255, reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 748.  But, sanctions under section 
1254 of the 2013 Act do not apply to: 
 
(i) [T]he Shah Deniz natural gas field in Azerbaijan’s sector of the 
Caspian Sea and related pipeline projects, (ii) projects that provide 
Turkey and European countries energy security and independence from 
Russia and Iran, or (iii) projects initiated before August 10, 2012, 
pursuant to a production-sharing agreement entered into with, or a 
license granted by, a government other than Iran’s before August 10, 
2012. This is the same exception for natural gas projects found in ITRA 
[the 2012 Iran-Syria Act] Section 603(a). 
 
Baker & McKenzie, U.S. Congress Enacts Additional Sanctions Against Iran, LEXOLOGY 
(Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1dbeb762-9695-4817-
88a8-f0130cf20844.  
319  For a chart of the sessions of Congress distributed by Indiana University, see 
Guide: Congressional Session Chart, supra note 7. 
320  See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 § 1243(a).  
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any more than human rights abuses in China was not entirely certain, but 
constructing a cogent argument was not difficult.  Assume Iranian liberals and 
reformists are less interested in developing a WMD or sponsoring terrorists than 
their opponents, yet suppose the opponents crush their democratic movement.  
The victorious hardliners may have free rein to threaten America and its allies 
with a nuclear weapon or by funding terrorist causes. 
 Thus, via the 2013 Budget Act, Congress sought to impede the ability of 
the Iranian government to “oppress the people of Iran and to use violence and 
executions against pro-democracy protestors and regime opponents,” “jam or 
otherwise obstruct international satellite broadcast signals,” and bolster the ability 
of those people to secure “basic freedoms that build the foundation for the 
emergence of a freely elected, open, and democratic political system.”321 
 
 
B. Energy, Shipping, Shipbuilding, and Port Prohibition 
 
 Congress ordered the President to block all transactions in property or 
property interests located in, or coming into, the United States, or under the 
control of a United States person, of any person connected to the Iranian energy, 
shipping, or shipbuilding sectors, or to any Iranian port, or of any Iranian or 
sanctioned person knowingly helping such a person.322  Further, the President had 
to impose five sanctions from the standard menu (discussed above) on such a 
person.323  Congress also designated any entity that operated a port in Iran, 
including the NIOC, NITC, and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), 
as “entities of proliferation concern.”324  Finally, Congress instructed the President 
to bar (or impose strict conditions on) any correspondent account or PTA in the 
United States of any foreign financial institution that conducts “significant 
financial transaction” for the sale, supply, or transfer of energy, shipping, or 
shipbuilding goods or services in Iran, including for ultimate use by the NIOC, 
NITC, and IRISL.  Congress allowed a limited exception to the prohibition for 
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321  See id. § 1243(b). 
322  See id. § 1244(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A)-(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 738-39.  Such “help” could take the form of material, financial, technological, or 
other goods, services, or support to such a person.  See id. § 1244(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A)-(B), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 738-39.  Iranian or other blocked persons 
did not include Iranian banks that had not already been designated for the imposition of 
sanctions.  See id. § 1244(c)(2)(iii)-(3), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
739.  Importation of goods was not sanctionable under this measure.  See id. § 
1244(c)(1)(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 739. 
323  See id. § 1244(d)(1)(A), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 739.  
Importation of goods was not sanctionable under this measure. See id. § 1244(d)(1)(B), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 739. 
324  Id. § 1244(b), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 738.  
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humanitarian aid (food, pharmaceuticals, or medical devices) to Iran,325 and a 
waiver of sanctions if “vital to . . . [American] national security” and justified in a 
report to the appropriate congressional committees.326 
 Simply put, Congress yet again tightened the noose around Iranian 
energy, shipping, and banking, and created a new noose around Iranian 
shipbuilding and ports.  Why did it do so?  The answer is that notwithstanding its 
aforementioned re-affirmation of support for human rights causes in Iran, 
Congress stuck to its two long-standing policy justifications for the sanctions: 
deterrence with respect to a WMD and terrorism. In the 2013 Act, Congress 
explicitly found: 
 
(1) Iran’s energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors and Iran’s 
ports are facilitating the Government of Iran’s nuclear 
proliferation activities by providing revenue to support 
proliferation activities. 
 . . . . 
(5) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010) 
recognizes the “potential connection between Iran’s 
revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of 
Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.” 
 
(6) The National Iranian Tanker Company is the main carrier 
for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-designated 
National Iranian Oil Company and a key element in the 
petroleum supply chain responsible for generating energy 
revenues that support the illicit nuclear proliferation 
activities of the Government of Iran.327 
 
These findings helped shape the new prohibitions and attendant penalties it 
established. 
 Despite sanctions from the 1996 ILSA, 2010 CISADA, and amendments 
wrought by the 2012 Iran-Syria Act and 2012 Defense Act, support for the energy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
325  Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 § 1244(e), reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 740.  The 2013 Defense Act also provided an exception 
linked to section 1245 of the 2013 Defense Act, namely, the new prohibition and attendant 
penalties applied to buying petroleum and petroleum products from Iran if the President 
determined that third country sources of these items were in sufficient quantities at 
reasonable prices so as to permit third country buyers to “reduce significantly” sourcing 
them from Iran.  Id. § 1244(g)(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 740.  
This exception meant the President had to monitor global petroleum and petroleum product 
market conditions, in addition to global crude oil supply and demand conditions thanks to 
the 2012 Defense Act. 
326  See id. § 1244(i)(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 741. 
327  See id. § 1244(a)(1), (5)-(6), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
738. 
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and shipping sectors was getting through to Iran.  Some of that assistance came 
from Iran’s own shipbuilding and port facilities, which thanks to repairs and 
upgrades could be used by the likes of the NITC to transport NIOC crude oil.  The 
sale proceeds could be used for a nuclear bomb or diverted to Hezbollah.  Put 
simply, Congress moved to plug holes in the vertical supply chain, which started 
with its ban on FDI in energy exploration in 1996 and expanded to downstream 
petroleum products in 2010 and to financing and insurance for energy transactions 
in 2012.  
 
 
C. Precious Metals Prohibition 
 
 Energy, shipping, and shipbuilding were not the only sectors, nor were 
ports the only routes, through which Iran and its Revolutionary Guard Corps 
obtained funds, goods, or services for possible use to acquire a WMD, sponsor 
terrorists, abuse human rights, or censor the press.  Global commodities markets 
(other than energy) afforded another opportunity.  Iran or the Guard could barter 
or swap gold, silver, or other precious metals for such purposes.  For instance, it 
could exchange aluminum with a dealer in Johannesburg, South Africa, to acquire 
gold, which it then could list as an asset in its national balance sheet,328 and 
possibly then use that gold as payment for guidance systems for ballistic missiles. 
 Indeed, holding seven percent of total global mineral reserves,329 Iran had 
an incentive to do so: to skirt the American sanctions against the Iranian financial 
sector, which made electronic transfers of funds illegal.  That Iran did so may be 
inferred from Congress opting to identify in the 2013 Defense Act a new kind of 
forbidden transaction with Iran: selling, supplying, or transferring, directly or 
indirectly, a commodity in any one of three broad categories: 
 
(1) Any “precious metal.”330 
(2) Certain raw or semi-finished metals, specifically, “graphite, raw or 
semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal (including 
coking, fuel, or metallurgical coal),331 and software for integrating 
industrial processes.”332  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
328  See id. § 1245(e)(1)(B), (h), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
743 (concerning the definition of “national balance sheet of Iran” as the ratio of 
government assets to liabilities, and its listing of precious metals and other minerals as 
assets). 
329  See Mining in Iran, COUNTRY MINE, http://www.infomine.com/ 
countries/iran.asp; GLENN E. CURTIS & ERIC HOOGLUND, IRAN: A COUNTRY STUDY xxvii, 
178-80 (5th ed. 2008) (concerning the Iranian mining industry, including aluminum). 
330  See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 § 1245(a)(1)(A), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 736-37. 
331  See id. § 1242(a)(3), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 737. 
332  See id. § 1245(a)(1)(B), (d), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
742-43. 
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(3) “Any other material” in the second category that Iran uses for its 
energy, shipping, or shipbuilding sectors, for any economic sector 
controlled by the Corps, or for its “nuclear, military, or ballistic 
missile programs.”333 
 
Any person that knowingly (i.e., that knew or should have known about their 
conduct)334 transacted in these commodities with Iran was subject to five sanctions 
from the standard list.335 
 Likewise, Congress forbade any foreign financial institution from 
opening a correspondent account or PTA that the institution knew was used to 
facilitate a “significant financial transaction” associated with a sanctionable sale, 
supply, or transfer of precious metals or other listed commodities.336  In other 
words, what Congress barred was both underlying transactions in those items, and 
payments for such deals.  Only if a person or financial institution “exercised due 
diligence” to eschew commodity transactions and payments, could the President 
exempt them from otherwise mandatory penalties.337  And only if it were “vital” 
to American national security could the President waive these prohibitions.338 
 
 
D. Three Reinforcements of Existing Prohibitions 
 
 In the 2013 Defense Act, Congress buttressed three existing prohibitions 
and attendant sanctions.  First, to strengthen the precious metals prohibition and 
the prohibition concerning the Iranian energy, shipping, shipbuilding sectors, and 
its ports, Congress supplemented rules from the 2012 Iran-Syria Act against 
providing underwriting, insurance, or reinsurance services to Iran.  Congress 
expressly banned provisions of those services in any way that might benefit those 
sectors or ports, or help Iran transact in precious metals.  Any person knowingly 
doing so was subjected to five or more penalties from the sanctions menu.339  This 
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333  See id. § 1245(a)(1)(C)(i)(I)-(III), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, 
at 742. 
334  See id. § 1242(a)(9), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 737. 
335  See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 § 1245(a), reprinted in 
2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 741-42.  The prohibited conduct covered re-sales, re-
supplies, or re-transfers, for example, through an intermediary that is a sanctioned person to 
an end user in Iran, like the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps.  See id. § 1245(a)(1)(C)(ii), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 742. 
336  Id. § 1242(c), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 742. 
337  See id. § 1245(f), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 743. 
338  Id. § 1245(g)(1)(A), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 743.  If 
the President chose to exercise this waive discretion, then – as with other provisions in the 
sanctions regime – he was obliged to provide a written justification to the appropriate 
congressional committees, possibly with a classified Annex.  See id. § 1245(g)(1)(B), 
reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 743. 
339  See id. § 1246(a)(1)(A), (B)(i)-(ii), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 
11, at 743-44.  The prohibition also applied to underwriting or reinsurance services for any 
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expanded denial of Iranian access to shipping insurance posed yet another 
challenge for the Islamic Republic to overcome in order to arrange for carriage of 
goods to its shores. 
 Second, to ostracize Iran further from global financial services, Congress 
clarified that it was illegal for a foreign financial institution to open a 
correspondent account or PTA in the United States, if that institution “knowingly 
facilitated a significant financial transaction” for any proscribed Iranian person or 
sanctioned entity.340  The mandatory penalty for running afoul of this bar was the 
familiar five-of-nine punishments selected by the President.341  Here again, along 
with a humanitarian assistance exception, a third country short supply exception 
existed for financial transactions associated with petroleum or petroleum products, 
if the President determined the price and supply conditions did not allow for such 
countries to eschew significant sourcing from Iran.342 
 Though technically convoluted, a noteworthy exception existed for a 
foreign financial institution that facilitated: 
 
(1) Financial transactions pertaining to goods and services,343 or natural 
gas exports to or imports from Iran, which were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
person sanctioned under the IEEPA that helped Iran acquire WMDs or support terrorism, or 
any other Iranian or blocked person listed by OFAC (excluding Iranian financial 
institutions not sanctioned).  See id. § 1246(a)(1)(B)(iii)-(C), (a)(2), (b), reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 744. 
 Here, too, exceptions existed for (1) humanitarian exports to Iran, and (2) any 
person exercising due diligence to avoid the forbidden behavior, and there was Presidential 
waiver authority on the ground of “vital . . . national security” interest if justified to 
appropriate congressional committees.  See id. § 1246(c)-(e), reprinted in 2013 
COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 745.  An exception also existed with respect to the bar, 
under section 6(a)(8) of the 1996 ISA, against any person from importing property within 
the jurisdiction of the United States in which a sanctioned person had an interest: such 
importation was not subject to the revised underwriting and insurance measure.  See id. § 
1246(a)(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 744. 
340  See Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 § 1247(a)-(b), reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 741-45.  OFAC maintained the list of proscribed 
persons, which as per the Section title were called “Specially Designated Nationals” or 
“SDNs.” 
341  See id. § 1247(a), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 745.  
Congress provided the President with the familiar waiver authority on the basis of “vital . . . 
national security” interests, with a justification to appropriate congressional committees.  Id. 
§ 1247(f)(1)-(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 747. 
342  See id. § 1247(c)-(d)(1), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 746.  
343  If the underlying commercial transaction involved goods or services other than 
natural gas, then to qualify for the exception, a foreign financial institution also had to be 
from a country holding primary regulatory authority over it that the President had certified, 
under the 2012 Defense Act, had significantly reduced or stopped crude oil purchases from 
Iran.  See id. § 1247(d)(2)(A), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 746 
(containing the additional qualification); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2012 § 1245(d)(4)(D)(i), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 719.  In 
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(2) Not subject to American sanctions, and were 
(3) Conducted directly between Iran and a third country with primary 
regulatory authority over the foreign financial institution, as long as 
(4) That institution credited any funds owed to Iran to an account in the 
third country.344 
 
This intriguing exception presumably preserved both a modicum of bilateral trade 
between third countries and Iran, and denial of access by Iran to any cash from 
such trade. 
 For instance, the San Francisco, California branch of Hanmi Bank (HB) 
could open or maintain a correspondent account or PTA for the benefit of Iran, 
under the aforementioned conditions.345  But, to avoid American sanctions, HB 
would have to credit funds to the Iranian beneficiary to an account in South Korea, 
because South Korea is the country holding primary regulatory authority over HB.  
In effect, the exception forces a change in the location of the beneficiary’s bank 
from any country in the world to the foreign bank’s primary regulatory 
jurisdiction. 
 Third, Congress reinforced sanctions motivated by its human rights 
concerns.  It ordered the President to penalize the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting (IRIB), including specifically its President, Ezzatollah Zargami.  It 
did so because IRIB and its President had “contributed to the infringement of 
individuals’ human rights by broadcasting forced televised confession and show 
trials,” thus “clear[ly] violat[ing] . . . international law with respect to the right to 
a fair trial and due process.”346  The mandatory penalties were those set forth in 
CISADA for human rights abuses, including IEEPA penalties, visa denials, and 
asset freezes, as well as OFAC blacklisting.347  
 
 
XI. NECESSARY, BUT NOT SUFFICIENT? 
 
 Six American Presidents and sixteen sessions of Congress, spanning 
nearly forty years, pursued a sanctions-based policy toward Iran.  For most of that 
period, the results were plain enough: no change in behavior and deepened distrust, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
other words, to avoid sanctions on their banks, third countries had to prove to the American 
President they tried to, or did, get oil from anywhere, but Iran. 
344  See id. § 1247(d)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), (e)(1)-(2), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra 
note 11, at 746. 
345  See HANMI BANK, https://www.hanmi.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2014); San 
Francisco, HANMI BANK, https://www.hanmi.com/about/branches/northern-california/san-
francisco (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
346  Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 § 1248(a)(1)-(2), reprinted 
in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 747. 
347  See id. § 1248(b)(1)(A)-(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 
747.  An exception to the requirement to impose sanctions existed for importation of goods. 
See id. § 1248(b)(1)(A)-(B), reprinted in 2013 COMPILATION, supra note 11, at 747. 
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even hatred.  The “Great Satan” piled on sanctions.  The “Evil Āyatollāhs” kept 
the centrifuges spinning, and even managed to procure more of them. 
 Then, on November 24, 2013, Iran agreed to a historic preliminary 
accord with the United States and five other signatories (collectively called the “P-
5+1”), the five permanent United Nations Security Council members (China, 
France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States), plus an additional European 
country (Germany). 348   Israel dubbed the accord a “historic mistake.” 349 
Nonetheless, these countries subsequently elaborated on this Joint Plan of Action, 
also called the Geneva Interim Agreement or simply the Iran Nuclear Deal, and 
began its implementation on January 20, 2014.350  The Deal had an initial lifespan 
of six months. 
 The following Table summarizes the key points of the Plan, listing what 
Iran “gave” and what it “got.”  Can it be inferred from the agreement that the 
sanctions worked?  Were they both necessary and sufficient, first, in wrecking the 
economy of Iran, and second, in leaving Iran no choice but to agree to the Plan? 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
348  See Iran Nuclear Deal: Joint Plan of Action – Full Text, GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/24/iran-nuclear-deal-joint-
plan-action [hereinafter Joint Plan of Action].  Given that there are three European Union 
countries (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), the P5+1 sometimes is referred to 
as the “E3+3” or “E3/EU +3.”  See id.; Laura Smith-Spark & Jim Sciutto, “Substantive” 
Talks over Iran’s Nuclear Program, CNN (Oct. 16, 2013), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/16/world/meast/iran-nuclear-talks/index.ht ml?hpt=hp_t3. 
349  Iran Nuclear Deal Makes Mid-East Peace Safer Place – Kerry, BBC NEWS (Nov. 
24, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25078961. 
350  The timetable for implementation was set in a January 2014 accord, which was 
not publicly released, and reportedly contained an informal addendum that was secret.  See 
Paul Richter, New Iran Agreement Includes Secret Side Deal, Tehran Official Says, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-iran-nuclear-
side-deal-20140113,0,4116168.story#axzz2rLwaPbUK. 
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Table: Synopsis of Iran Nuclear Deal351 
 
What Iran “Gave” 
(What the United States “Got”) 
What Iran “Got” 
(What the United States “Gave”) 
Conversion of Existing Stockpile of Highly Enriched Uranium352 
From its existing Uranium enriched to 20 
percent (that is, 20 percent Uranium 
Hexafluoride, UF6), Iran dilutes (blends 
down) half the 20 percent Uranium to no 
more than 5 percent purity.353  There is no 
line for reconversion. 
 
Once the line for conversion of UF6 enriched 
up to 5 percent purity to Uranium Dioxide 
(UO2) is ready, Iran converts the 5 percent 
newly enriched Uranium to oxide UF6, in 
accordance with a schedule of the conversion 
plant declared to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). 
From its existing Uranium enriched 
to 20 percent, Iran retains the other 
half as working stock of 20 percent 
oxide for fabrication of fuel for the 
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). 
Further Enrichment354 
Iran does not enrich Uranium over 5 percent 
purity. 
 
Iran also does not add any Uranium at the 3.5 
percent enrichment level or higher to its 
current stock.355 
Iran continues its safeguarded 
research and development (R&D), 
including enrichment R&D 
practices that are not designed to 
accumulate enriched Uranium. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
351  The Joint Plan of Action is rather sketchy, and credible published analyses of its 
details are limited.  Hence, the table draws on following additional sources to fill in certain 
details about provisions of the Plan.  See Kelsey Davenport, Iran, Implementation of the 
Joint Plan of Action at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.armscontrol.org/taxonomy/term/10/0; Geneva Interim Agreement on Iran 
Nuclear Program, WIKIPEDIA, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva_interim_agreement_on_ 
Iranian_nuclear_program (last visited Apr. 4, 2014); Uranium Oxide, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_oxide (last visited Apr. 4, 2014); Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fuel_cycle#Enrichment (last visited Apr. 
4, 2014); Additional Protocol, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Additional_Protocol#Additional_Protocol (last visited Apr. 4, 
2014); Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_Nonproliferation_Treaty (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
352  See Joint Plan of Action, supra note 348, at 1-2. 
353  At the 5 percent purity level, uranium can be enriched for nuclear fuel, but not 
weapons, purposes.  See Hossein Mousavian, It Was Not Sanctions that Brought Tehran to 
the Table, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2013, at 11.  The concentration of 5 percent is suitable for 
operating a nuclear power station.  At higher degrees of refinement, uranium serves in the 
core of a nuclear warhead.  See Parisa Hafezi & Justyna Pawlak, Breakthrough Deal Curbs 
Iran’s Nuclear Activity, REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 
11/24/us-iran-nuclear-idUSBRE9AI0CV20131124. 
354  See Joint Plan of Action, supra note 348, at 1. 






Iran does not make any further advances of 
activities at its: 
(1) Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, 
(2) Fordow Enrichment Facility, or  
(3) Arak reactor (which the IAEA 
designated as IR-40).357 
 
In particular, with respect to Natanz and 
Fordow, Iran: 
(1) Leaves inoperable 50 percent of the 
centrifuges at Natanz, 
(2) Does not install, or prepare for 
installation, any new centrifuges for 
Uranium enrichment at Natanz.358 
(3) Leaves inoperable 75 percent of the 
centrifuges a Fordow,359 and 
(4) Does not use its more sophisticated IR-
2 centrifuges for Uranium enrichment. 
 
With respect to Arak, Iran does not: 
(1) Commission this reactor. 
Enrichment Capacity: 
 
Iran may manufacture items for its 
nuclear facilities off of the premises 
of those facilities, but it may not 
install any such items into the 
facilities. 
 
At Natanz and Fordow, Iran may 
replace existing centrifuges with 
centrifuges of the same type.360 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
355  Uranium purified to 3.5 percent or below is considered low enriched.  There’s a 
Chink of Hope, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 2013, at 51-52. 
356  See Joint Plan of Action, supra note 348, at 2. 
357 Natanz and Fordow are underground Uranium enrichment facilities, with Fordow 
beneath a mountain.  Geoff Dyer & John Reed, Iran’s Arak Plant Reveals Depth of Distrust, 
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2013, at 6; Roula Khalaf, Lionel Barber, Najmeh Bozorgmehr & 
Geoff Dyer, Rouhani Takes Tough Nuclear Line, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2013, at 1.  The heavy 
water reactor at Arak has been called “the second string of Iran’s [nuclear] program,” 
because it “has the potential to produce plutonium for a bomb” – possibly 5-10 kilograms 
“of weapons-grade plutonium, enough for a nuclear weapon every year.”  Dyer & Reed, 
note 357.  If that were to occur, then it would be “invulnerable” to the kind of military 
attack the Israelis successfully conducted against the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 
and a facility in Syria in 2007.  Id.  That is because, even though Arak is above ground, 
once it is loaded with nuclear fuel, it cannot be destroyed without causing tremendous 
damage to surrounding areas, as occurred with respect to Chernobyl in 1986.  In sum, the 
Arak facility, which had been projected to be operational in late 2014, was “an alternative, 
plutonium, path to creating the fissile material for a nuclear bomb.”   There’s a Chink of 
Hope, supra note 355. 
358  See Joint Plan of Action, supra note 348, at 2 n.1. 
359  This provision is set out in the Joint Plan of Action, id. at 2 n.2, which states that 
at Fordow, Iran will not further enrich over 5 percent at four cascades currently enriching 
Uranium, but not increase their enrichment capacity, and not feed UF6 into the other twelve 
cascades, which are to remain non-operative. 
360  See id. at 4 nn.1-2. 
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(2) Make or transfer fuel or heavy water to 
the site of the reactor. 
(3) Test additional fuel, or produce more 
fuel, for the reactor. 
(4) Install remaining components in the 
reactor. 
 
Iran does add any new facilities for 
enrichment. 
 
Iran does not reprocess Uranium, or 
construct a facility capable of reprocessing. 
Enhanced Monitoring (International Inspections)361 
Iran provides (within three months of the 
January 2014 implementation) specific 
information to the IAEA, including: 
(1) its plans for nuclear facilities, 
(2) descriptions of each building on each 
nuclear site, including the design 
details of the Arak reactor, and of the 
scale of operations for each location 
engaged in specified nuclear activities, 
and 
(3) data on uranium mines and mills, and 
source material. 
 
Iran submits to the IAEA an updated DIQ for 
the Arak reactor. 
 
Iran agrees with the IAEA on steps for a 
“Safeguards Approach” for the Arak reactor. 
 
At Natanz and Fordow, Iran grants daily 
access to IAEA inspectors when inspectors 
are not present for the purpose of Design 
Information Verification, Interim Inventory 
Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, 
or unannounced inspections, so that 
inspectors may obtain offline surveillance 
records. 
 
Also at certain sites at Natanz and Fordow, 
Iran permits twenty-four hour surveillance 
cameras. 
 
Iran grants managed access to IAEA 
Consistent with Iran’s plans, it may 
produce centrifuges for the purpose 
of replacing damaged machines.362 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
361  See id. at 2. 
362  See id. at 2 n.4. 




(1) centrifuge assembly workshops, 
(2) centrifuge rotor production workshops 
and storage facilities, and, 
(3) Uranium mines and mills. 
 
Iran responds to IAEA questions about 
possible military aspects of its nuclear 
program, and gives the IAEA data as part of 
the Additional Protocol (the model for which 
the IAEA established in 1997) that Iran is 
expected to sign with the IAEA.   
 
(Under an Additional Protocol to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, or 
NPT), the IAEA receives more information 
from the signatory country about its nuclear 
activities, including imports and exports, has 
enhanced inspection access rights including 
to suspected locations on short notice, and 
greater administrative flexibilities, including 
automatic visa renewals for its inspectors.) 
Sanctions Relief: Crude Oil and Related Insurance and Shipping363 
Overall, all forms of sanctions relief amount 
to roughly U.S. $7 billion.  Of that, $4.2 
billion are revenues from crude oil sales that 
are transferred to Iran in installments as Iran 
complies with its obligations under the Joint 
Plan of Action.364 
 
Iran could revive its sagging crude oil 
industry.  As of January 2014, Chinese state 
oil companies dominated the Iranian crude 
oil industry, and President Hassan Rouhani 
sought to attract large western energy 
multinationals to revive that industry, starting 
with a major address at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos, the first there by an Iranian 
President in ten years.365 
 
The United States (and European 
Union) pauses efforts to cajole third 
countries to significantly reduce, 
and ultimately cease, buying crude 
oil from Iran, and agrees those 
countries may maintain their current 
average amounts of Iranian oil.  In 
essence, the United States suspends 
its third country short supply 
measures. 
 
To facilitate third country oil sales, 
the United States (and European 
Union) also suspends sanctions on 
insurance and transportation for 
crude oil shipments. 
 
The United States (and European 
Union) also permits repatriation of 
an agreed amount of crude oil 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
363  See Joint Plan of Action, supra note 348, at 3. 
364  See Hafezi & Pawlak, supra note 353. 
365  See Gideon Rachman & Ajay Makan, Rouhani Tries to Lure Western Oil Majors 
to Iran, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2014, at 3. 
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revenue of Iran frozen in bank 
accounts overseas. 
Sanctions Relief: Petrochemical Products and Related Insurance and Shipping366 
 
The United States (and European 
Union) suspends sanctions against 
exports from Iran of petrochemical 
products, and on services related to 
those exports, namely, financial, 
insurance, and transportation 
sanctions.367 
Sanctions Relief: Precious Metals368 
Iran has access to U.S. $1.5 billion of 
revenues from gold and precious metal 
trade.369 
The United States (and European 
Union) suspends sanctions on 
precious metals (including gold), 
and on services related to 
transactions in precious metals 
involving Iran, namely, financial, 
insurance, and transportation 
sanctions. 
Sanctions Relief: Autos and Aircraft370 
 
The United States suspends 
sanctions against Iran with respect 
to auto and auto parts, and related 
financial, insurance, and 
transportation sanctions. 
 
The United States permits licensing 
for (1) export licensing of spare 
parts for safety of flight of Iranian 
civil aircraft (including, but not 
limited to, Iran Air),371 (2) 
installation services for these parts, 
and (3) repair and safety inspections 
services for those aircraft, and (4) 
suspends related financial, 
insurance, and transportation 
sanctions. 
Possible New Sanctions372 
 The American President will not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
366  See Joint Plan of Action, supra note 348, at 3. 
367  See id. at 3 n.5  (“associated services” are identified in a non-exclusive manner).   
368  See id. at 3. 
369  See Hafezi & Pawlak, supra note 353. 
370  See Joint Plan of Action, supra note 348, at 3. 
371  See id. at 3 n.6. 
372  See id. at 3. 
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impose any new nuclear-related 
sanctions, and will discourage 
Congress from imposing any such 
sanctions.373 
 
The European Union and United 
Nations Security Council also will 
refrain from imposing any new 
nuclear-related sanctions. 
Humanitarian Issues374 
Via the humanitarian financial channel, Iran 
can use its oil revenues frozen in overseas to 
acquire food and other agricultural products, 
medicine, medical devices, and to pay for 
medical expenses incurred outside Iran, and 
thereby fulfill some of its domestic needs. 
 
Also via this channel, Iran may make 
payments (1) for United Nations obligations, 
(2) to overseas universities hosting Iranian 
students for their tuition expenses (up to a 
defined threshold). 
The United States establishes a 
financial channel to facilitate trade 
with Iran for humanitarian 
purposes.  Only designated foreign 
banks, or non-sanctioned Iranian 
banks, may participate in the 
channel. 
 
(Similarly, the European Union 
increases its thresholds to an agreed 
level for which it authorizes non-




If asking whether statements of the players are to be believed, then the 
answer is “it depends who is asked.”  The American President said 
“unprecedented sanctions and tough diplomacy helped to bring Iran to the 
negotiating table.”375  The Iranian narrative was different: diplomacy mattered 
more than sanctions.376  Both sides can point to facts supporting their opposing 
views that sanctions were necessary and sufficient, or not, to pressure Iran 
economically so as to force it to bargain.  A fair assessment is the midpoint 
between the two perspectives: sanctions were a necessary, but not sufficient, cause 
to pressure Iran economically to sign the nuclear accord. 
 For the United States, it is true that sanctions helped wreck the Iranian 
economy.  The ever-growing number of transactions it forbids and the ever-larger 
number of attendant sanctions it created hurt Iran.  Before the tightening of 
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sanctions in 2012, the Iranian economy was “fragile.” 377   Following their 
tightening, the challenges worsened.  Numerous realities evinced the parlous state 
of Iran’s economy, including: 
 
(1) The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Iran shrank by 6 percent in 
2012, and another 5 percent in 2013.378  In the year up to October 
2013, GDP declined by 6 percent.379 
 
(2) The value of the Iranian rial relative to the U.S. dollar tumbled by 
over 50 percent between January 2012 and October 2013.380 
 
(3) In October 2013, Iran’s unemployment and inflation rates were 30 
and 40 percent, respectively381 – in effect, a monstrous combination 
of joblessness and price hikes called “stagflation.”  In January 2014, 
inflation had eased only to 36 percent.382 
 
(4)  In 2011 and 2012, Iran’s revenues from daily crude oil sales fell 60 
percent.383 
 
(5)  In 2011, Iran produced 3.5 million barrels of oil per day.384  In 
September 2013, that figure fell to the lowest level since 1989, just 
after the September 1980 to August 1988 Iran-Iraq War: 2.58 million 
barrels per day.  In 2012 alone, and through January 2014, Iran’s 
production of crude oil dropped from 3.7 to 2.7 million barrels per 
day.385  These drops were harbingers of a further fall in sales receipts. 
 
(6)  For decades, roughly U.S. $50 billion in Iranian funds have been 
frozen outside of Iran as a result of sanctions, i.e., Iran has not had 
access to a large sum of funds.386 
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(7) The Iranian travel and tourism market was “stagnant” between 2006 
and 2013, despite the country being “home to a treasure trove of 
antiquities and world class archaeological sites.”387 
 
Still, in evaluating whether sanctions truly caused the damage, it is important not 
to confuse correlation and causation, or over-attribute causation to one 
independent variable amidst others. 
 On the one hand, other intervening domestic and foreign variables may 
have contributed to Iran’s woes.  For example, there likely was self-inflicted 
damage caused by internal political upheaval and mass street protests (or the 
prospects thereof), which exacerbated an unpredictable, uncertain climate for 
business.  Assuredly, the global economic recession commenced in 2008 
dampened demand for Iran’s energy products and interest in investing in its 
energy sector.  On the other hand, the vicissitudes appear to follow the tightening 
of sanctions and tend to mount with the 2012 legislative changes.  It strains 
credibility to assert the long, strong arm of American justice had no effect in 
deterring prospective investors and traders from dealing with Iran.  Surely among 
the many that dearly wanted to, at least some calculated that the risk of detection 
and punishment offset any anticipated returns. 
 Conversely, for Iran, internal economic mismanagement and corruption 
also helped wreck the economy, along with a “suffocating security 
atmosphere.”388  That is, the sanctions hardly were the sole cause of Iranian woes. 
Even climate change played a role.  Global warming (along with neglectful 
government) helped diminish water supplies in qanats – trenches created 3,000 
years ago to irrigate Ancient Persia whereby water from aquifers beneath 
mountains flows across hundreds of miles.389  So, Iranian pistachio output has 
fallen. 
 Amidst self-inflicted wounds and shifts in Mother Nature was prideful 
determination: 
 
Contrary to the claims of some U.S. lawmakers and Israeli 
officials, sanctions only caused a dramatic rise in nuclear 
capability, as Tehran sought to show it would not respond to 
pressure.  Before, Iran was enriching uranium to below 5 
percent at one site with 3,000 centrifuges and possessed a 
minute stockpile of enriched uranium.  Today [i.e., four days 
before signing the Joint Action Plan], it is [enriched to] 20 
percent at two sites with 19,000 centrifuges.  It has a stockpile 
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of 8,000 kg of enriched uranium and more sophisticated 
centrifuges.390 
 
Moreover, of enormous significance to Iran’s participation in the Joint Action 
Plan were two points. 
 First, the United States “red line . . . changed from ‘no enrichment of 
uranium’ to ‘no nuclear bomb.’”391  That is, America ceased to insist Iran could 
not enrich uranium at all, which it had done up through 2005, when negotiations 
with Iran failed: 
 
In past negotiations, the U.S. demanded that some Iranian 
nuclear facilities should be closed in exchange for a modest 
reversal of sanctions.  But, this dialogue failed, partly because it 
was never made clear to Iran what kind of nuclear program it 
would retain in the long run.392 
 
The Joint Action Plan does commit the United States to recognizing the right of 
Iran to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.  Whether such a “right” exists in 
International Law itself may be a question.  Still, the accord “gave Iran de facto, if 
not explicit, recognition” to do so.393  So, in signing the deal, America pivoted to 
the narrower goal of denying Iran a nuclear weapon.  To be sure, the latter goal 
was the explicit one in American sanctions rules, so whether there was a change in 
substance or rhetoric is unclear.  But, at least from the perspective of Iran, there 
was a meaningful shift whereby it could enrich uranium for peaceful nuclear 
energy purposes and maintain its long-standing disinterest in a nuclear weapon. 
 Second, the election of Hassan Rouhani as President of Iran mattered.  
He sought “rapprochement” with America, Europe, and other countries. 394  
Generally, perhaps the new President, like an earlier predecessor, Mohamed 
Khatami (1943–, who was President from 1997-2005), understood the importance 
of Iran not being a pariah state in a globalized world, and sought to avoid a clash 
of civilizations.  Specifically, perhaps he embodied changes in style and substance 
in part to help bring about relief from the suffering inflicted on his people by the 
sanctions.  Softening Iran’s position in nuclear negotiations was necessary if 
America was to loosen the sanctions, which in turn was needed if the people who 
voted him into office in a “landslide” election were not to be disappointed.395  
That is, the causal chain may have been from (1) sanctions to (2) economic 
pressure to (3) the election of a moderate to (4) agreement from Iran’s Supreme 
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Leader, Āyatollāh Ali Khamenei to sign a deal.396  But that chain was by no means 
assured and the 2005 election of a hard liner before Mr. Rouhani, that is, of 
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, who was President until 2013, suggests a “rally around 
the flag” effect may have occurred amidst sanctions. 
 In sum, have American sanctions against Iran worked?  Have they caused 
economic pain to Iran that, in turn, caused a change in the behavior of the Iranian 
government in respect of its nuclear ambitions?  A resolute “no” is implausible. 
Iranians suffered economically.  But, an unqualified “yes” gives the Americans 
more credit than they deserve.  The sanctions regime was a work in progress, 
ultimately evolving into a tight noose; it was not a carefully designed and 
comprehensive regime from inception. 
 If the question of efficacy is about achieving policy goals, then the sure 
answer is indeterminate.  Whether the deal becomes a permanent one, and sees 
Iran without WMDs in the long run, is uncertain.  Moreover, nothing in the terms 
of the agreement address two of the three American justifications for sanctions: 
deterring Iran from sponsoring cross-border terrorism, and promoting human 
rights, including press freedom, in Iran.  In the context of entry into this 
agreement, the United States made a strategic decision to champion one policy 
goal, and set aside two others – at least for an indeterminate period. 
 Time will tell whether a sanctions regime that the most powerful nation 
in human history designed, and that evolved into the most comprehensive set of 
economic strictures on a foreign country in human history, was necessary and 
sufficient to achieve all of its purposes.  Until then, what is certain for as long as 
the prohibitions and penalties remain in place is that their sheer technical intricacy 
creates plenty of work for international trade lawyers. 
 As for America and Iran, if the two countries were individuals, then a 
psychologist surely would label their relationship dysfunctional, and recommend 
therapy.  Perhaps the sanctions-induced Joint Action Plan is the start of that 
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